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.A .. bstract 
This comparative study is focused on the relationships between the institutional 
environment and the development of the aerospace industry in Brazil and Canada. Based on 
the theories ofDouglass North and a madel designed by Jone Pearce (2001), we identified 
the governments of both countries as hostile or supportive as a consequence of their 
erratic or predictable actions towards the private sector. We also took into consideration 
the ability of each country to enforce their legal frameworks, a characteristic that will make 
a government weak or strong. In arder to compare two countries as distinct as Brazil and 
Canada, we selected six different aspects of the institutional framework of both countries 
that are essential to the development of high-technology sectors, such as aerospace: 
intellectual property rights; research & development; government procurement; investments 
in infrastructure and higher education; financing of extemal sales; and industry regulation 
(together with other aspects of the legal framework). Once we decided which aspects of the 
institutional environment were more important to the development of the aerospace 
industry in Brazil and Canada, we compared how those aspects impacted in the 
development of Embraer and Bombardier, the powerhouses of the industry in each country 
and two leading forces in the global aerospace market. 
Based on structured interviews with representatives of the Brazilian and Canadian 
governments, industry associations, private corporations, and scholars, we compared the 
government programs and actions that have the highest impact in the development of the 
aerospace sector and we point out which initiatives could serve as a madel in the further 
economie development of Brazil and Canada. 
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1.1 Institutions and Economie Development 
The purpose of this study is to investi gate how the actions of governments 
combined with the institutional environment of a given country can affect the development, 
behaviour and performance of independent organizations and contribute to the 
establisl:1ment and expansion of a specifie industry, contributing to the improvement of the 
social and economical conditions of the country. In our study, we compare the development 
of the aerospace sectors of Brazil and Canada and how their institutional frameworks 
contributed to the success of Embraer and Bombardier, two world-class, major players 
within the industry. 
Since its inception, aircraft manufacturing is a business that has been and still is 
highly connected to state support: military aircraft is of strategie importance to national 
defence policies; while civil aviation companies were created, in most cases, as state-run 
monopolies aimed at regional transportation and domestic integration- especially in 
continental countries like Brazil and Canada. In the specifie case of Brazil, the aerospace 
industry was never a priority until the 1950s: only after the World War II the Brazilian 
government came to understand the importance of aircraft manufacturing to the country's 
defence strategies. Embraer was created and received ali the necessary support from the 
~. ' government in the years of the military government, later establishing itself as a world 
leader in the regional jets market. In its turn, the Canadian aerospace industry benefited 
from its proximity to the United States, supplying finished aircraft and their systems and 
sub-systems to both civil and military operations to the neighbouring nation. Also, as a 
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Canada is in a privileged 
position to promote its military products, including those of the aerospace industry 
(Malerba and Mani, 2009; Celli Junior, 2010). 
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Governments also have a keen interest in the development of the aerospace industry 
as the sector is known for its massive investments in R&D, state of the art technology, and 
constant innovation. Economically, the industry is a strong source of revenues, both by 
means of the well-paid jobs it creates and the sales of its products and services. The high 
investments in R&D and innovation are usually replicated in other industrial sectors, 
generating more revenues to the country. Aerospace products are complex, sophisticated 
and expensive goods, and in the case of Brazil and Canada, they account for a considerable 
share oftheir exports and are of strategie importance to their foreign trade policies (Sherry 
and Sarsfield, 2002; Silva, 2008; Malerba and Mani, 2009). 
However rewarding the industry may be, international competition is tough and less 
than a dozen countries managed to develop a strong, competitive aerospace industry. As we 
present in this study, there are considerable barriers to entry in the industry and high 
financial risks associated with the development of every new mode! of an aircraft. In 
addition, aircraft are expensive products, with sales being often financed with the support 
of national governments. In this context, states can play a decisive role in the development 
and survival of national industries. A competitive national industry is considered to be part 
of the wealth-generating blood of a nation. The creation, revitalization, and decline of 
national industries both indicate and affect a country's economie health. Such is the 
importance of Bombardier and Embraer to Canada and Brazil that the financial support 
programs to the development and export oftheir aircraft generated a sour dispute between 
the countries within the World Trade Organization (WTO) starting in the 1990s (Griffiths 
and Zammuto, 2005; ABDI, 2008; Malerba and Mani, 2009, Celli Junior 2010). 
The government support to the economie development of a country can be usually 
seen as a reflection of its institutional framework. In his book American Indus trial Po licy, 
Nester (1997) poses the following questions: 
What is the govemment's proper role in the economy? Do free or managed markets best promote 
economie development? Who can best pick industrial winners and losers, the govemment or the 
private sector? 
2 
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According to Nester (1997), these questions are as old as the American Republic, 
and to this day, there is no consensus on whether governments should design policies that 
invested in education, infrastructure, the development of strategie industries, and the 
improvement of reciprocal trade relations with foreign countries in order to achieve 
economie development. On the ether hand, Thomas Jefferson was said to advocate "that the 
government that governs least governs best; markets rather than officiais should determine 
the nation's economie fate." As the debate never reached an agreement, the questions 
shifted over the years not to the issue ofwhether governments should develop the economy, 
but rather how and where it should do so. And at least over the last 200 years, governments 
have never been more active in defining to which directions the economy should go: they 
have enacted a series oftariffs, invested in major infrastructures such as roads, railways, 
airports, ports and canals; gave away public land to homesteaders and entrepreneurs; 
promoted or inhibited trade; conquered and developed new territories; imposed an income 
tax; passed antitrust laws; and experimented with central banks. It is undeniable that ali of 
these actions contributed to the economie development of sorne regions, industries, firms, 
technologies, families, and individuals more than ethers. The fact that national governments 
have been preoccupied with the generation of national competitive advantage is generally 
considered uncontroversial. It is a weil known fact that in advanced industrialized nations, 
hundreds of issues are addressed in a public po licy process every year. Such vast number of 
directives can easily create an environment ofuncertainty for economie organizations and 
may substantially increase the transaction costs of doing business (Nester, 1997; Hillman 
and Ritt, 1999; Griffiths and Zammuto, 2005). 
Every nation has policies aimed at its economie development. Industrial policies can 
be comprehensive or fragmented, and government officiais may or may not admit the 
practice. As industrial policies are hardly unique and are in fact, a tool virtually used by 
every government around the world, the theoretical starting point of our study is the works 
ofDouglass North (1990, 1991 , 2005) in which the author discusses the concepts of the 
"new institutional economies" and their implications on transaction costs and property 
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rights; and on public choice and political economies, for example. As we discuss it on 
Section 3.1- "The Perspectives ofDouglass North and Jone Pearce on New Institutional 
Economies," the institutional framework is essential to economie development as it 
provides a set of laws, rules, and regulations that will mediate the interrelations between the 
different agents of the political, economie and social systems. The focus of our study is on 
the institutional framework, as we understand that it is as important to the economie 
development as the classic industrial policies designed by national govemments (Nester, 
1997; Hillman and Wan, 2005). 
To complement the views ofNorth (1990, 1991, 2005), which can be easily related 
to the realities of an industrialized country such as Canada, we also analyze the institutional 
framework organizational mo del presented by Pearce (200 1 ). The author designed a model 
based on her studies of China and former communist states of Eastern Europe. As opposed 
to the theories ofNorth and his focus on well-established, solid institutional frameworks of 
Western democracies, the Pearce (200 1) model seeks to understand the effects of 
institùtional changes in developing countries, which could be more easily adapted to the 
reality of Brazil and the modernization process of its institutions in the last 25 years, 
combined with the development of the local aerospace industry (Silva, 2008). 
Given the limitations of our study and the impracticability of a complete 
comparison of the governmental structures of Brazil and Canada, we limited ourselves to 
, the comparison of sorne aspects of the institutional framework ofboth countries, especially 
~
those connected to the three dimensions of government characteristics that facilitate 
independent organizations in the Brazilian and Canadian aerospace industries, according to 
the model proposed by Pearce (200 1 ), presented in the figure below: 
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IMPEDING FACILITA TING 
HOSTILE SUPPORTIVE 
to independent organization of independent organization 
ERRA TIC PREDICTABLE 
laws and regulations laws and regulations 
WEAK STRONG 
government government 
FIG. 1 -Dimensions of Government Characteristics Facilitating or Impeding Independent 
Organization 
Source: Pearce (2001) 
In our effmis to determine how the governments of Brazil and Canada are 
positioned within the Pearce (2001) model, as a reflex of the institutional framework of 
each country, our study investigated the impact of the following characteristics on the 
development of the aerospace industry: 1) investments in infrastructure, 2) legislation on 
intellectual property rights, 3) investments in research and development (R&D), 4) 
government procurement, 5) financing mechanisms and export credits, and 6) regulation 
and the legal framework. The se characteristics were the foc us of the questionnaire 
presented to industry representatives, government officiais and researchers who are 
knowledgeable of the aerospace industry in Brazil and Canada. We chose to explore these 
specifie characteristics as we understand that they are strongly connected to the three 
dimensions of the Pearce (200 1) model and reflect how the institutional environment of a 
country is facilitative or non-facilitative of independent economie organizations. The 
questionnaire was meant to investigate the recent evolutions in the Brazilian and Canadian 
institutional frameworks and the specifie impact they had in the behaviour of the aerospace 
industry in both countries. 
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In our study, we compare the development ofEmbraer and Bombardier, the major 
players of the Brazilian and Canadian aerospace industries, as an example of how the 
institutional framework can be a determinant in the success of an independent organization. 
Embraer is both an important symbol ofBrazil ' s new technology and a flagship enterprise 
with deep public resonance. Bombardier, for its part, represents a significant and solid 
achievement of the Canadian aerospace sector, especially when one considers the country's 
past decision not to pursue aerospace achievements, as the A vro Arrow case suggested 
(Dosman and Frankel, 2002). Pearce (2001) defines independent organizations as "those 
that operate independently of direct government dictate. They are not components of 
government, nor do they exist to achieve government-determined objectives." When 
compared to Brazil, the government structure of Canada is rather different- perhaps the 
most important difference is that Brazil is a presidential republic; even though both 
countries are federalist states. However well defined are the differences and similarities 
between the institutional framework and government structures of Brazil and Canada, 
understanding them is fundamental to the improvement of bilateral relations and the 
development of mutual cooperation projects in different areas such as trade, democracy, 
environment, industrial development, intemational aid, etc. While Canada is a developed 
nation and Brazil a developing one, they are still remarkably similar in severa! primordial 
respects. Both countries are important producers and exporters of commodities and, in spite 
of the ir comparative ad v an tage in these sectors, public poli ci es reflect their desire to move 
up the value-added ladder. Similarly, both countries have a relatively narrow set of global 
competitive firms in high-technology sectors (Goldstein and McGuire, 2004). 
Based on the establishment and growth of the aerospace industry in Brazil and 
Canada, this comparative study seeks to examine the institutional framework ofboth 
countries and the implications in their economie development and it is meant to offer a 
small contribution to a better understanding of both countries. As means of comparing the 
stature of each country and their economie power, sorne of the main economie indicators of 
both countries are presented in the Table 1, below: 
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GDP Real Growth Rate 
GDP perhE!élc! 
Public Revenues 
Public EXPE!flc_IItur~s 
Public Debt 
sqkm 
-- ~g~~~-~_,_?!.~ (July -~011 est.) __ -~~-~~~~~~9 (July 2011 
_ g;Intrillion32010"e,~t·l 
Z·~~i?~!~~t.l 
.... $!.Q.~QQ . {2010 .. ~~t.) 
_ ~:!!i(2~!0 est.) 
$}!},400 (2010 est.) 
Exports ofGoods ar:9 ~e~~ices ~40§ :8 ~il lion (2010 
lmports of§()Oc_ls and Services"' '"'""'> i , $c!~.ZZ .. !2!11ion {2010=~s_!:LLLCC••••ê $iQ?.4 bi~ion ~2010 e~t.) 
s_~,r_r~~-tAs_~~-~~~~nce~-----~-.. ~~----~--~-$~S~1Lbillio n. (2~10est.) ~~~~i0.2l ?iHion (201~_t:~!L -•• ~--~- -
Unemplpyment r~t~ ' CC• "' ~-""-'·----~t'ill'tzr~J~QJO esq "" 0 ,,_ ,.:; --L--~~, S,~J2010 est.) 
Table 1 - Brazil vs. Canada: Geography and Economie Indicators 
Source: The CIA World Fact Book, 2011 
Brazil and Canada have sorne similar characteristics in their economie profile: both 
countries rely heavily on foreign trade to finance their public expenses and both countries 
are major expmiers of commodities- which mean that both are vulnerable to the priee 
oscillations of raw materials and agriculture products. Brazil and Canada also have similar 
challenges to overcome in order to achieve sustained economie growth and social 
development (The Conference Board of Canada, 2009; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2009). 
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2 The Pïoblem to be lüvestigated 
The start point of the problem to be investigated was the development of two 
independent economie organizations: Embraer in Brazil and Bombardier in Canada, and the 
role that governments in each country play in the aerospace industry. After comparing the 
main play ers of the aerospace industry in both countries, this study attempted to answer the 
following question: wh at are the main aspects of the institutional framework of Brazil 
and Canada that have impacted in the development of in dependent economie 
organizations in the aerospace industry of each country? This question can be divided 
into two key elements: 1) the institutional frameworks of Brazil and Canada, and 2) the 
connection between the institutional framework and the development of the aerospace 
industry. 
The first element of the question addresses the main differences in the organization 
of each country in issues related to infrastructure, intellectual property rights, private 
investment, monopolies, legislation on aerospace regulation, labour and taxation; and law 
enforcement, among others. Based on the governmental structures of both countries in such 
issues, the first objective of the question is to identify the aspects of each government 
that qualify them as facilitative or nonfacilitative of the independent organization, in 
close connection with the three dimensions (hostile or supportive; erratic or predictable; 
weak or strong) presented in the model proposed by Pearce (2001). 
The second element of the question is connected to the strategies that each company 
developed to take ad van tage of the opportunities and to deal with the constraints presented 
by the governments of Brazil and Canada and how such strategies influence in the ir 
performance. Based on the experiences of the main players of the aerospace industry in 
each country, the second objective of the question is to examine how organizations in 
the a eros pace industry of Brazil and Canada relate to their institutional environment 
in order to enhance their positions in terms of business performance, profitability, 
market share, and other indicators of economie development. 
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In an attempt to answer these questions, our study first explores the role of Brazilian 
and Canadian institutions in the development of the aerospace industry of each country, 
according to the perspective of Douglass North (1990, 1991, 2005). In a second moment, as 
part of the pro cess of identifying the main differences between the institutional frameworks 
of Brazil and Canada, in accordance to the dimensions of governrnent characteristics 
facilitating or impeding independent organization presented in the Pearce (200 1) model, our 
study determines how each country fits within the model. Finally, comparing the 
interactions between governrnent agencies and private organizations - resulting from the 
institutional frameworks ofboth countries, combined with an analysis of the consequences 
of such interactions to the development of the ir aerospace industries - allow us to 
determine how facilitative or nonfacilitative of the independent organization each 
governrnent is. 1 
1 Our study analyzes the development of the aerospace industry through the development of 
Embraer and Bombardier, two major players in the aerospace industry with worldwide operations. 
An important aspect to consider when companies engage in international trade is how multinational 
organizations will react to the different institutional frameworks in the different countries where 
they do their businesses. Rodriguez et al. (2006) suggest that multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
should be primarily concerned with three main factors that can interfere in their performance in a 
foreign country: (1) politics, (2) corruption, and (3) corporate social responsibility. It is clear that 
multinationals sometimes have the power to influence national governments to promote changes in 
the institutional framework, so that institutions are more in line with the interests of the MNEs. 
However, in accordance with the objective of our study and for the practical reason to limit the 
scope of our research, the study does not focus on the interactions between MNEs and governments, 
even though there are considerable foreign investments in the aerospace industry in Brazil. 
9 
3 Conceptual Framework 
3.1 Govemment Policies and Economie Development 
In order to investi gate the determinants of the institutional framework that had the 
potential to facilitate the development of independent organizations in Brazil and Canada, 
the theoretical starting point of our study was based primarily on the works of Jone Pearce 
(2001) on the actions of governments as facilitative or nonfacilitative of the independent 
organization, and tho se of Douglass North on the new institutional economies (1990, 1991, 
2005). In this section, we first discuss how govemments and their policies can contribute to 
the expansion of the business environment and economie development. Th en, we present 
the perspectives of Douglass North on New Institutional Economies and how the 
institutional framework can be the reflex of a country' s position towards businesses. 
Finally, we discuss the viewpoints of Jone Pearce on the embrace of government and how 
these concepts relate to the aerospace industry in Brazil and Canada. 
The classic industrial policy debate is as old as the Industrial Revolution itself. In 
his 1776 book Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith argued that govemments should confine 
themselves to three essential duties for government: ( 1) deferree - the duty of protecting the 
society from violence and invasions, (2) justice - the duty of establishing an exact 
administration of justice, and (3) the general welfare the duty of"erecting and 
maintaining certain public institutions, which can never be clone in the interest of any 
individuals, or small number of individuals," while allowing entrepreneurs to supply goods 
and services demanded by the populace. In 1891, David Ricardo and his book Political 
Eco no my expanded Smith' s ideas and diffused the concept of "comparative advantage" 
whereby states, in the same manner of individuals, specialize in making or marketing the 
things which they can best make or market, and then trading those products for other things 
they need from other countries. Smith and Ricardo shared similar views regarding business 
cycles of growth and depression, believing that they were a natural part of economie 
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development. That position was challenged by John Maynard Keynes, who in 1936 argued 
that business cycles could be smoothed out by government spending. Keynes believed that 
if depressions were caused by low demand for goods and services, governments could 
stimulate a depressed economy by spending more and cutting taxes. When the demand for a 
good or service was too high, inflation was expected to rise. In this case, governments 
could curb inflation by cutting back their own spending and raising taxes. As a result, 
modern governments have accepted the "neoclassical economie" idea that the economy can 
be fine-tuned by manipulating taxes, interest rates, and government spending (Nester, 1997; 
Hillman, Keim and Schuler, 2004; Murtha and Lenway, 1994). As a result, Robert Reich, 
cited by Nester (1997) states that 
Every major industry in America is deeply involved and dependent on government. The 
competitive position of every American firm is affected by government po licy. No sharp distinction 
can validly be drawn between private and public sectors within this or any other industrialized 
country; the economie effects of public policies and corporate decisions are completely 
intertwined. 
The classic industrial policies can be justified as they are believed to contribute to 
the economie development of a nation far more rapidly than it would otherwise have 
occurred. A government' s industrial strate gy can be defined as its plans to allocate 
resources with intent to meet long-term national economie objectives, including growth, 
international competitiveness, GDP expansion, improvements in national security and state 
legitimacy. Governments also use industry policy to facilitate investment strategies or 
encourage specifie industrial activities. Therefore, governments can provide the strategie 
outlook so often lacking in business, while the effects of government policies can determine 
the competitive position ofbusinesses and have an impact in their performance. Since one 
of the most important functions of the state is to facilitate economie development and 
improve general welfare, industrial activity is regarded as the cornerstone of national 
economie development. In this sense, all states practice a variety of industrial polices, albeit 
under different names and in different forms. States can be committed to country-specifie 
governance capabilities, that when combined with national factor endowments, influence 
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the international economie strategies that governments can support and implement. 
Governments can be influenced by and influence the range of strategie choices and actions 
that managers face every day through the state's policies conceming such issues as 
industrial relations, international trade, and access to resources. As a consequence, when 
states get involved in industries through the development of institutions ( especially the orres 
that coordinate economie activity, such as licensing and regulatory agencies, legislation on 
IP, and multilateral enforcement among a community of traders), the result is positively 
associated with economie competitiveness. In addition, the ability of a govemment to 
implement and maintain consistent industrial strategies are largely predetermined and 
conditioned to state organizational structures, functional political institutions, and society's 
expectations regarding the appropriate economie role of the public sector (Lenway and 
Murtha, 1994; Murtha and Lenway, 1994; Hillman and Keim, 1995; Nester, 1997; Hillman 
and Ritt, 1999; Hillman, Keim and Schuler, 2004; Spencer, Murtha and Lenway, 2005; 
Griffiths and Zammuto, 2005; Dixit, 2009). 
Under a different perspective, govemments and their policies can also be critical 
sources ofuncertainty and have control over limited, critical resources that will affect a 
firm's competitive environment and governrnent policy. Critics of industrial policies state 
that they have two potential downsides. First is protectionism, which can cause domestic 
priees to rise, with the potential to burt not only consumers but producers as weil (whose 
high-priced components may mak:e finished goods uncompetitive in foreign markets). 
Second, states may retaliate and a trade war could erupt as the one that happened in the 
1930s, although this possibility is considered unlikely to happen again (Murtha and 
Lenway, 1994; Nester, 1997; Hillman, Keim and Schuler, 2004). 
At the macroeconomie level, governrnent intervention is crucial in developing an 
appropriate business environment, as key institutions are usually created via state 
intervention. The formation of a legal framework is a good example that emphasizes the 
need for state intervention: in the invisible band model, govemments restrict themselves to 
a limited number of activities, such as providing public goods, regulating markets and 
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enforcing the la\v, leaving most allocation decisions to private organizations. i\t the 
microeconomie level, however, a state can be interventionist but also unorganized, having a 
larger number of bureaucrats pursuing personal agendas, opening a door to corruption and 
other negative distortions of the system. As a consequence, it is important to differentiate 
between a government's influence in implementing a 'friendly' business environment 
which can be achieved notably through an adequate legal framework and law enforcement 
base, and the intervention of a government in the functioning of private organizations 
(Griffiths and Zammuto, 2005; Venard, 2009). 
On a macroeconomie level, it is generally accepted that political intervention leads 
to the transformation of the institutional environment. In order to build the appropria te 
elements of an optimal institutional framework (laws and regulations, public policies, law 
enforcement, quality of markets, etc.), there will always be a need for state intervention. 
However, such intervention should be limited and governments should allow private 
organizations the freedom to make decisions within an adequate, fully functional 
institutional frame\vork. When governments are involved in the development of an 
industry, the result is a state/industry linkage that is coordinated. As a result, institutional 
arrangements and capabilities will exist, defining the shape and maintenance of a national 
industrial competitiveness. On the other hand, when governments have little involvement in 
industry decision making, the institutional framework will rely on market forces or 
corporate policies instead (Griffiths and Zammuto, 2005; Venard, 2009). 
3.2 The Perspective ofDouglass North on New Institutional Economies 
As the mainstream economie theories evolved, authors such as Harold Demsetz, 
Avner Greif, Claude Menard, Ronald Coase, Elinor Ostrom, Oliver Williamson and 
Douglass North worked within a modified neoclassical framework, considering both 
efficiency and distribution issues, in contrast to more traditional, old or original 
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institutional economies, which are usually perceived as critical of the mainstream 
neoclassical economies. The works of Douglass North can be a primai source to the 
understanding of the "new institutional economies" and they have influenced the writings 
of dozens of researchers and scholars around the world. The importance of the new 
institutional economies is that it combines concepts from various social science fields such 
as politics, sociology, management, law, and history with those oftraditional economies. 
There are four broad fields of research that characterize the new institutional economies: 
(1) transaction costs and property rights, (2) public choice and political economies, (3) 
economie history, and ( 4) belief and knowledge systems (ideology). These four fields are 
important to explain the development of institutions and their impact on the economie 
growth of a nation. The concepts related to the field public choice and political economies 
are of particular interest to our study, as they are connected to the actions of a given 
government and their impact in the development of independent economie organizations 
(Gauthier and Gomez, 2005). 
As the commercial transactions between nations and different regions of the ·world 
grew in volume, complexity, and different degrees of specialization, they required the 
existence of a solid institutional framework that facilitated and encouraged exchanges. Over 
the centuries, commercial negotiations and their enforcement in different parts of the world 
entailed typically the development of standardized weights and measures, units of account, 
mediums of ex change; and the establishment of notaries, consuls, merchant law courts, and 
enclaves of foreign merchants protected by foreign princes in retum for revenue. As costs 
of transactions increased, it became co mm on for nations to impose trade ban·iers in order to 
protect their interests. Following the advancements of global trade in modem days, 
improvements in the costs of exchange were considered to contribute to a greater 
development of trade and the overall productivity of an economie system (North, 1991; 
Gauthier and Gomez, 2005). However, Coase (1998), cited by Gauthier and Gomez (2005), 
says that one of the main factors influencing the costs of ex change is the institutions of a 
country: 
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( ... )the costs ofexchange depend on the institutions of a country: its legal system, its political 
system, its social system, its educational system, its culture, and so on. In effect it is the institutions 
that go vern the performance of an economy. 
To better understand the importance of institutions for the economie development, 
North (1991, 2005) points out the differences between two key concepts: that of 
institutions and that of organizations: 
Institutions are the ru! es of the game both formai and informai rules and the ir en forcement 
characteristics. Together they define the way the game is played. 
If institutions are the ru! es of the economies game, organizations are the players. Organizations 
refer to groups of individuals engaged in activities with a common objective, a particular goal. 
Rodrik (1999), cited by Onodera (2008) defines institutions as 
a set ofhumanly devised behavioural mies that govem and shape the interactions ofhuman beings, 
in part by helping them to form expectations of what other people will do. 
And the same au thor goes on io àiscuss five types of market supporiing instituiions: 
property rights; regulatory institutions; institutions for macroeconomie stabilisation; 
institutions for social insurance; and institutions of conflict management (Onodera, 2008). 
Institutions can be divided into a set of formai constraints and informai constraints. 
Examples of formai constraints include: constitutions, laws, regulations, property rights, 
charters, bylaws, statute and common law; together with enforcement characteristics, such 
as sanctions. Resulting from co-ordinate repeated human interaction, informai rules can be 
exemplified as extensions, elaborations, and modifications of formai rules; socially 
sanctioned norms ofbehaviour (taboos, customs and traditions); internally enforced 
standards of conduct, such as norms, conventions, and codes of conduct. Formai and 
infmmal institutions bind elites from business and government together. The element that 
will bring both sets together is the mechanism intended to ensure that these two types of 
constraints are enforced. Furthermore, institutions have the potential to prohibit, permit or 
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reducing transaction costs, for optimizing the flows of information, and for defining and 
enforcing property rights. Institutions can also encompass organizational entities, 
procedural deviees, and regulatory frameworks. Other authors, such as Griffiths and 
Zammuto (2005) suggest that national governments and a sound institutional environment 
play an important role in fostering the competitive capabilities of industries and firms. In 
this sense, national governments play an active role in the creation of an institutional 
governance system that support and encourage national competitive advantage, which is 
the result of mechanisms of coordinated adjustment set in place by the state. Such an 
institutional govemance system consists not only of government involvement in an industry 
or just an industry structure; rather, it is something that incorporates both. In a broader 
sense, institutions can also be linked to various different measures of institutional quality to 
development outcomes from various angles and disciplines. As far as economie 
development is concemed, good institutions ensure two desirable outcomes: the existence 
of relatively equal access to economie opportunity, which offers a "level playing field;" and 
the guarantees to those who provide labour and capital that they will be appropriately 
rewarded and the ir property rights will be protected (North, 1991; Jütting, 2003; Hillman, 
Keim and Schuler, 2004; North, 2005; Griffiths and Zammuto, 2005; IMF, 2005; Malerba 
and Mani, 2009). 
Organizations can serve to several different purposes: political (political parties, 
legislatures, regulatory bodies), economie (firms, trade unions, cooperatives, etc.), or 
educational (universities, schools, vocational training centers, etc.). Whether their 
immediate objective is profit maximizing (in the case of economie organizations) or 
improving re-election prospects (for political parties), organizations are committed to an 
ultimate objective: their survival in a world of scarce resources and tight competition. As 
distinct national policies and institutional framework can assist or hinder firm 
competitiveness and firm access, economie institutions are usually closely connected to 
political institutions. Political institutions determine the incentives of the executive and 
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define the distribution of poli ti cal power, including the ability to adequate economie 
institutions and the distribution ofresources. For their part, economie institutions also 
shape political institutions, as they contribute to determine the relative affluence ofvarious 
groups of society. Effective economie institutions are likely to be paired with good political 
institutions. When the political power is broadly shared and subject to checks and balances, 
the risk that those with political power will take advantage oftheir position is minimized. 
In addition, the institutional settings within which political organizations (such as interest 
groups and political parties) and the government interaction will have an impact in the 
types of policies chosen in democracies. As a matter of fact, all democracies have a similar 
formai institution, based in the use form ofmajority voting as the decision rule for most 
public policy decisions. In such systems, most public policy decisions result from a process 
of collective decision making and they rely on constitutions and other institutions of 
government that are designed for organizing the collective decision making process. In our 
study, we take into consideration the formulation processes of public policies that have an 
impact in the aerospace industry in Brazil and Canada and base our classification of each 
nation as facilitative or non-facilitative of independent economie organizations on the 
interactions between the state and the industry in both countries (Hillman and Keim, 1995; 
Griffiths and Zammuto, 2005; IMF, 2005; North, 2005). 
The evolution of modern commercial transactions meant that a larger amount of 
resources are needed to define and enforce exchange agreements. Industrialization, 
urbanization, and integration into a global economy created a new set of socioeconomic 
problems with which individuals and basic social groups could not cope. In the context of 
individual wealth-maximizing behaviour, when only asymmetric information about the 
valuable attributes of what is being exchanged (or the performance of agents) is available, 
transaction costs can be regarded as a critical determinant of economie performance. As a 
result, institutions and the effectiveness oftheir enforcement will determine the cost of 
transacting. Therefore, the importance of effective institutions lays on the benefits of 
cooperative solutions or the costs of defection. In other words, institutions have the power 
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to reduce transaction and production costs per exchange, augmenting the potential gains 
from trade. In modern days, governments have at least four broad economie duties: 
maintaining economie growth, full employment, stable priees, and a positive balance of 
payments. As a result, both poli ti cal and economie institutions are essential parts of an 
effective institutional matrix, together with other variables such as the local setting and the 
behaviour ofhuman actors (North, 1991; Nester, 1997; Jütting, 2004). 
The issue of how the actions of a government can facilitate the development of 
independent economie organizations is controversial and it is closely linked to the debate of 
the advantages of free markets versus the role of positive government direction in the 
growth process. Together with institutional determinants, economie determinants and 
cultural heritage are the fundamental determinants of economie growth. Aiming at the 
objectives of the research, our study focuses only on the influences of the institutional 
determinants to the overall constitution of the institutional framework of Brazil and 
Canada and how they contributed to the development of the aerospace industry in each 
country (North, 1991, 2005)? 
Another component of an analysis of institutional frameworks and economie 
development is the conformity levels for the institutions, especially the legal framework, by 
the economie organizations ofboth countries. Organizations can interact with institutions 
(the rules of the game) in two different ways: they will either conform to the rules in place 
or try to circumvent them. If the rules are not clear or incomplete, there will be a possibility 
2Besides the institutional framework which provides the set of laws, rules, and regulations that 
will mediate the interrelations between the different players of the political, economie, and social 
systems, North (2005), points out to the importance of demographie features to economie 
development, as a reflex of the quantity and quality of human beings available in a given work 
market. Demographies are influenced by the rates of fertility, mortality, embodied human capital, 
and occupational distribution characteristics. Finally, the stock of knowledge, including scientific 
knowledge and its dissemination will also play a significant role in the economie development. In 
order to observe the purpose of our research, out of the three fundamental determinants listed 
above, we focus only on the importance of the institutional framework to the development of the 
aerospace industry in Brazil and Canada. 
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for the organizations to interpret them incorrectly, trying to obtain the maximum level of 
advantage from their transactions. Rules can be regarded as incomplete due to two main 
causes: an imperfect information system and a limited cognitive capacity of individuals 
involved in the transactions. To fully understand the importance of the institutional 
framework in the development of independent economie organizations, it is important to 
examine the dynamics of the evolution ofboth organizations and institutional frameworks 
(Chabaud et al., 2005).3 
As the economie organizations in the aerospace industry in Brazil and Canada 
engage in more complex transactions with commercial partners in different patis of the 
world and seek the financial support from foreign investors, it is imperative that the 
governments ofboth countries promote the stability and reliability oftheir institutions. As 
North (1991) points out, a sound institutional matrix consists of an interdependent web of 
institutions and the resulting political and economie organizations that are characterized by 
massive increasing retums. Thus, the very own existence of private organizations depend 
on the opportunities provided by a healthy institutional framework. Such oppmiunities 
provide for independent economie organizations to evolve; and in a virtuous-cycle effect, it 
is normally expected that development is directed towards the promotion of productivity-
raising activities and freer markets. Instead, in the case of the aerospace industry, private 
profitability is usually enhanced by the creation of monopolies, by the restriction of entry 
and factor mobility, combined with political organizations that establish property rights 
aiming at the redistribution of income, instead of augmenting it. In this more widespread 
model, it is imperative, or at least desirable, that the judiciary branch be strong and 
3 According to Chabaud et al. (2005), organizations can and usually try to influence sorne 
modifications in the structure of the institutions to better serve the ir pm-poses. Organizations su ch as 
private firms, unions, professional associations, media, etc., can use severa) different strategies 
(lobbying being the most common) to influence the positions of the public opinion and cause it to 
promote the institutional changes, so that institutions are more adequate to their interests. Although 
we understand that private organizations can influence and may try to adjust the institutional 
framework to their needs and purposes, the focus of our research is on how governments and the 
institutional frameworks can and will influence private organizations, and not the other way around. 
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independent, so that the con tracts can be respected and the lev el of interference of the 
executive and legislative branches in the commercial transactions is minimized (North, 
1991; Hillman and Wan, 2005; Chabaud et al., 2005). 
Another factor that has an impact in the business-government interface is the form 
of government: in our case, a parliamentary versus a presidential-congressional form of 
government. The executive branch pla ys a greater role in the formulation of new legislation 
in parliamentary democracies (such as in Canada), as opposed to a political regime in 
which there is a cl earl y separation of power between the executive and the legislative 
branches (such as in Brazil). In a parliamentary system, the effort to formulate the general 
policies that are of business interests is usually part of a party's election agenda. When new 
legislation is developed, the ministry of the executive branch becomes an important venue 
for business-government interaction. However, this does not mean that all new government 
poli ci es in a parliamentary system derive from the election agendas of the winning parties: 
sorne policy proposais can be initiated by career bureaucrats in individual ministries. 
Parliaments are also capable of originating legislative proposais on their own, and business 
groups often meet with members of parliament. In such a system, policies originating in the 
parliament are required to meet with the approval of the leaders of the executive branch, 
even if one specifie policy is not formulated as part of the government's agenda (Hillman 
and Keim, 1995). 
In a presidential-congressional system, there are essentially four substantially 
autonomous institutions: Congress, the President, the judicial branch, and the bureaucracy. 
In such a system, the pursuit of coherent, consistent, and stable policies formulated out of 
these autonomous institutions may pose a complex govemance challenge to the country. In 
case of weak party discipline within the institutions, the result can be the conflict inherent 
in a variety of interests. In general, presidents do have po licy agendas and usually submit 
legislation to Congress. Nevertheless, most presidents have far less control over how 
Congress vote or modify their proposais than leaders of governments in most parliamentary 
systems. In presidential systems, the Jack of strong party discipline may reflect on the 
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rnembers of Congress, who will be subject to a greater disparity of interest group pressures. 
As consequence, this poor party discipline complicates the public policy formulation 
process, since many important policies originate in the legislature. When members of 
Congress are subject to fragmented special interests and left without sorne sort of 
overarching directive, such as party positions, the policies originating in the legislature may 
be incoherent and inconsistent (Hillman and Keim, 1995). 
3.3 The Perspective of Jone Pearce and the Embrace of Govemment: 
The theories of Douglass North and the New Institutional Economies can be more 
easily associated with the institutional frameworks of developed countries, with solid 
democratie traditions and stable and strong govemments. On the other hand, Jone Pearce 
(2001) states that the New Institutional Economies theories do not fully explain how 
organizations and organizational behaviour function if govemments are non-supportive, 
erratic or weak, while suggesting that if non-supportive, erratic, and weak govemments 
cannat provide protection, sorne substitute is to be found if complex organization is to take 
place. For many years, severa! authors in various fields of social science suggested that 
there are connections between institutions and the structure and behaviour of organizations. 
The "new institutionalism" authors attempted to provide fresh answers to old questions 
about how social choices are formulated, mediated, and established by institutional 
arrangements (V enard, 2009). In our case, the views of North on institutional frameworks 
and economie development are more in line to the govemment of Canada and its support to 
the local aerospace industry; while the views ofPearce can be more easily identified with 
the Brazilian framework and its support to the local aerospace industry. As part of the 
investigative process required to understand the importance ofthe institutional framework 
for the optimal development of independent economie organizations, it is necessary to 
analyze how govemments can interfere- either promoting or presenting obstacles - in the 
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ways in which organizations do business and how they prepare themselves to respond to 
institutional constraints. As governments have the power to legislate, the decision to make a 
course of action profitable or illegal is in their hands. Pearce (200 1) suggests that 
Governments facilitate the establishment and enforcement of the fundamental understandings 
necessary to action: who is entitled to what uses (use rights); who may legitimately sell products, 
land, and equipment (ownership rights); and what actions are acceptable (contract law). 
In this sense, facilitating governments will work towards a stable and predictable 
environment, with laws and regulations that they are capable of enforcing. One of the main 
difficulties that organizations and investors willing to expand their commercial operations 
in developing countries- or more precisely, countries where governments are 
nonfacilitative- is that these organizations have no idea on how to react to a nonfacilitative 
environment. One of the main reasons for this lack of knowledge is that the se organizations 
have been historically operating in a facilitative environment. But what is it that facilitative 
governments do that has such a positive impact in their economie development? According 
to Pearce (200 1) 
a primary role of government is to facilitate effective complex organization. Among other 
organizational effects, strong facilitative governments create legal infrastructures and enforce 
regimes that allow sufficient ad vance planning to enable participants to judge whether persona! and 
financial investments are worthwhile, and to rely on more impersonal coordination. 
This does not mean that efficient independent organizations will only flourish in a 
facilitative environment. Even when governments lack the capacity to enforce their own 
laws and regulations - and as a consequence, are not facilitative of independent 
organization- people do not stop their entrepreneurial ambitions because such efforts are 
not made easier by the governments. Instead, they will make the best use of their re sources 
and personal networks to overcome the difficulties they face as entrepreneurs (Pearce, 
2001). 
Even though governments can occasionally act in ways that are nonfacilitative of 
independent organization, they are necessary because they have the power to establish 
22 
stable structures for human interaction and therefore, reduce the levels of unpredictability 
in a business environment. As the complexity of trade negotiations between nations 
increase, organizations will look for a stable environment, with fair rules and regulations, in 
hopes that contracts will be respected and that they will not be cheated in their transactions. 
It is here that governments can make a difference in the economie development: when a 
government enforces a formallegal system that can handle more complex disputes and 
guarantee the rights of an organization, people will feel more confident to invest more and 
exp and their businesses (Pearce, 2001 ). 
As the model presented in the introduction of our report shows, the practices of a 
government that can facilitate or impede the development of independent organizations can 
be clustered into three dimensions: 
1. Government hostility to independent organizations, which can be 
presented either as a central strate gy (as in a communist regime) or in a 
partial and subtle manner (when the state controls access to a critical 
resource ). The variations in the capacities of governments to intervene can 
be linked to the fact that sorne governments do not have sufficient control 
over their own officiais to ensure reliable enforcement. As result, these 
governments fail to enforce their laws and this incapacity can be doubly 
costly: both in the absence of a vital facilitating function and in the 
unpredictability of erratic, partial enforcement. Weak governments are 
subject to pressure groups, whereas strong states have the ability to remake 
societies and cultures. The strength or weakness of a state can exp lain 
differences in national industrial competitiveness, particularly as 
demonstrated through governments that favour corporatist institutional 
regimes (e.g. Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Japan). When a 
government is weak or erratic, there is a threatening environment for those 
seeking to organize. Such environment favours the existence of 
unpredictable government officiais who may expropriate private 
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organizations, levy unexpected taxes and fees, and even possibly threaten 
their persona! safety. In addition, emerging markets can also have problems 
with inadequate financial disclosure and an absence of intermediary 
institutions (investment bankers, venture capitalists, and an active business 
press). On the other hand, facilitative governments support private 
organizations by providing useful information, which can benefit credit and 
capital suppliers through the offer of extensive databases and regulatory 
bodies, which can allow a more ace urate assessment of risks. In addition, the 
graduai reduction of national barri ers to trade can facilitate commerce 
among nations. Regarding the policies that can facilitate economie 
development, governments can bring new initiatives or repeal and reinterpret 
old ones. In any case, even when governments qualify as "facilitative" of 
independent organizations, the possibility that they will follow through on 
any given polie y never approaches 1 00 per cent (Pearce, 2001; Griffiths and 
Zammuto, 2005; Spencer, Murtha and Lenway, 2005; Onodera, 2008; 
Venard, 2009).; 
2. Government unpredictability, which is the translation of the establishment 
of laws and regulations, the enforcement of property rights, and the stability 
in the provision of public goods. The transparency and predictability of the 
institutional environment can be linked to policy reforms that encourage and 
facilitate resource reallocation by the private sector. The predictability of a 
nation conceming its business-government interface can be associated with 
the stability/instability of the following factors: 1) the locus where business-
government interactions take place, 2) the tactics and strategies employed by 
businesses to influence public policy decisions, and 3) the frequency with 
which the same actors from business and govemment institutions have 
repeat dealings with each other. Additionally, a govemment can influence 
firms as they are subject to rules institutionalized and legitimized by the 
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state. Govemments define institutional frameworks that influence 
organizations by establishing rules, inspecting the conformity of firms and 
handing out rewards or punishing those who fail to follow the rules (Hillman 
and Keim, 1995; Pearce, 2001; Griffiths and Zammuto, 2005); and 
3. Government weakness, which is characterized by the inability of a 
government to maintain a stable and reliable enforcement of its legal 
framework, leading to abuse of power and corruption. The strength of an 
institutional framework can be defined through the strength of certain 
variables, su ch as the quality of its legal framework, the quality of law 
enforcement, and the quality of the financial markets. The legal 
framework is an important variable in the analysis of institutional framework 
because the existence of a common legal environment can virtually affect ali 
aspects of an organization's structure, behaviour and performance. A solid 
legal framework is crucial not only for the protection of contracts and 
private property, and it also has the power to discourage officiais to prey on 
private property and solicit bribes. While a strong legal framework is 
important, laws are useless if not combined with a strong enforcement 
mechanism. For this reason, an effective institutional framework can be 
positive! y linked to the ability of a government to enforce its laws, 
especially in its ability to influence corruption. Besicles the laws, the legal 
framework also encompasses the creation of regulatory institutions that 
monitor competition, securities markets, banking, trade, patents and ali other 
economie sectors that require business law enforcement. Regarding the 
financial system, its importance to the institutional environment lies on fact 
that an institutional framework should be partly based on an evaluation of 
the quality of its financial markets. As a consequence, it is possible to 
differentiate between various countries and their institutional framework by 
analysing the characteristics oftheir different types offinancial institutions. 
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If access to capital is easier in a given country, it should also be easier for 
firms in such country to finance their activities and, consequently, invest in a 
new economie project such as product development or the creation of a 
foreign subsidiary; as such activities will be easier to fund (Venard, 2009). 
As the topics presented above suggest, governments can interfere in severa! 
different ways in the creation of independent organizations and the economie development 
of a country. It is usually accepted that economie development depends on a sound 
institutional and governance framework, one that favours structural reform while enhancing 
public understanding and acceptance of reform measures. In addition, a regulatory and 
competition environment allows transformation within firms as weil as entry and exits 
across sectors. It is undisputable that the right regulatory framework and effective 
competition environment were paramount in the development of many industrial sectors. 
Ideally, as part of facilitative institutional framework, governments should foster a healthy 
regulatory and competition environment, which will allow transformation within firms as 
weil as facilitating mergers and shifts in corporate culture, while keeping regulatory 
barriers on enterprises to the necessary minimum, while promoting economie development 
and trade through domestic regulation. The performance of the aerospace industry in both 
countries presents concrete examples ofhow national institutions can influence the growth 
of a specifie industry in particular, and the economie development as a whole. 
As we discussed in this section, the role of governments in economie development 
is undeniable: from the original debate about classic industrial policies to the concepts of 
New Institutional Economies and the government embrace of independent economie 
organizations, governments have always attempted to optimize their resources and 
promoted economie growth. Figure 2 summarizes how the debate has evolved over the 
years: 
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FIG. 2- The Role ofGovernments in Economie Development 
Source: the author, 2012 
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4 Methodology 
The main objective of our study is to compare the relationship between the 
development of the aerospace industries and the institutional frameworks of Brazil and 
Canada. Based on the theories ofDouglass North and the model proposed by Pearce 
(200 1 ), we attempt to determine how each country is facilitative or nonfacilitative of 
independent organizations in the aerospace industry, as the institutional framework of each 
country is compared to the model. The comparison is based on governments being hostile 
or supportive ofprivate organizations; having erratic or predictable laws and regulations; 
and having weak or strong governments. In order to illustrate how governments can play a 
crucial role in the economie development of a country, we compare how the different 
institutional frameworks and governmental support of each country influenced in the 
development and behaviour ofEmbraer and Bombardier, the leading forces of the 
aerospace industry in Brazil and Canada. As we chose a comparative methodology for our 
research, we took into account the views of authors such as Hillman and Keim (1995), 
according to whom 
Differences in business-government relations across countries can be better understood by 
examining the institutions through which business and government interact with particular attention 
to what North called "formai constraints - such as rules that individuals devise and informai 
constraints - such as conventions and codes ofbehaviour. 
As part of the process of comparison of the institutional frameworks ofBrazil and 
Canada and how they played a role in the development of the aerospace industry in each 
country, we investigate the circumstances that were decisive to the establishment of 
Embraer and Bombardier as leading forces in the regional aviation market. Each company 
is the main player of the aerospace industry in their country of origin and each has obtained 
different types of governmental support or incentives over the past 30 years. In addition, the 
comparison of the impacts of the institutional framework in the development and growth 
only of the main player in each country served to narrow the scope of our research. For that 
same reason, we only considered the evolution and transformations that happened in the 
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Brazilian and Canadian institutional fra.111eworks between the 1980s and the present date. In 
this period, Embraer was privatized, Bombardier ventured in the aerospace industry, and 
the globalization of the world economy combined with the 9/11 attacks brought profound 
transformations to the aerospace industry worldwide. 
In or der to compare how the governments of Brazil and Canada acted to facilitate 
the development of these two in dependent organizations, our study considered the 
evolution of the institutional frameworks of Brazil and Canada in the past three decades and 
as a consequence, of the institutional changes; which in tum, help us to determine how each 
country is positioned in the scale ofthree dimensions proposed by Pearce (2001). 
According to this scale, a govemment can be hostile or supportive to independent 
organizations; offer an erratic or predictable environment for laws and regulations; and be 
weak or strong in their ability to enforce their laws and regulations. These three 
dimensions served as the basic parameters to the comparison between the two countries. 
To illustrate how hostile or supportive each govemment is, our study compares the 
impact of the investments of Brazil and Canada in infrastructure, including 
transportation, energy, education, R&D, and the like in the aerospace industry over the past 
ten years. Investments in basic infrastructure are a key-factor to the economie development 
of a country, as the existing infrastructure will determine whether independent economie 
organizations will succeed or not in said country. Economie organizations will feel 
confident to invest in a country if they perceive that their investment is being matched by 
the govemmental support, presented in this case, in the form of the necessary infrastructure 
to operate a lucrative business operation. This analysis uses a qualitative approach to 
compare the impact of investments promoted by each country in the improvements of the ir 
infrastructure in the past decade. 
Regarding the classification of a govemment as erratic or predictable, the study 
analyzes and compares the main characteristics of the legal frameworks of Brazil and 
Canada dealing with private organizations in the aerospace industry, in order to 
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determine how predictable the legislation of each country is, especially the laws and 
regulations that deal with intellectual property rights, private investment (including 
FDI), civil aviation regulation, labour, and taxation. Although these five areas are not 
the only determinants to the development of independent economie organizations, clear and 
predictable laws and regulations in these fields are crucial to the success of any economie 
organization. This comparison uses a qualitative approach to establish the differences 
between the legal frameworks ofBrazil and Canada in five different fields ofthe law. 
Finally, in order to determine how weak or strong each government is, our study 
compared the law enforcement mechanisms of the judiciary systems of Brazil and 
Canada and the associated penalties for breaking the law. The study focused especially on 
the enforcement of the laws and regulations con ce ming the five areas of the legal 
framework listed above. This comparison uses a qualitative approach to identify the 
different law enforcement mechanisms and the associated penalties for breaking the law in 
Brazil and Canada. 
Sorne of the limitations in comparative analyses of institutional frameworks result 
from the lack of variations in governments and ali the confounding societal features to 
allow the isolation of governmental effects. Altematively, abrupt and definitive 
governmental changes would permit the isolation of government effects from those of other 
societal institutions (Pearce, 2001; Onodera, 2008). 
The qualitative methodology of our study was based on the field research 
approach. As part of our research, we have met with representatives from govemmental 
agencies, business associations, researchers and the private sector in both Brazil and 
Canada in order to collect the primary data that was required to answer the question 
presented in Section 2 of this document "The Problem to be Investigated." The study used 
primary and secondary data collected from the organizations listed below, both in Brazil 
and Canada. Government representatives interviewed for this study were selected based on 
their knowledge of the industry and the role their agencies play in the development of the 
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industry in both countries. Other sources of information included representatives of the 
aerospace industry, such as Bombardier; industry associations, and universities, ali of 
whom connected to the industry. To collect the primary data, the study used structured 
interviews with selected collaborators, as opposed to applying questionnaires to a large 
sample ofrespondents. As the focus ofthe study was on the institutional frameworks of 
Brazil and Canada and their impact in the development of the aerospace industry, we 
be lieve that the structured interviews with representatives of the key organizations listed in 
this section adequately provide the data required to answer the question presented in 
Section 2 of this report. 
We interviewed 17 representatives from 12 different organizations, including 
govemment agencies, industry associations, universities, and one private organization 
within the industry. In a snowball sampling effect, sorne of the collaborators referred us to 
other key contact people within the industry, both in Brazil and Canada. The list of selected 
organizations, in both countries, which collaborate with our research, is presented below: 
In Brazil: 
• Two representatives from ANAC- National Agency of Civil Aviation; 
• Two representatives from MDIC - Ministry of Development, Industry 
Foreign and Trade; 
• One representative from BNDES - Brazilian Development Bank; 
• One representative from ABDI- Brazilian Agency for Industrial 
Development; 
• One representative from UnB -University of Brasilia; and 
• One former executive from Embraer. 
In Canada: 
• One representative from Bombardier; 
• Three representatives from Industry Canada; 
31 
e Two representatives from AIAC - .A1erospace Industries Association of 
Canada; 
• One representative from AQA- Association Québécoise de l'aérospatiale; 
• One representative from MDEIE - Ministry of Economie Development, 
Innovation and Export Trade - Quebec; and 
• One representative from UQAM- Université du Québec à Montréal. 
Besides Bombardier and the government agencies listed above, the industry 
associations were a useful source of information, as they provided a broader point of view 
of the interactions between the industry and the governments of Brazil and Canada. All 
organizations were selected based on the ir decisive role in the aerospace industry of both 
countries. After several attempts, it was not possible to meet with representatives from 
Embraer, the Brazilian Ministry of Justice's agency responsible for overseeing mergers and 
acquisitions, and the Brazilian Association of the Aerospace Industries (AIAB) in Brazil. In 
Canada, it was not possible to establish a contact with AéroMontréal, the Montreal's 
aerospace cluster association, and the National Research Council's Institute for Aerospace 
Research. As pointed out in the research project of our study, we used secondary sources of 
information to minimize the lack of the primary sources that were unavailable to the study. 
The structured interviews took place in Brazil and Canada, between July and 
December 201 O. The structured questionnaire was prepared with the collaboration of 
Professors César Garzon, PhD (ENAP Montréal) and Tomas de Aquino Guimaraes, PhD 
(University of Brasilia). Both Professors offered their input on the relevance of each 
question in the context of our research and in the adaptation of the questionnaire to the 
different realities of Brazil and Canada. Professor César Garzon approved the final version 
ofthe questionnaire in June 2010. The final questionnaire first presented the problem to be 
investigated; and then it presented the four objectives of the research. The next step was to 
make a brief presentation and exp lain the context of the research and ask for the 
interviewees' permission to record the interviews. The questionnaire had 11 questions and 
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at the end of each interview, the resea.rcher asked for the interviewees to make comments or 
remarks on topics that they thought that could be valuable to the research. At this point, 
sorne of the interviewees indicated the nam es and contact information of other people who 
could collaborate with our project. The questionnaire was originally elaborated in 
Portuguese and then it was translated into English and French. A copy of the questionnaire 
is presented at the end of this report, in Appendix B (in English only). All the interviews 
were conducted face to face with the respondents and they all agreed to have the interviews 
recorded. The interviews were conducted in Portuguese, English and French. On average, 
each interview lasted between 45 minutes and 1 hour. We transcribed the audio recordings 
of the interviews, summarized them, and translated the Portuguese and French 
transcriptions into English. The summary of the interviews is presented in Appendix C, at 
the end of this report. 
Secondary quantitative data, archivai and other secondary source material were 
obtained from official government sources or representatives of the aerospace industries of 
Brazil and Canada. Other relevant sources of secondary information include data, 
documents and reports prepared by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
Organisation for Economie Co-operation and Development (OECD), and other 
organizations connected to the aerospace industry. 
In order to collect data that could serve as an example of governmental initiatives 
aiming at the further development of industrial activity in both countries, this research also 
used official publications prepared by the governments ofBrazil and Canada, in addition to 
documents and reports published in both countries by representatives of the aerospace 
industry and the industry-related organizations. A list of selected documents used for this 
purpose is presented on Appendix A: "Selected Bibliographie References." 
After the data collected in the course of the interviews were transcribed, we 
analyzed how the answers of the interviewees related to the bibliography and the 
institutional frameworks ofBrazil and Canada. This analysis took into consideration the 
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scope of the research and the limitations of the number of aspects used in the comparisons 
between Brazil and Canada. To validate the opinions of the interviewees, we compared 
how similar or different the answers to each question were, and how they relate to 
governrnent policies and official documents, in addition to other documents presented in 
Section 8- Bibliography. To corroborate and illustrate how vital aspects of the institutional 
environment of each country impact on the aerospace industry, we often cited the opinions 
and answers of individual interviewees in our analysis in Section 6 - Governrnental 
Support to the Aerospace Industry. 
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5 National Institutional Frameworks and the Aerospace 
Industry 
Brazil and Canada are unique countries, with their continental dimensions, generous 
natural resources, freely elected democratie governments, and a long tradition as non-
belligerent countries. There are several similarities and differences in the institutional 
frameworks of the two countries that contributed to the different stages of development of 
their aerospace industries. In this section, we first discuss the recent changes in the 
institutional frameworks ofBrazil and Canada. In Section 5.3, "The Aerospace Industry," 
we present the main characteristics of the global aerospace industry; while discussing sorne 
specifie details of regional aviation, as both Embraer and Bombardier are competing in this 
subdivision ofthe industry. 
In Section 5.4, "The Brazilian Aerospace Industry," we present a briefhistory of the 
aerospace sector in Brazil, the main characteristics of Embraer and the local supply chain. 
The Canadian counterpart, including the history and characteristics of Bombardier and the 
local supply chain are presented in Section 5.5, "The Canadian Aerospace Industry." 
5.1 Recent Developments in the Brazilian Institutional Framework 
Brazil went through profound political, social, and economie changes between the 
1980s and the mid-2000s: in 1985, there was a pacifie government transition from the 
military dictatorship that ruled the country for 25 years to a democratie government; a new 
constitution was promulgated in 1988 and a direct presidential election was held in 1989. 
The elected president took office in 1990 only to be impeached in 1992, caught in an 
elaborate corruption scheme that had contacts in most of the Federal Government agencies. 
The 1980s was known as the "lost decade," as hyperinflation destroyed the purchase power 
of the middle class. It was only in 1994 that Fernando Henrique Cardoso, then the Ministry 
of Finance, presented the "Piano Real," an economie plan designed to control the inflation 
and bring sorne normality to the country's eéonomy, allowing Brazil togo from 
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hyperinflation to single digit annual inflation rates. In 1995 Cardoso took the office as the 
President ofBrazil and promoted extensive economie reforms: after the World War II, the 
Brazilian government promoted a comprehensive import substitution program, stimulating 
high growth rates. However, this growth was unsustainable and the program was heavily 
based on state monopolies and a closed economy. Dming the Cardoso administration, 
Brazil privatized hundreds of public enterprises that the state had no longer financial 
resomces to maintain or expand (The Conference Board of Canada, 2008; Lattimore and 
Kowalski, 2008). 
The newly democratie regime that started in 1985 promoted major changes in the 
legal framework of Brazil. The constitution that was promulgated in 1988 marked the 
starting point of general economie reforms, which besicles the privatization of key sectors 
of the economy included major liberalization policies in investment and foreign trade. The 
privatizations marked the end of state monopolies in oil and gas, electricity and mining, 
telecommunications, banking services, transportation, and many other businesses. The 
economie reforms promoted by the govemment were somehow compromised by a number 
of extemal and internai economie shocks, preventing the country to experience a high 
sustained economie growth. When compared to China and India, the economie growth in 
Brazil over the past fifteen years can be regarded as modest, setting the country to be in a 
transition position. However, the role of the government in this economie development is 
undeniable and the po licy continuity resulted in the establishment of stability in 
macroeconomie indicators and the balance of payments, together with steady employment 
growth and improvements in the income distribution (Lattimore and Kowalski, 2008). 
The economie reforms initiated in the 1980s had the effect to reinvigorate the 
trading relationships of Brazil with the rest of the world. In 1988, the participation of trade 
in the country's GDP was 14 percent, while in 2006, that figure was 30 percent. The 
annual inflation rate was around 3 percent in 2006, while growth was in the 4-5 percent 
range in recent years. In spi te of the govemment efforts to enhance economie development 
and to promote industrial activity, GDP growth is still struggling with slow rates. During 
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the years of the import substitution program (from mid 1950s through mid 1980s), real 
GDP growth averaged 5.9 percent, while the average since 1989 is 2.2 percent. One 
possible explanation for the weak GDP growth is that the country is still in the process of 
adjustment to the more liberal environment resulting from the economie reforms, together 
with recent global economie shocks. Another possibility is that the overall investment in 
research and development is too low in sorne sectors of the economy (with the notorious 
exceptions of agriculture and aircraft) and therefore, productivity growth is being held 
back. In general terms, recent economie analysis shows that Brazil's trade performance is 
modest, especially when compared to other emerging countries (Hausman, 2008) 
The recent economie reforms promoted by the Brazilian government have coincided 
with a marked rise in the relative priees of products based on natural resources. In addition, 
a more open trading environment in Brazil has caused the country' s trade mix to change. 
Brazil has recently registered an increase in the experts of primary sector goods at the 
expense of sorne non-food manufactures. It is important to remark that the international 
competitiveness of certain sectors of the economy, such as machinery and equipment 
remains strong. In addition, Brazil has a growing ethanol industry, which is considered of 
great importance as the world struggles with the transition to alternative energy sources. 
The country is also a strong player in the export of soy beans, and of iron ore - a 
commodity in increasingly high demand by China, one of Brazil' s main trade partners. 
Together with continued fast growth in emerging economies, this factor can continue to 
provide consumers with the benefits from inexpensive imports and growing experts for the 
competitive sectors ofBrazil. The share ofthe agriculture sector in Brazil's GDP is 
considered to be somewhat small, but the sector is of particular importance, sin ce Brazil is 
a major world producer ofbeef, coffee, soya, sugar, and wheat (The Conference Board of 
Canada, 2008; Lattimore and Kowalski, 2008). 
However important the changes in the trade and trade-related policies are, the 
government of Brazil still has sorne major challenges ahead in order to rem ove all the 
constraints on the tradable sector. Sorne main problems to be corrected include the 
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necessary infrastructure improvements of port and airport systems and faciJities, together 
with the road and railroad systems. Another major challenge is the value-added taxation 
system that continues to be biased against exporters. Finally, the high payroll taxes and the 
complex labour legislation tend to reduce the competitiveness of businesses and 
simultaneously reduce employment incentives. Recent empirical research indicates that 
Brazil should liberalise even further, if it wants to improve income distribution, 
productivity across the tradable sectors and international competitiveness (Lattimore and 
Kowalski, 2008). 
With further support from the Brazilian government - in the form of additional 
reforms aiming at the facilitation of the independent organization, a more predictable set of 
laws and regulations, and a strong government capable of enforcing its laws, service sectors 
and traditional expmiers could gain even more in global, highly competitive business 
environment. According to Brazil's National Confederation ofindustry (CNI), there are 
urgent issues that need to be addressed by the public administration, so Brazil could offer 
an improved environment for the further industrial development of the country. CNI 
considers that the institutional development of the country is directly connected to its 
growth: in order to grow more, Brazil needs to break the vicious cycle resulting from partial 
and inconclusive institutional reforms. In an environment of economie growth, it is easier 
to promote institutional improvements that can facilitate even further the development of 
the country. Sorne of the issues that need to be addressed are: financial support for 
entrepreneurial innovation, fiscal incentives and direct support to research and 
development, property rights and improvement of the patenting system, the public policies 
concerning the access to foreign markets, the development of different policies for specifie 
sectors of the economy, the improvement ofthe technological services infrastructure, and 
the developrnent of industrial policies that include SMEs (CNI, 2005). 
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5.2 Recent Developments in the Canadian Institutional Framework 
Similar to Brazil, Canada is a country of continental dimensions, rich in natural 
resources. The country became a self-governing dominion in 1867, while retaining ties to 
the British crown. Economically and technologically, the nation has developed in close 
parallel with the United States, the neighbour to the South across an unfortified border. The 
economies of the two countries are closely integrated: in 2008, the U.S. economy absorbed 
75.5 percent of all goods exported by Canada, and it was the source of 63.4 percent of its 
imported goods. In 2008, the country GDP amounted to U.S. $ 1,499.5 billion (market 
ex change rate), which positions Canada as the 11 th largest economy in the world (Central 
Intelligence Agency, 201 0). 
Canada is an affluent, high-tech industrial society in the trillion-dollar class, with 
seats in the G7 and the G20, and membership in all major international organizations. The 
country has a market-oriented economie system, a sophisticated pattern of production, and 
high living standards. Profiting from the economie growth of the United States since World 
War II, Canada has experienced impressive growth of the manufacturing, mining, and 
service sectors, all of which contributing to transform the nation from a largely rural 
economy into one primarily industrial and urban . Almost 58 percent of Canadians speak 
only English; while 22 percent speak only French, most ofwhom are in Quebec. This 
language and cultural differences leaves Canada with a serious fault line, even though 
current support for sovereignty in Que bec is soft. Additional source of political concern is 
the public demands for quality improvements in health care and education services (The 
Conference Board of Canada, 2009; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009). 
After signing the 1989 U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the 1994 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFT A) (which includes Mexico), the country 
experienced a dramatic increase in trade and economie integration with the U.S., its main 
trade partner. Canada is the largest foreign supplier of energy to the United States, and 
exports include oil, gas, uranium, and electric power. Canada also has great natural 
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resources, a skilled labour force, and a modem capital plant, which reflects in solid 
economie growth. The govemment also plays an important role in this growth, since a 
prudent fiscal management resulted in consecutive balanced budgets from 1997 to 2007. 
(The Conference Board of Canada, 2008; OECD, 2009) 
After the global economie downtum of2007-2008, Canada experienced slow 
economie growth, combined with the U.S. housing slump, plunging auto sector demand, 
and a drop in world commodity priees. From October 2008 to August 2009, the economy 
shed an estimated 400,000 jobs. Foreign trade continues to depend on the U.S. economy, 
although revenues originated from raw materials were expected to increase in the years 
following the economie crisis, due to a priee appreciation of commodities. After contracting 
by 2.7 percent in 2009, the real GDP was forecast to grow by 3.2 percent in 2011 (The 
Conference Board of Canada, 2009, OECD 2010). 
Although governments play a decisive role in the economie growth of a country and 
can as a consequence, benefit from higher revenues in a healthy economie environment, in 
2009, Canadian public finances deteriorated for the first time since the mid-1990s. Even 
though the planned capital spending by alllevels of govemment managed to boost real 
GDP growth to 3.6 percent in 2010, earlier tax cuts and a stimulus package budgeted at 
CAD $46.6bn hit public finances hard. As a consequence, the recent string of fiscal 
surpluses came to an end in 2009. Recent tax cuts together with the cyclical decline in 
revenues and the stimulatory spending measures had the potential to cause the general 
govemment deficit to rise significantly. The government deficit was expected to remain 
high in 2010, when the stimulus measures were scheduled to start being withdrawn. The 
stimulus package was viewed as a legitimate effo1i to tackle unfavourable economie 
conditions, but it had the side effect of decreasing govemment revenues sharply. The 
resulting deficit at the federal and provinciallevels of govemment is considerable and there 
is a concem about its overall effectiveness, as govemments struggle to rebalance their 
books (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009; The Conference Board of Canada, 2009; 
OECD, 2009; OECD, 2010). 
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Regarding the stimulus package promoted by the Canadian governrnent, especially 
in light of the aging population of Canada, it is crucial that the country enters the second 
half of the next decade with reduced levels of net public debt (Dodge, 201 0). As Que bec 
alone concentrates between 55 and 60 percent of the Canadian aerospace industry, a 
snapshot of Quebec's overall business environrnent and support to the development of the 
aerospace industry should reflect the potential for growth of Canada' s aerospace industry. 
The Ministry of Economie Development, Innovation and Export Trade of Que bec 
(MDEIE) is the agency responsible for supporting economie development, innovation, and 
exports in the province. In addition, MDEIE supports R&D programs that can have a 
positive impact on the scientific, social and cultural development of Que bec. The Ministry 
recognizes that the private sector is the main force of economie development, while stating 
that private firms must take their fair share of risks when investing in economie projects. In 
addition, Quebec understands that economie development should benefit all citizens of the 
province, a clear statement that the redistribution of wealth remains as one of the priori ti es 
of the provincial government. In addition, the Que bec governrnent states that the 
development of public infrastructures contributes to sustainable economie development, 
which is reflected in the province' s commitment to in v est in research, technology and 
transport infrastructures, professional and technical training programs, and energy 
infrastructures (MDEIE, 2010). 
On the other hand, in a report published in August 2011, the Que bec Employers 
Council (Conseil du patronat du Québec) states that Quebec is losing its overall 
competitiveness when compared to other Canadian provinces (Alberta, British Columbia, 
and Ontario) and the OECD countries. The Co une il publishes an annual survey 
encompassing 21 indicators of economie competitiveness, regrouped in five main 
categories: 1) availability and quality of the labour force; 2) cost of the labour force; 3) 
regulation; 4) public finances; and 5) overall business environrnent. On average, Quebec 
received a grade Con the indicators included in the survey, while the other provinces had 
an average grade ofB- (Ontario and BC) orB (Alberta). According to the Council, in terrns 
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of human resources management, Que bec is lagging behind in areas such as the pere en tage 
ofyoung adults who do not have a secondary diploma; the proportion ofadults who have a 
degree in an area related to their employment; and the economie integration of immigrants. 
In addition, labour costs in Quebec are higher than in the other three provinces, placing 
Quebec in 15th place in a list of26 provinces/OECD countries surveyed by the Council 
(Hill Times, 201 0; Conseil du patronat du Québec, 2011 ). 
The province is also lagging behind in terms of public finances, as the Council 
points out that the tax burd en and lev el of public debt are considered to be harmful to the 
economie growth of Que bec. In addition, Que bec also should address issues such as the 
perceived low entrepreneurship intensity; a low number of registered patents; poor 
investments in information and communication technologies; and low global productivity. 
On the other hand, Que bec is weil placed in terms of investments and maintenance of its 
infrastructure and investments in R&D. Even though the report does not specify the 
concerns of different economie sectors (e.g. the aerospace industry) in terms of the 
efficiency of public poli ci es aiming at economie development, it is important to stress that 
the Council reflects the needs and values of priva te organizations doing business in 
Quebec; which include the aerospace sector (Conseil du patronat du Québec, 2011). 
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5.3 The A eros pace Industry 
According toLima et al. (2005) and Ferreira (2009), the aerospace industry can be 
usually divided into three different industrial sectors: 
1) Aeronautic- this sector comprises companies that operate in the following 
fields: design and manufacture of aircraft (airplanes and helicopters) and 
aircraft parts; aircraft engines and engine parts; avionics and electronic 
systems; maintenance, repair, and overhaul; simulators and training; and 
design and manufacture of space ships; 
2) Defence- this sector is dedicated to the development and production of 
weapons: missiles, rockets, radars and their parts and systems. The sector 
also produces several defence and communications systems (both the ones 
integrated in aircraft and the ones installed in land facilities) and their 
integration into defence networks; and 
3) Space- this sector deals with the development and manufacture of space 
vehicles: satellites and their on-board equipment, probe rockets and their 
parts and systems, besicles other specialized services. 
These three sectors have a common technological base that relies upon 
aerodynamics, resistance of materials, thermodynamics, and electronics. The industry is 
characterized by intensive innovation and the duality ( civilian and military) of its purpose. 
Heavy investments in innovation explain why aerospace is usually connected to other 
industrial systems based on scientific advancements, while the duality of purpose exp lains 
wh y aerospace is considered one of the most strategie industries of ali productive 
structures, in a global scale. The launch of a new aircraft is seen as an act of innovation, 
and it successively restructures the market. The enormous cost of launching new models, 
associated with forbidding risks crucially affect the market conduct and its performance. As 
a result, analyses that do not take the central importance of innovation into account can 
hardly be deemed adequate. Large original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) usually 
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integrate numerous technologies and systems, originating from various fields and 
industries, combining them into ever more efficient and capable means of air transport. A 
modem jet aircraft combines millions of components, incorporating a wide range of 
seemingly unrelated technologies: materials, propulsion, electronics, hydraulics, 
aerodynamics, among others. The many constituent systems found in a new jet aircraft are 
individually extremely complex. The current cost to develop a new commercial jet aircraft 
is estimated to be approximately $4-$6 billion in upfront R&D expenditure (Tyson, 1993; 
Ferreira, 2009). 
The relevance of the state in the aerospace industry can be understood as the 
presence of the state is crucial in determining the investment levels in regards of both the 
demand and in support of technological development. Public demand is crucial for the 
defence and space sectors. In all countries that are major producers ofweapons, the defence 
sector (including the military segments of the aeronautic and space sectors) seeks primarily 
to meet the demands ofits armed forces. The exports ofthe defence sector, which can be 
categorized as weapons, need the support, or at !east the acquiescence ofthe state. As a 
re suit, larger nations see a domestic aircraft industry as an integral part of the ir defence 
strategies. In the space sector, demand for scientific equipment is virtually restricted to 
public orders. In the commercial area, the state can influence the demand through the 
selective protection of market segments (Tyson, 1993; Lima et al., 2005; Ferreira, 2009; 
Rira and De Oliveira, 2007; De Oliveira, 2009). 
Aircraft production is one of the most technologically complex sectors, and it 
requires heavy financial investment, usually in different conditions of business cycles. In 
addition, the industry is known for constantly developing technological applications and 
supporting high levels ofwell-paid employment. For these reasons, the state is committed 
in supporting the development and introduction of new technologies in the aerospace 
industry. Besicles the direct support for R&D through the establishment of research centers, 
the state can offer long-term loans at low interest rates to finance the development of new 
projects in science and military equipment. It can also offer incentives and tax subsidies for 
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commercial projects, besides financing investments and the expansion of production 
capacity and marketing. Moreover, the state is the main coordinator agent of the assets 
restructuring process (mergers, acquisitions and strategie alliances) of the industry, both at 
the national and intemationallevels (Tyson, 1993; Lima et al. , 2005; Ferreira, 2009; De 
Oliveira, 2009). 
Aerospace has al ways relied upon heavy govemmental subsidies in order to 
continue to improve technology. However, in the past decades, the business environment of 
the industry has evolved into four main areas: deregulation, consolidation of intemational 
competition (including mergers and acquisitions), reduction of govemment support, and 
commercial disputes on the WTO (Hira and De Oliveira, 2007; De Oliveira, 2007). In 
addition, the aerospace industry is of vital importance to the governments of Brazil and 
Canada, as the well-documented disputes between the two countries illustrates. According 
to Goldstein and McGuire (2004), as far as the WTO disputes are concemed, both 
govemments are supportive of their industries: 
Through the latter part of the 1990s and dragging on into the fust years of the new miiiennium, 
Brazil and Canada engaged in a remarkably bitter and lengthy trade dispute concerning government 
support for their respective national aerospace industries. 
There are sorne particular characteristics of the aerospace industry that canjustify 
the concems of national govemments to support the development of the industry. The 
aerospace industry plays a strategie role in national economy and security of a country. The 
industry is also known for: 
1. High economie concentration and expressive barriers to entry: it is not 
uncommon for an OEM to risk ali of its liquid assets in the development of 
a new product; 
2. Intensive use of scientific and technological research ( exemplified in the 
high investments in R&D); 
3. The technological complexity of its products; 
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4. Dominance of large conglomerates as the main players; 
5. National (or at least, regional) control offirms, despite the global 
characteristic of the industry; 
6. The establishment ofpartnerships, especially in the space division (e.g. 
NASA and CSAjoint projects); 
7. Imperfect competition (the top ten global players account for 85 percent of 
ail profits); 
8. Tight profit margins, even though the industry generates significant 
revenues; 
9. The return on investments is generated on long-term: it can take up to 6 
years between the launching of a new aircraft and the first de li very of the 
finished product. The average ROI period for investments in new aircraft 
platform is between 10-12 years, and high levels returns are projected over a 
30-40 period; and 
1 O. Intense participation of governments, both at the civil and the defence 
sectors (De Souza, 2007; Ferreira, 2009; AIAC, 2010). 
As a consequence, competition is limited in each sector of the industry (large 
civilian aircraft, regional aircraft, business jets, helicopters, etc). Aircraft production 
requires massive economies of scale and sophisticated supply lines, which in most cases 
results in natural oligopolies. The high barriers to entry are in part caused by the 
requirements of the industry in high capital commitments to design and produce aircraft, 
highly skiiled and concentrated workforce and its heavy regulations in terms of 
performance and safety. In addition, manufacturers have to constantly deal with 
inconsistent orders (both because of competition and business cycles); the constant 
necessity to improve the models as weil as the production of many variants of each 
generation of aircraft. Also, production capacity should be flexible enough to be 
changed quickly to meet the sales, as virtually every unit is custom produced. As a result, 
since the 1960s, only one entirely new manufacturer of aircraft- Embraer- was capable of 
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entering in the civil jet aircraft market (Niosi and Zhegu, 2005; Hira and De Souza, 2007; 
De Souza, 2007). Figure 3 shows how the industry structure creates cost pressures on 
manufacturers: 
FIG. 3- Aerospace Industry Structure and Cost Pressures 
Source: Sherry and Sarsfield, 2002 
In order to survive, the few established business in the industry have to face strong 
competition and observe the unique dynamics of the industry. Niosi and Zhegu (2005) 
argue that 
Aerospace is a high value-added sector, strongly affected by scale and timing. The industry success 
depends on rapid technological progress; govemment support for corporate R&D is essential. Their 
activity depends on components and parts which can be widely dispersed in terms ofboth industry 
and location. 
The aerospace sector will tend to concentrate in regions where a pool of skilled and 
semi-skilled labour is available, which translate into regions with strong presence of 
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universities, research centers and laboratories, both public and private. Moreover, the 
availability of skilled personnel, combined with the development of a specialized supply 
chain resulted in the concentration of the industry in a few regional aircraft clusters, located 
in cities such as Montreal, Toronto, Seattle, Toulouse, and in a certain way, Sao José dos 
Campos. The industry is highly concentrated in North America, which controls 48.5 per 
cent of total revenues, and Europe, which accounts for 43 percent ofworld revenue. A 
recent trend in the industry is the shift of production towards low-cost high-GDP areas, 
such as Asia-Pacific and Latin America. In 2009, commercial airlines accounted for 78.5 
per cent of the aerospace industry revenues, followed by freight, at 1 0 per cent, and other 
end-users at 11.5 percent (Niosi and Zhegu, 2005; Bernardes, 2010; Deloitte & Touche 
LLP, 2010). 
The strong "buyer power" that the airlines exhibit over aircraft manufacturers 
compounds the sales pressure on cost. In general, airlines do not operate as independent 
buyers, even though there are a large number of commercial airlines and aircraft leasing 
agencies that are very active in the world market. In addition, airline demand for new 
equipment is heavily influenced by energy priees and economie growth. As a consequence, 
the requirements of the airlines tend to be qui te similar in terms of what aircraft each air 
company needs and when they them to be available. These shifts in the demand for types 
and quantities of aircraft tend to be synchronized and effective! y mimic the behaviour of a 
single buyer (Sherry and Sarsfield, 2002). 
In order to illustrate the current dynamics of the competition in the aerospace 
industry, Niosi and Zhegu (2005) state that 
In the last 10 years, civil aircraft original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) have been competing 
for orders from airline companies, whose revenues have been declining. The four major civil 
aircraft prime contractors are EADS/Airbus and Boeing (for planes over 100 seats) and Bombardier 
and Embraer for regional jets. 
Even though the international aircraft market has a global dimension, it is 
characterized by a concentrated oligopoly worldwide. Today, no country hasan internai 
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market that is both dynamic and large enough to singularly finance the high costs of 
developing a new aircraft. Only a few global players can afford such costs, and they tend to 
organize themselves into large aerospace conglomerates, focused on the different sectors of 
the industry: aeronautic, deferree, and space. As the development of new aircraft is a highly 
capital-intensive and risky venture, military orders have been essential to maintaining basic 
stability in the industry. Commercial aircraft production is strategie in the traditional 
deferree context because of spillovers between commercial and military operations. Scope 
economies and technological innovation are deeply intertwined in both sides of the 
industry. Ali commercial airframe manufacturers are also major military contractors, and 
both si des of the industry share an overlapping pool of subcontractors and component 
suppliers. The collaborations between the military and civil divisions of the industry are 
remarkable: while deferree equipment focus on performance and flexibility; the commercial 
sector focus on cost and reliability- resulting in overall high technology and innovation, 
the trademarks of the industry. As a consequence, it is no accident that the democratie 
countries which are the biggest sellers of deferree equipment are also the major producers of 
commercial aire raft (Tyson, 1993; Sherry and Sarsfield, 2002; Niosi and Zhegu, 2005). 
To remain competitive and cost-effective, severallarge OEMs have taken advantage 
of economies of scale and the risk/cost sharing benefits of merging or outsourcing. As a 
result, a majority of the components in modern aircraft are designed and manufactured by 
vendors in the supply chain. The consolidation of the industry's supply chain has decreased 
costs. From the perspective of the large OEMs, the mergers reduced the number of 
suppliers, eliminating the costs of managing and executing con tracts. In addition, the 
mergers also reduced the cost of the components, as they provided products already 
integrated by suppliers and eliminated duplication of general administrative costs that were 
previously included in the cost of each individual component. A more integrated supply 
chain meant eliminating duplicate equipment and processes and utilizing shared parts 
inventories, which is believed to be a source of cost reduction (Sherry and Sarsfield, 2002; 
Niosi and Zhegu, 2005). 
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These mergers also reflected in the way large OEMs place themselves in the 
industry, as the world market became more and more competitive in recent decades. Figure 
3 shows that sorne major players of the industry opted to merge or acquire other companies, 
while others went out of business (Sherry and Sarsfield, 2002; Niosi and Zhegu, 2005). As 
a result, the industry became more and more concentrated between 1980 and 2008: 
France 
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Canada 
Canada 
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Holland 
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............ USA 
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FIG. 4- Concentration ofthe World Civil Aircraft Industry (1980-2008) 
Source: ABDI & UNICAMP, 2008 
The growing technological complexity of the industry, which is reflected in its high 
R&D costs, has been forcing the large manufacturers into the specialization of tasks: large 
players will concentrate on designing and assembling new aircraft, while their suppliers 
will handle the production of structural components and parts, such as fuselage and wings. 
The implication of such arrangement is that the further development of the aerospace 
industry will depend increasingly on a strong supply chain and the capacity of the large 
players to coordinate such diverse supply chain (ABDI & UNICAMP, 2008). 
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In the 1980s, the industry developed a new characteristic that is now progressive! y 
widespread: the industrial offset agreements, which are aimed at transferring part of an 
aircraft production to a country with less technological capacity. Such agreements were 
designed as a way to force the relocation of the economie activity from the selling country 
to the one purchasing the aircraft. Thus, major buyers managed to impose purchasing 
conditions, such as partnerships in the manufacturing of new aircraft, which suppliers could 
not ignore. In the end, the offset agreements triggered an international transfer of 
production skills from one nation to another, allowing competitors to build new production 
capabilities. These offset agreements are the result of strong competitive pressures and the 
bargaining power from buyers. De Souza (2007), citing Pritchard (2002) states that the 
agreements were originally conceived by Douglas, when it subcontracted the assembly of 
the wings and fuselage for the DC-9 and DC-1 0 in Canada and Ital y, which resulted in 
substantial sales to these countries. Therefore, the offset agreements are meant to support a 
sale that would not take place in the absence of a compensatory scheme (Hira and De 
Souza, 2007; De Souza, 2007). 
Conceming the organization of the aerospace industry, Figure 5 shows the hierarchy 
divisions within the industry, which are generally referred to as "tiers": 
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FIG. 5- The Subdivisions of the Aerospace Industry 
Source: Niosi & Zhegu (2005) 
OEMs are located at the top of the pyramid and are usually referred to as Ti er 1. 
OEMs include the main aircraft assemblers, such as EADS/ Airbus, Bell Helicopter 
Textron, Boeing, Bombardier, Embraer, and Eurocopter. There are significant entry barriers 
in this ti er, as a reflex of high costs of developing a new aircraft, technical training and the 
complexity of post-sales services. Even though OEMs have a relatively low volume of 
production, an aircraft is a highly complex product: a Boeing 747 has approximately six 
million individual parts, while a modern aircraft has on average over 100 kilometres of 
cables (Lima et al., 2005; Niosi and Zhegu, 2005). 
Tier 2 encompasses manufacturers of propulsion systems (General Electric, Pratt & 
Whitney, Snecma, and Rolls-Royce), on board avionics (Honeywell, Sextant Avionique), 
airframe structures and subassemblies such as landing gear, nacelles, and hydraulic systems 
(Messier-Dowty, Héroux-Devtek). Developing costs at this tier are also high: developing a 
new engine can cost up to U.S. $1 billion. This segment also encompasses the maintenance, 
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repair and overhaul (MRO) services, which are essential in the industry, considering that 
the lifespan of an aire raft is 25-40 years. Different! y from the rest of the industry, MRO 
services tend to expand in economie crisis, as customers tend to postpone the purchase of 
new aircraft and invest more on the maintenance oftheir current fleet (Lima et al. , 2005; 
Niosi and Zhegu, 2005; ABDI and UNICAMP, 2009). 
Ti er 3 is composed of producers of electronic subassemblies, hydraulic systems, and 
fuselage parts. Even though Ti er 3 is at the base of the pyramid, this division of the industry 
is a highly concentrated group of producers, with only a handful of manufacturers 
dominating each segment (Lima et al., 2005; Niosi and Zhegu, 2005). 
Besides these 3 tiers, hundreds of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) complete 
the supply chain of the aerospace industry, offering parts and components to be assembled 
by tier 2 and 3. In general, large aerospace clusters are consisted of one or more OEMs 
surrounded by hundreds of SMEs, which supply parts and components to the tiers at the 
upper levels of the industry pyramid, besides rendering maintenance, repairing, and 
alignment services to aircraft. With large OEMs outsourcing their design and 
manufacturing activities to companies in Tier 3 in order to reduce the cost of components, 
the origin and rate of flow of innovation and technology development in the industry has 
radically changed in recent years. As a result, R&D -a key determinant of sustainable 
competitive advantage, is now performed by fragmented vendors in the lower end of the 
supply chain (Sherry and Sarsfield, 2002; Lima et al., 2005; Niosi and Zhegu, 2005). 
The clusters within the industry are highly specialized. The main components of an 
aircraft (fuselages, wings, engines, avionics, landing gear, etc) are high-value parts that can 
be easily shipped from one cluster to another at relatively low transportation costs. As a 
consequence, civil aircraft assembly is concentrated in a few clusters (Montreal, Seattle, 
Toulouse, and Sao José dos Campos). The production of engines is concentrated around 
GE's plants in the U.S. (in Ohio and Massachusetts), and in Montreal as weil. Seattle is a 
cluster for engineering and production of large commercial aircraft, since Boeing is located 
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in that area. The companies located in the Toulouse cluster are major suppliers of 
EADS/ Airbus and ATR. This points out to the dominance of large OEMs in the clusters, 
acting as a magnet for suppliers and other SMEs within the industry. Another characteristic 
of the industry is that its clusters display strong international connections rather than local 
ones, which also reflects in the inter-firm competition, which takes place around the world, 
not within the cluster (Niosi and Zhegu, 2005). 
In 2009, the estimated global size of the aerospace industry was U.S. $382 billion, 
including both military and civil sectors. The value includes all components of the value 
chain ranging from aircraft and aircraft parts; and aircraft maintenance, repair, and 
overhaul. The global civil aviation aerospace sector accounts for 46 percent (U.S. $ 176 
billion) of the whole industry, while the military aerospace sector comprises the other 54 
percent (U.S. $205 billion) of the 2009 total revenue. In the civil aviation segment of the 
industry, aircraft manufacturers account for 59 percent of total revenues, followed by 
manufacturers of engines and engine parts (22.5 percent), and airplane part and equipment 
manufacturers (18.5 percent) (Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2010). 
The industry relies heavily on capital (e.g. the financing of aircraft sales); extremely 
qualified workers (e.g. engineers, researchers of new materials, specialized technicians); 
infrastructures (e.g. energy, transportation); and technology (R&D centers), all ofwhich 
expose it to a wide variety of economie risks and in which development and availability 
govemments play a central role. In addition, since aerospace is a global industry, 
macroeconomie disturbances in any part ofthe world are most likely to influence the 
businesses of the industry in ail continents. As the civil aviation industry is closely 
connected to the performance of the airline companies, its sales were hurt in the recent 
financial crisis. On the other hand, the military and defence industry continued to profit 
from the rising threat of global terrorism and remained a lucrative niche for its players, who 
also benefit from high barriers to entry. Considering the 2009 global revenue, the three 
main countries in the civil aerospace industry are the United States, the European Union, 
and Canada (Lima et aL, 2005; Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2010). 
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Table 2 shows the top 9 global civil market leaders in 2009: 
1 EADS/ Airbus E.U. 43764 34.5% 
2 Boeing u.s. 29897 23.6% 
~~ ... ,~ .. ····--
3 United Technologies u.s. 11195 8.8% 
4 General Electric u.s. 9414 7.4% 
5 Bombardier Canada 7761 6.1% 
6 Rolls-Royce UK 6997 5.5% 
---~-----· 
7 Embraer Brazil 4834 3.8% 
8 Honeywell u.s. 4325 3.4% 
9 Textron u.s. 4325 3.4% 
10 Other n/a 4198 3.3% 
Table 2- Top Global Civil Market Leaders 
Source: Deloitte & Touche LLP (2010) 
The military aerospace market is concentrated at the various departments within the 
military establishments in each country. The defence market is usually seen as 
unpredictable and even unstable within the industry, and its development depend basically 
on governmental procurement decisions (Lima et al., 2005). Even though defence 
purchases and military investments in R&D have been decisive the development of the 
aerospace industry in most countries, the focus of our study is on the civil aerospace 
industry. 
Deloitte & Touche LLP (2010) points out that in terms ofindustry development, the 
main drivers of the civil aerospace industry are: 
• GDP; 
• Renewal and expansion of active fleet; 
• Long term pilot and workforce shortages; 
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• Industry expansion in emerging markets; 
• Changes in rules and regulations; 
• Changes in technologies and intensity in R&D; 
• Aircraft deliveries and backlogs, together with the risks of order 
cancellations. 
In terms of industry development and production costs, an expansion in orders is a 
major driver of investments in modernization and gro\vth of the installed productive 
capacity. Expansion in the civil aerospace sector is directly connected to general economie 
growth and favorable financing conditions. Expansion in the deferree and space sectors is 
connected to the interest of governments in renewing and expanding military equipment 
and advancements in space exploration programs. Regarding production costs, they are 
incurred both directly (R&D) and indirectly, as sunk costs are common in the initial phases 
of the technologicallearning curve. Sunk costs usually decrease after a new aircraft is fully 
assembled; as the workforce assimilates the required skills and the number of aircraft 
produced incœases. It is estimated that production costs decrease by 20 per cent when 
production is doubled, while labour requirements are estimated to drop by 30 to 40 per 
cent. This is one of the main drivers for major players to have a strong presence worldwide 
(De Souza, 2007; Ferreira, 2009). 
5.3.1 Regional Aviation 
Bombardier and Embraer both compete for the leading position in the regional and 
business aircraft segment of the industry. For the aerospace industry, regional aviation 
became more important in the late 1980s, as the world market for the civil aviation changed 
radically when large airlines shifted from point-to-point to hub-and-spoke networks, which 
required large aircraft on1y for the service of major airports, whereas regional aircraft fed 
the lines around the hub. For companies as Bombardier and Embraer, this change in the 
civil aviation industry inaugurated the era of regional jets. As passengers expressed their 
preferences for regional jet aircraft instead of propeller-driven machines, sales of regional 
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jet aircraft soared, and that was the genesis of the Brazil-Canada dispute on the WTO 
(Goldstein & McGuire, 2004; Lima et al., 2005; Niosi and Zhegu, 2005; ABDI & 
UNICAMP, 2008). 
As competition in each niche of the industry is fi erce, aircraft manufacturers are 
obliged to consider each sale a "must win," not only because of revenue generated by the 
sale and market share, but for the sustained revenue from spares and maintenance over the 
lifespan of the aire raft. Each successful sale is also considered to increase the probability of 
future sales to any given airline by virtue of the economies of scale that the airline can 
ac hi eve by operating a fleet of aircraft with the same (or similar) engines and other aire raft 
system components. As a result, the Bombardier and Embraer follow the maxim of the 
industry, "don't abandon a market to the competitors," seeking creative ways to finance and 
serve each airline's specifie needs at almost any cost (Sherry and Sarsfield, 2002). 
In 2008, Bombardier had annual revenues ofU.S. $10 billion, while Embraer 
amassed U.S. $ 6.3 billion in that same year. Even though Bombardier and Embraer are a 
quasi-duopoly in the regional aircraft segment, there are severa! other players competing in 
that niche: Textron, General Dynamics, Onex Corp, and Dassault, for example. 
Competition is expected to recrudesce in the coming years, as the Chinese and the Russian 
governments were backing two new companies to enter the regional aircraft market in late 
2010 (Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2010). 
Considering annual revenue, large commercial aircraft, the segment in which 
Boeing and EADS/ Airbus compete, dominate world sales: in 2009 large aircraft had an 
estimated U.S. $60.8 billion in revenue, against U.S. $15.5 billion of regional and business 
aircraft. Large aircraft are also predominant in the world's commercial airline fleet: in 
2008, 83.7 per cent ofthe 18,800 aire raft were large commercial aire raft, against 16.3 per 
cent of regional aircraft (ABDI, 2010; Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2010). 
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The economie crisis that started in 2007 had an extremely negative impact on the 
regional and business aircraft segment: order volumes for business aircraft dropped by 38 
percent in 2008. Other factors that have a negative impact in the performance of the 
regional segment are: 
1. The economie and enviromnental efficiency requirements that are pushing 
airlines to larger aire raft - as a result of more passengers in each route, air 
carriers willlikely replace smaller regional aircraft with larger models. The 
consumption of fuel (and the autonomy of an aire raft), combined with the 
emissions of air pollutants can also determine the size of the aircraft in a 
regional carrier' s fleet; 
2. The congestion at major airports that is driving demand away from the 
smallest planes - as the busier the airport, the higher the priees charged for 
their services, which most likely will drive away regional carriers; and 
3. The trend of fractional ownership arrangements in the business market-
despite the maintenance and fuel costs, more businesses and individuals can 
afford to bu y a "percentage" of an aircraft and have the rights to use it for a 
certain number of hours a year. In this mo del, regional airlines are more 
exposed to the risk oflosing customers than the larger ones (ABDI & 
UNICAMP, 2009; Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2010). 
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5.4 The Brazilian Aerospace Industry 
The genesis of the Brazilian aerospace industry is tightly connected to the 
reorganization and development of the Brazilian Air Force in the 1940s. During the World 
War II, Brazil had to reconsider the efficiency of its aerial defence system, which was 
scattered between the three armed forces- each of them with their own aircraft, controlled 
independently from a central command. In 1941, with the technical support ofthe United 
States government, Brazil created the Brazilian Air Force. One of the objectives of the Air 
Force was the constitution of a national aerospace industry and mastering of the technology 
necessary for that achievement (Forjaz, 2005; Silva, 2008). 
As Brazillacked most of the infrastructure in transportation, communications, and 
energy, the Air Force knew that it would be almost impossible to develop the aerospace 
industry at that stage of country' s economie development. Instead, the govemment opted to 
develop an aeronautics engineering school and a research center on aeronautics technology. 
In 1946, the then Brazilian Ministry of Aeronautics (which was merged into the Ministry of 
Defence, together with the Ministries ofthe Army and the Navy in 2001) created the 
Brazilian General Command for Aerospace Technology (CTA), a research facility aimed at 
the improvement of the Brazilian Air Force operations. In 1948, the Ministry created the 
Aeronautical Institute of Technology (ITA), a higher education and training facility with 
emphasis in aerospace science and technology, funded by the Federal Govemment. Even 
though Brazillacked a minimal industrial infrastructure at the time, the establishment of 
CT A and IT A marked the initial investment in the training of high qualified aeronautic 
engineers, an investment that would generate new specializations in aerospace electronics, 
mechanics, and infrastructure in Brazil (Forjaz, 2005; Silva, 2008). 
In 1950, CTA was transferred to Sào José dos Campos; a city located 100 
kilometres Northeast of Sào Paulo, which would later become the Brazilian aerospace 
cluster. The establishment of CTA and ITA in Sào José dos Campos was essential not only 
to the development of the Brazilian aerospace industry but also to the economie 
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development of the V ale do Paraiba region, where the city is located (De Souza and Da 
Costa, 2010). In the 1950s and 1960s, CTA and ITA became reference centers in high 
technology in Brazil and both institutions assisted in the creation of severa} private 
businesses, including Embraer (Forjaz, 2005). In 1964, a coup d'État and the military 
regime that would be in power for the next 25 years intensified the development of the 
Brazilian aerospace industry: the military not only had control over the Federal 
Government budget but they also had more freedom to increase the investments in military 
equipment and deferree (Pinto, Migon and Montoro, 2007; Silva, 2008). 
In 2006, North America was the main importer of the Brazilian aerospace industry, 
as the destination of 49.4 percent of the Brazilian aerospace production (to the amount of 
U.S. $1.84 billion), followed by Asia and the Middle East, which imported 23.1 percent of 
the Brazilian production (at U.S. $863 million), the European Union at 22.3 percent (U.S. 
$835 million), while the rest ofthe world bought 5.2 percent of production (U.S. $194 
million). For these reasons, the Brazilian government consider the aerospace in general and 
Embraer in pmiicular to be a key element in the economie, technological and geopolitical 
development of the country (ABDI and UNICAMP, 2008; ABDI and UNICAMP, 2009). 
Figure 6 shows the segmentation of revenues in 2007 (in percentage of revenues): 
Spa ce 
0.4% 
FIG. 6- The Brazilian Aerospace Industry: Segmentation of Revenues, 2007 
Source: Ferreira (2009) 
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Today, aerospace is considered to be the only high technology industry in which 
Brazil has a recognized competency in the global market. The Brazilian share of the world 
market is modest, as its aerospace industry is concentrated in the regional aviation market. 
In addition, the industry is centered in only one major player- Embraer, but this is not 
perceived as a deficiency: it actually allows Embraer to have an active insertion in the 
global market. Embraer is seen as weil regarded company in a high visibility industry, 
which is an excellent marketing tool for Brazil abroad. On the other hand, this could also be 
interpreted as a deficiency of the industry, since only Embraer has the necessary business 
scale to be competitive in the world market (Ferreira, 2009). Despite this problem, the 
industry is considered to be strategie to the economie development of the country as it is a 
source ofboth high level jobs and solid commercial surpluses, despite its high coefficient 
ofimports (ABDI and UNICAMP, 2008). 
5.4.1 Embraer: The Main Playet of the Brazilian Aerospace Industry 
Embraer is today the main player of the Brazilian aerospace industry, concentrating 
84.5 percent of the annual revenues of the sector in 2007. The company was established in 
Sao José dos Campos in 1969, under the military regime and when it was conceived, it was 
focused on a strong connection between three main characteristics of the aerospace industry 
idealized by the military: higher education, technological research, and the industrialization 
of the country. Originally, the company was state-owned, but it was traditionally governed 
by private law and for a long time, it was directed by a competent independent manager 
with important connections with government officiais. As the company always had close 
ties with the Ministry of Aeronautics, the bureaucratie red tape was avoided from the very 
beginning. Further governmental support was provided through a series of mechanisms, 
including favouring the firm in public procurement and government financing support. In 
addition, Brazilian corporations were allowed to invest up to 1 per cent of their due income 
taxes each year into buying Embraer shares, providing a much needed injection of capital 
(Goldstein and McGuire, 2004; Hira and De Oliveira, 2007; Ferreira, 2009). 
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The development of Embraer was based on the acquisition of the know-how 
necessary to create an industrial program aiming at specifie national and international 
market niches. The company also aimed at obtaining knowledge resulting from local 
research, international agreements for technology transfer, extemal consulting services and 
licensing agreements. Embraer's technological advancement also benefitted from the 
demands and propositions of the Ministry of Aeronautics. Unlike the implementation ofthe 
Brazilian auto industry (where transnational corporations were at the highest level of 
industrial activity), Embraer was conceived as astate company with the exclusive mandate 
to be the final assembler of aircraft resulting from an endogenously aeronautic project. As 
Embraer was created by the military in an attempt to provide Brazil with the ability to 
develop and build aircraft- including military equipment, its first product was a military 
plane, the Xavante, which was unveiled in 1971. So, in a sense, the military guaranteed 
Embraer a learning curve and served as a testing ground for the company's aircraft. In 
addition, the government insisted that ali public sector planes had to be purchased from 
Embraer and that air travel within Brazil should take place on Embraer planes (Frischtak, 
1994; Bemardes, 2000; Espafia, 2004; Hira and De Oliveira, 2007; Bragion, 2010). 
The Xavante was a trainer, attack and reconnaissance aircraft developed by 
Aermacchi, an Italian aerospace company. At the early stages ofEmbraer, the strategy of 
the Brazilian government was to establish licensing agreements with foreign manufacturers 
that later involved outsourcing relationships, joint ventures, equity participations and 
finally, direct investment by Embraer in foreign countries and the establishment ofrisk-
sharing partnerships with foreign manufacturers. The partnership with Aermacchi was later 
expanded in 1985, with the development ofthe AMX program, which was ajoint venture 
between Embraer, Aermacchi and Alenia, another aerospace finn from Italy. The AMX 
was emblematic to the development of Embraer as it gave the company access to advanced 
technologies in airbome electronics, system and data integration and aerodynamics. The 
aircraft was integrated by the Brazilian and Italian air forces (Espafia, 2004; Silva, 2008). 
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In the 1990s, Brazil started a major privatization program and institutional reform 
aiming at the modemization and opening ofthe Brazilian market to the world economy. 
Between 1991 and 2006, the Brazilian govemment sold over 40 state-owned companies in 
sectors as different as telecommunications and mining and aerospace. As a result of the 
world recession following the 1991 GulfWar, the aerospace industry was affected with 
serious financial problems. In 1994, after reporting a loss ofU.S. $337 million, the 
company was approaching bankruptcy. As a consequence, the govemment considered 
selling a stake of Embraer to a foreign aerospace company in order to save the company, as 
the high lev el of debt of Embraer did not encourage the govemment to off er a rescue 
package that would effectively restructure its balance sheet. In December 1994, a group of 
investors that includes a union, the Brazilian Holding and Investment Bank Bozano 
Simonsen SA (a leading financial conglomerate in Brazil), and two large semi-public 
pension funds (PRE VI and SIS TEL) bought a controlling stake of 60 per cent of Embraer. 
The govemment, who retained 6.8 percent of the company's stock, injected new capital 
and assumed the debt, estimated at U.S. $700 million. In 1999, a French consortium of four 
aerospace companies (Aerospatiale-Matra, Dassault Aviation, Snecma, and Thomson-CSF) 
acquired a combined participation of 20 per cent of Embraer stake, valuing the company at 
approximately U.S. $1 billion (Frischtak, 1994; Espafi.a, 2004; Goldstein and McGuire, 
2004; Silva, 2008). 
Besicles promoting major layoffs (resulting in the dismissal of about one third of its 
5,500 employees), the new administration promoted sorne changes in the company culture 
in 1995, trying to integrate the technological and industrial focus ofthe state-run company 
with new entrepreneurial vision of the new controllers. From that point on, the company 
would: a) be focused on results; b) embrace a new entrepreneurial culture, together with 
new finance and management competences; c) introduce the concept of the Global 
Enterprise; d) develop a new organization, client oriented, agile and responsible, making 
use of the best practices and available resources, and e) build a new relationship with the 
63 
employees, based on a clear, open and transparent communication (Espaîia, 2004; 
AIAC, 2009) 
In 1998, after giving financiallosses for 11 consecutive years, Embraer retumed to 
profitability. In 2000, the company eamed U.S. $297 million on estimated revenues ofU.S. 
$2.4 billion. Foreign trade is a crucial element to the success of the company, as exports 
make up 90 per cent of total sales of Embraer. The company is also the biggest Brazilian 
exporter, accounting for 3.5 percent of total Brazilian sales abroad in 1999 (Goldstein and 
McGuire, 2004). 
Embraer went through a comprehensive corporate restructuring in 2006, and 
became the first large Brazilian company to have its capital thoroughly dispersed. As part 
of the restructuring process, the following guidelines were approved: a) no shareholder or 
group of shareholders would be entitled to control over 5 per cent of the votes, which 
discouraged the concentration of shares in the hands of a few controllers; b) foreign 
shareholders, either individually or in groups, would have their rights limited to 40 percent 
of the total votes, in order to secure the national character of the company; and c) any 
shareholder or group of shareholders are prohibited from acquiring a stake of 35 percent or 
more ofEmbraer, except under cases with express authorization of the Federal Government 
(who is the holder ofthe company's golden share), and subject the completion of a takeover 
bid. This restructuring was considered to be a elever way of Embraer to continue using the 
international stock market to capitalize without ceasing to be a Brazilian corporation. The 
golden share retained by the government gives it a seat on the board and veto rights over a 
change in control of the company, and the Brazilian government can interfere on 
merge/acquisitions operations and issuances of new securities. The veto power was justified 
for decisions related to matters of national security, but Embraer claims that the 
government has no effective power to interfere in day-to-day operations (Gomes et al., 
2005; Hira and De Oliveira, 2007; ABDI & UNICAMP, 2008). 
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In 1990, when the company was at its peak, it had 12,700 employees. In 1995, after 
the privatization, the number of employees was down to 3,600. In 1998, when the company 
was once again profitable, the number of employees raised to 6,737 (including 2,788 who 
were working in the company's overseas facilities). In 2011 , Embraer had 17,250 direct 
employees and a net profit ofU.S. $86 million. As for the Brazilian aerospace industry as a 
who le, it employed over 22,600 people as of December 2010 and it generated exports to the 
amount ofU.S. $4,99 billion (ABDI and UNICAMP, 2008; ABDI and UNICAMP, 2009, 
AIAB 2011). 
Embraer is now the world leader in the segment of commercial aircraft with 70-120 
seats; and until the unveiling of Bombardier' s CSeries, it was the sole manufacturer of 
aircraft with 90 to 115 seats. The company has plants and offices in Brazil, the United 
States, France, Portugal, China, and Singapore and its business areas include the 
commercial aviation market, deferree systems, and the executive aviation market. In 
addition, it is generally agreed that Embraer's decision to focus on underserved market 
niches proved to be a great oppmtunity for leaming, as the manufacturing of agricultural 
spray planes and the military training planes proved to consolidate the company's position 
worldwide. The company's decision to export, back in the 1980s, forced the Brazilian 
government to pro vide increasing amounts of public finance and public support towards 
exports (including the Financing Program for Brazilian Exports- ProEx; subsidies and 
marketing assistance). On the other hand, Embraer toda y has little need to seek for 
govemment financial support to invest in R&D. The company is one of the few Latin 
American firms to have succeeded in leveraging foreign technology and indigenous 
managerial expe1tise for intemational success. The recent successes of Embraer made it 
possible for the company to shift part of its focus to the deferree market, in a search to 
expand its businesses even further. The Brazilian govemment is aware that the company 
generates hard currency receipts, develops indigenous technology, and induces foreign 
companies to invest in Brazil (Silva, 2008; ABDI and UNICAMP, 2009). As oftoday, the 
company manufactures the following aircraft: 
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TARGET 
MARKET 
Regional Jets 
Executive Aviation 
Defence Systems 
Agricultural 
Aircraft 
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Regional aviation is the main market of Embraer, who produces two 
different jet families: 
• ERJ 135/145XR (35-50 seats) 
• EMB 170/195 orE-Jets {70-122 seats) 
Embraer has recently entered this market, adapting regional jets and 
unveiling a family of small executive jets: 
• Lineage 1000 (13-19 seats + 3 crew) 
• Legacy 450/650 (7-14 seats + 2-3 crew) 
• Phenom 100/300 (6-10 seats) 
Turboprop and jet fighters for advanced training and light attack, 
aerial surveillance and electronic war: 
• EMB 314 Super Tuca no 
• AMX/A-1M 
• ISR Systems- Special Mission Aircraft (Surveillance) 
• KC-390- Military airlift and tanker aircraft 
lpanema is the main agricultural aircraft in Brazil: with 1,100 units 
sold, it re presents about 75% of the Brazilian fleet in this segment. 
• lpanema 
Table 3 - Embraer: Markets and Aircmft, 2011 
Source: Ferreira (2009), AIAC (2010), Embraer 2011 
One of the weaknesses of Embraer is that even though the company is considered to 
be a strong contender in terms ofproduct design, it stilllacks manufacturing capacity, 
which is a consequence of its technological deficiencies. There is also a good potential to 
improve exports ofmilitary equipment. IfEmbraer were to work closely with military 
institutes in the development of new deferree products, the new technologies could later be 
transferred to the civilian industrial base, which would translate into high value products. It 
is quite accepted within the industry that investments in military technology usually retum 
in the form of stronger sales- and exports of the civil sector (ABDI and UNICAMP, 2008; 
ABDI and UNICAMP, 2009). 
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5.4.2 The Brazilian Aerospace Supply Chain 
The supply chain is considered to be a weak point of the aerospace industry in 
Brazil, as it is estimated that 95 percent ofEmbraer's suppliers are located outside Brazil. 
International suppliers are responsible for over 60 per cent of the final cost of an Embraer 
aircraft, while the company accounts for 3 8 per cent of that cost. The se figures could be an 
indicator of the reduced importance of local knowledge flows and it reinforces the fact that, 
in terms of business placement, most of Embraer suppliers are in higher positions within 
the industry than Embraer itself. In terms of employment, the weakness of the supply chain 
can be also translated into the concentration of jobs within the industry: 80 per cent of the 
employees work in one of the four major players of the local aerospace industry- an 
indication of the weak presence of large manufacturers ( especially in the upper tiers) in 
Brazil (Niosi & Zhegu, 2005; ABDI and UNICAMP, 2008; Malerba and Mani, 2009; 
ABDI, 2010; Bragion, 2010). 
As Embraer is the only OEM in Brazil and the leading player of the Brazilian 
industry, the analysis of the local supply chain is in many regards, the analysis of the 
Embraer supply chain. Over the years, Embraer has drastically changed its relationship with 
suppliers. In the 1980s, the company had more than 500 different suppliers, not a single 
risk-sharing partner and had all work share done in-house. In the 1990s, the number of 
suppliers had dropped to 350, while 4 different risk-sharing partners produced structures 
and interiors for the company. In the 2000s, the company only had 22 direct suppliers, 16 
risk sharing partners and was outsourcing the structures, interiors and systems packages of 
its aircraft. In order to survive in the new environment, smaller firms within the supply 
chain are improving their innovative capabilities by strengthening their basic technological 
capabilities, improving production and process. In addition, they are also upgrading to 
intermediate and advanced levels of innovative capability. SMEs within the industry see the 
relationships with Embraer, foreign buyers and Brazilian research institutions as the main 
source ofknowledge for the technologicalleaming processes (Malerba and Mani, 2009; 
ABDI, 2010; AIAC, 2010). 
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In the 1980s, the supply chain had a high degree of verticalization of manufacturers 
and suppliers, while today there is a process of de-verticalization and specialization: 
suppliers are responsible for manufacturing subcomponents, which are assembled into 
components by risk patiners who supply them to manufacturers, who in turn are 
responsible for the integration of all systems, subsystems and the main parts. As the lengthy 
development process and test stages of an aircraft combined with the safety certification 
process can take up to five years to be completed, major OEMs decided to share the risk of 
developing a new aircraft with their suppliers: risk partners will invest in the development 
of specifie parts and systems and will only receive the return on their investments when 
(and if) the aircraft sale is finalized and the product is delivered (Lima et al., 2005; Pinto, 
Migon and Montoro, 2007; Hira and De Oliveira, 2007). 
Embraer states that in the future, the supply chain will be characterized by 
competition among productive chains, large horizontalization and risk sharing. In such 
model, suppliers would be responsible for manufacturing components; the next leve! of 
suppliers would be responsible integrating subsystem and manufacturing components; then 
system integrators would be responsible for integrating systems and manufacturing 
modules, which would then be passed to the large OEMs (manufacturers) who would 
integrate the main systems and manufacture sorne modules of the final aircraft (Lima et al., 
2005; Hira and De Oliveira, 2007). 
In such production aiTangement, there is no space for partners who have limited or 
weak technological and financial capacities, a fact that contributed to exclude the majority 
of the Brazilian su pp liers as risk partners. As a consequence, almost all of the risk -sharing 
partners of Embraer are foreign companies with well established positions in the 
international industry and they were chosen for two main raisons: these foreign companies 
were considered to be useful for gaining access to Northern markets and they helped to 
establish the quality of the product as weiL Embraer first invited these partners to take part 
in the design and development ofthe ERJ-145 andE-Jets families, and the partners 
contributed financially and technology to these project areas. In order for this strategy to 
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work, it is imperative that ali components and subsystems can be assembled to perfection, 
so that the final assembly is reduced to the task of joining or fitting patis and pieces (Hira 
and De Oliveira, 2007; De Souza, 2007; Figueiredo et al. , 2008; ABDI and UNICAMP, 
2008; FeiTeira, 2009, ABDI, 201 0). 
In 2000, Embraer launched the Program for the Expansion of the Brazilian 
Aerospace Industry (PEIAB), a pro gram to encourage its foreign suppliers and partners to 
establish units in Brazil, aiming at the strengthening of the local supply chain. The idea was 
to aggregate value to the national industry, speeding up the development of joint projects 
and the delivery of aircraft parts and pieces. As a result, several risk-sharing partners 
installed plants in the Sao José dos Campos area, including Aemnova, Sobraer, Latécoère, 
C&D Interiors, Parker Hannifin and Pilkington Aerospace. This business model gave 
Embraer the ability to specialize in the design, integration, marketing and the production of 
selected components, which reduced R&D costs and allowed the company to continually 
learn from long-term relationships with technologicalleaders in specifie production areas 
(Hira and De Oliveira, 2007; Figueiredo et al. , 2008; ABDI and UNICAMP, 2008; FeiTeira, 
2009, ABDI, 2010). 
The partners that established units in Brazil did not transfer aU the production 
phases to the country; instead, they concentrated on the last phases, importing semi-
finalized components to be assembled in Brazil. On the other hand, these subsidiaries are 
ali considered to be medium and large players in the global industry, manufacturing aircraft 
structures, interiors, aeronautic engines, avionics, landing gears, and hydraulic and 
electronic systems. The risk partnerships are considered an integral part of Embraer' s 
strategy, and they even set the mark for global integration of supply chain in the industry, 
which was followed by even Boeing. The current strategy at Embraer is to reduce the 
number of suppliers: if the company had 350 suppliers in the ERJ-145 family, that number 
was reduced to 22 in the ERJ 170/190 project (Lima et al., 2005; Hira and De Oliveira, 
2007; ABDI and UNICAMP, 2008; Figueiredo et al. , 2008; Ferreira, 2009). 
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On the other hand, as a result of the risk partnership model, the local supply chain 
remains underdeveloped: the levels of value-added and local manufactming are qui te low 
and there is a high level of extemal dependence on technology and finance. Apart from the 
multinationals (that co-design and help finance a project) and the suppliers of systems, 
parts, and services for the planes (which are 98 per cent foreign), at the bottom of the 
supply chain pyramid are the subcontractors, who are outsourced small bus ines ses with 100 
per cent national capital, with fewer than 50 employees. They are highly specialized and 
have high technological capacity in engineering services, machining, surfaces processing, 
and chemical treatment. These companies focus their activities on the needs for products 
and services of Embraer and its risk partners, which generally account for more than 90 per 
cent oftheir revenues. As a result, the performance of subcontractors is completely tied to 
the expansion of the Embraer operations (Hira and De Oliveira, 2007; Pinto, Migon and 
Montoro, 2007; Figueiredo et al., 2008). 
5.5 The Canadian Aerospace Industry 
The Canadian aerospace industry is extremely diverse and is considered to be one of 
the strongest pillars of the country' s manufacturing sector and economy. Canada is a weil 
established market that designs and manufactmes regional passenger jets and tmboprops, 
executive jets, helicopters, jet engines, avionics, advanced composites and many other 
products and services that range from flight training to maintenance, repair and overhaul. In 
2009, the revenues of the Canadian aerospace indust:ry amounted to CAD $22.1 billion, 
while export sales in that same year generated CAD $17.2 billion in revenues (which 
accounted to 78 percent of total industry revenues). As for the domestic figmes, sales in 
Canada totalled CAD $4.8 billion. The geographical proximity to the American aerospace 
market the world's largest, places Canada in a unique position: the United States remains 
as the single most important market for Canadian aerospace goods and services, with sales 
to the amount of CAD $9.8 billion (57 percent). As a result of such a close relationship, 
Transport Canada and the F AA work closely together, and there are severa! important 
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bilateral trade agreements dealing with manufacturing, procurement, and maintenance of 
aerospace products and services, including the Defence Production Sharing Agreements 
(DPSA), the Defence Development Sharing Agreement (DDSA), and the Canada-U.S. 
airworthiness bilateral, which was put in place to allow Canadian businesses to repair and 
maintain U.S.-registered aircraft (Technopolis, 2004; EDC, 2006; AIAC, 2010; CAARHA, 
2010). 
It is estimated that 83.4 per cent of the Canadian aerospace production has the civil 
market as its final customer, while the military accounts for 16.6 percent ofthe production. 
In 2009, there were 78,965 people directly employed by the industry. In 2008, the 
investments in R&D and capital improvements amounted to CAD $1.93 billion, with 
investments in R&D accounting for 73 percent (CAD $1.4 billion), while investments in 
capital improvements accounted for 27 percent (CAD $0.53 billion) (AIAC, 2010; 
CAARHA, 2010). 
Canada hasan estimated 5 percent share of the global aerospace industry, and its 
highest overall share is in aircraft and parts (6 percent), a fact that is largely attributed to 
Bombardier's position as a leading business and regional jet OEM. Canada also has a 5 per 
cent share of the aire raft engine & parts segment, on the strength of Pratt & Whitney 
Canada, the leading small propulsion OEM; as well as engine module suppliers such as 
Magellan Aerospace. In electrical systems & components- which major forces include 
CMC Electronics, Honeywell, L3, and Thales- Canada has a relatively lower share (at 4 
percent). Finally, in maintenance, repair & overhaul (MRO), simulation and training, 
Canada has a 5 per cent share and boasts several world-class firms including A veos, CAE, 
Cascade Aerospace, L3 MAS, IMP Aerospace, and Standard Aero. In addition to these 
companies, there are several OEM service centers in Canada. Such diversity is a key 
Canadian advantage, as SMEs within the industry are considered to be good at supporting 
the domestic Tier 1 manufacturers. In addition, such capabilities mean that they are capable 
of working intemationally in their own right. As a result, Canada is strong in creating 
special applications aircraft - such as maritime patrol planes, and therefore filling specifie 
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niche markets around the world. The Canadian aerospace industry has achieved renowned 
world leadership in many sub-sectors, including space and defence; and Canada is a key 
international supplier of high-technology in these sectors. The achievements in defence are 
particularly notable given the small size of the country' s domestic market for defence 
products (EDC, 2006; AeroStrategy, 2009; AIAC, 201 0; Investissement Québec, 201 0; 
CAARHA, 2010). 
Figure 7 presents a geographical distribution of the Canadian aerospace industry: 
FIG. 7- Geographical Distribution of the Canadian Aerospace Industry 
Source: CAMAQ, 2010 
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5.5.1 Bombardier: The 1\1ain Player of the Canadian Aerospace Industry 
For Canada, Bombardier is no less important than Embraer is to Brazil: 
headquartered in Montreal, Bombardier has today 29,500 employees worldwide as follows: 
48 percent in Europe, 33 percent in Canada, 13 percent in the U.S., and 6 percent in the 
rest ofthe world. Bombardier's Aerospace division generated revenues ofCAD $8.6 billion 
in 2010. The company states that 96 per cent of its revenues are generated outside Canada. 
Today, the Bombardier family owns 60 percent of the company, and Bombardier emerges 
as a global player in the aerospace industry (Goldstein and McGuire, 2004; Bombardier, 
2011 ). 
The company was created in 1907 by Joseph-Armand Bombardier and achieved its 
first commercial success in 1937 with the launch ofthe B7 snowmobile. In 1948, in a 
demonstration of how govemments can influence in the success of a business, the Que bec 
government passed legislation requiring ail highways and local roads to be cleared of snow, 
which resulted in the sales of the Bombardier snowmobiles to fall by nearly half in one 
year. The company diversified its production in 1953, by introducing the Muskeg Tractor, 
an ail-terrain vehicle used in the resource and construction industries to move heavy loads 
over swamp and snow. The unveiling ofthe Ski-Doo snowmobile in 1959 further 
consolidated the commercial success ofthe company, which grew constantly until the 1973 
oil crisis (MacDonald, 2001; Bombardier, 2011 ). 
In 1969, the company listed its shares on the Montreal and Toronto Stock 
Exchanges. As business increased, the company devised a new way to facilitate the Ski-
Doos sales, through the creation, in 1972, of a financing subsidiary to pro vide inventory 
financing for its dealers. This situation would change drastically the next year, when the gas 
shortages forced the company to eut the production of its snowmobiles by half; but the 
crisis presented the company' s management team a new business opportunity: by 
redeploying the company's excess manufacturing capacity, Bombardier acquired mass 
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-------------, 
transit tech.11ologies and applied its rnanufacturing know-how to build rolling stock 
(MacDonald, 2001; Bombardier, 2011). 
In 1981 the company changed its name to Bombardier Inc. and was awarded an 
order for 180 subway cars from transit authorities in Mexico City. After expanding its 
businesses to rail transit and establishing a solid presence in Europe, Bombardier decided to 
diversify once again in 1986, entering the aerospace industry through a series of 
acquisitions, including state-owned Canadair. In that same year, the company was awarded 
a CAD $1.7 billion multiyear contract to service CF-18 jets, a fighter jet used by the Royal 
Canadian Air Force and produced by McDonnell Douglas (MacDonald, 2001; Hadekel, 
2004; Bombardier, 2011). 
Canadair was a leading aircraft manufacturer of civil and military aircraft, including 
the Challenger wide body business jets and the CL-215 amphibious firefighting aircraft. 
The acquisition of Canadair was made possible with the support of the Federal 
Governrnent, who absorbed CAD $1.2 billion ofCanadair's CAD $1.35 billion debt. In 
1991, Bombardier launched the 50-seat Canadair Regional Jet (CRJ) program, which was 
poised to revolutionize regional air travel. A 70-seat version followed in 1997 (CRJ700), an 
86-seat version in 2000 (CRJ900) and a 1 00-seat version in 2007(CRJ1 000). After the 
acquisition of Canadair, Bombardier purchased Short Brothers (Great Britain) in 1989, 
which helped to reinforce its aerospace capabilities and established a European presence in 
the industry. In 1990, Bombardier acquired the Learjet Corporation, which gave the 
company access to the American aerospace industry and the most complete range of 
business jets on the market. Bombardier promptly launched the Learjet 60 aircraft, the first 
midsize business jet, which would rank as the top-selling aircraft in its class four years 
later. In 1992 the company acquired the de Havilland Canada division from Boeing. De 
Havilland was the manufacturer of the Twin Otter aircraft and Dash turboprop airliner. De 
Havilland's Dash 8 turboprop and the CRJ Series established Bombardier as one of the 
world leaders in regional aircraft (Goldstein and McGuire, 2004; MacDonald, 2001; 
Hadekel, 2004; Bombardier, 2011 ). 
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In 1991, Bombardier launched the Bombardier 415 amphi bian, an advanced 
firefighting aircraft, and in 1998 expanded its turboprop portfolio by launching the 70-seat 
Dash 8 Series 400 turboprop, renarned Q400. The next year Bombardier launched the 
Bombardier Continental Business Jet, an all-new transcontinental super rnidsize business 
jet, which was renarned Challenger 300 in 2002. In 1996, the company was reorganized 
into five groups: Bombardier Aerospace, Bombardier Transportation, Bombardier 
Recreational Products, Bombardier Capital, and Bombardier Services (which was later 
disbanded). A new version of the Canadair Regional Jet, the 70-seat Canadair Regional Jet 
700 was launched in 1997, the sarne year the company was awarded a CAD $2.8 billion 
rnultiyear contract for the training ofNATO pilots in Canada. Another change in the high 
management carne in 1999, when RobertE. Brown was appointed to replace Laurent 
Beaudoin as the President and CEO of Bombardier. Beaudoin rernained as the cornpany's 
Chairrnan. The next year, Bombardier signed with Delta Connection carriers to provide 94 
Canadair Regional Jet aircraft, a contract worth as rnuch as CAD $2.7 billion. In 2002, 
Bombardier launched the Bombardier Global 5000 super-large business jet; while in 2003, 
the company added the Global Express XRS ultra long-range business jet, an aircraft that 
combines superior transatlantic speed with the largest cabin in the super-large segment. The 
Challenger 605 intercontinental business jet and Learjet 60 XR rnidsize business jet were 
unveiled in 2005. Also in 2005, Bombardier launched the Challenger 800 Series corporate 
shuttles, an evolution of its flagship Challenger. In 2006, Bombardier established a 
rnanufacturing facility in Querétaro, Mexico, dedicated toits aerospace business. Following 
the 9/11 attacks, the world's airline industry went into a tailspin. As part ofits strategy to 
deal with the industry' s crisis, Bombardier restructured, narrowed its focus and sold several 
of its assets. The company sold its recreational products business segment to focus on core 
business operations in aerospace and transportation. In 2007, Bombardier launched the 
CRJ 1 000 regional jet, the new aircraft of the CRJ Series. In that sarne year Bombardier also 
introduced the next generation ofits regional jets, the CRJ NextGen farnily, which featured 
irnproved operating costs, an all-new cabin and increased use of composite rnaterials 
(MacDonald, 2001; Hadekel, 2004; Bombardier, 2011). 
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Re garding the competition of its jets with Embraer, the CRJ700 (70 seats) and the 
CRJ900 (86 seats) are considered to be the direct competitors ofEmbraer' s ERJ-170 and 
ERJ-175. In this segment, Bombardier took advantage from the fact that its models were 
released before the Embraer aircraft, which allowed them to be ahead in the sales 
campaign. On the other hand, the Bombardier models are based on stretched platforms of 
older models, sorne of which with over 25 years sin ce their launch, so in certain ways they 
are non-optimized models and are considered to be technologically outdated in several 
aspects. This may play a role in the competitiveness of the company, as it reported a 
negative net order of 53 business jets in 2009, while booking 15 net new orders for 
commercial aircraft in that period (Lima et al. , 2005, The Conference Board of Canada, 
2009). 
Bombardier was also a key player in the establishment of an aerospace cluster in 
Canada. The company is regarded as a 'flagship firm,' since it contributes to the success of 
the industry with both valuable monetary sense as a buyer and seller and also for being a 
leader in the sector. In this regard, Bombardier' s activities and strategy have the potential to 
affect the performance and competitiveness of the entire network of suppliers. The good 
results of the company, coup led with strong competitive positions in commercial and 
virtual flight simulators and landing gears contributed to place Canada among the five top 
aerospace industries in the world. In 2000, there were 250 aerospace manufacturing and 
service sector companies in Canada, employing 90,000 people and generating over CAD 
$20 billion in sales. Another indicator of the relevance of the aerospace industry is the 
investment on research and development and new infrastructure: in 1999, the industry 
invested more than CAD $2 billion, which equals to approximately 12 percent of the total 
revenue and 15 per cent of ali manufacturing R&D in Canada. For all of the se reasons, 
defending the aerospace cluster is a high priority for the Canadian government and its 
industrial and trade policies (Goldstein and McGuire, 2004, Hadekel, 2004; Smith and 
Ibrahim, 2006). 
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As the WTO disputes between Canada and Brazil in 2001 showed, the Canadian 
government is fully committed in its support to Bombardier. In fact, the govemment 
commitment to Bombardier proved to be so strong that sorne critics stated that the Federal 
Government was going too far in its support to the company, and that the close ties between 
the company and the government influenced Ottawa' s willingness to be aggressive. The 
fact is that Ottawa has al ways been a supporter of Bombardier, as exemplified in 1981, 
when the Metropolitan Transportation Agency (MTA) in New York announced the 
purchase of 1,150 subway cars from Bombardier. The sale was made possible with the 
financial backing ofEDC, who offered a 15-year U.S. $750 million loan at a rate of3 to 5 
per cent below what it cost to raise. The transaction was highly questioned in Canada, but 
the Federal Govemment committed its support to Bombardier nonetheless. Then, in 1997, 
the Federal Govemment took the company's defence in an investment dispute in Mexico 
and, once again the low-interest loans offered to help close Bombardier sale to Air 
Wisconsin, which generated complaints from opposition leaders and taxpayer advocates. It 
is not surprising that a firm like Bombardier, which is characterized by a very high asset 
specificity, R&D intensity and job immobility, may, and most likely will, forcefully engage 
in politicallobbying. As a matter of fact, the relationship between Bombardier and the 
Federal Govemment has been described as 'co-dependent' and 'only in that kind of 
relationship would the government res pond as willingly as it has.' It is not surprising that 
Bombardier is a major contributor to ail major Canadian political parties. As Elections 
Canada data for the study period showed, Bombardier was one of the largest corporate 
donors to the Liberal party - and was the largest non-financial sector donor in 1998, 1999 
and 2000, when the party had the majority in the Canadian Parliament (Pasquero, 1988; 
Goldstein and McGuire, 2004). 
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As presented in the table below, Bombardier is the manufacturer of the following 
aircraft: 
TARGET 
MARKET 
Regional Jets 
Executive Aviation 
Amphibious 
Aircraft 
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Bombardier is a leading force in the regional aviation segment and 
the company produces three different jet families: 
• CSeries (100-149 seats) 
• CRJ Series (60-99 seats) 
• Q Series Turboprop (70-80 seats) 
The executive aviation market was the aerospace industry entry door 
for Bombardier, the manufacturer of the following executive jets: 
• Learjet 40 XR (6 seats + 1 crew) 
• Learjet 45 XR & Learjet 60 XR (8 seats + 1 crew) 
• Learjet 85 (8 seats + 2 crew) 
• Challenger 300 (8 seats + 1 crew) 
• Challenger 605 and Challenger 850 (13-14 seats + crew) 
• Global5000, 6000, 7000, 8000 (8-19 seats + 2-4 crew) 
Amphibious aircraft are used on firefighting missions, humanitarian 
relief, maritime search and rescue, surveillance, and personnel 
transport. Bombardier manufactures the following amphibious 
aircraft: 
• Bombardier 415 
• Bombardier 415 MP 
Table 4 - Bombardier: Markets and Aircraft, 2011 
Source: Bombardier (20 11) 
5.5.2 The Canadian Aerospace Industry Supply Chain 
The Canadian supply chain is responsible for aircraft systems and subsystems, 
structural components, and aircraft parts for OEMs in Canada, the U.S., Europe, and Brazil, 
besicles offering maintenance, repair and overhaul services. Canadian aerospace businesses 
are also leading players in the areas of flight simulation, visual systems, communication 
systems for satellites, and systems integration. Bombardier is the main OEM in Canada, 
and a leading player in the regional aircraft sector. Pratt & Whitney Canada (PWC) is 
another main play er of the Canadian aerospace sec tor: it specializes in designing, 
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developing, manufacturing and maintaining aircraft engines. PWC has approximately 50 
per cent of the world market of small and medium engin es (Bernardes, 201 0; CAARHA, 
2010). Regarding the dynamics between OEMs and SMEs, Figure 8 shows how their 
relationship has evolved: 
FIG. 8 - Redistribution of the Canadian Aerospace Supply Chain 
Source: CAMAQ 2010 
In the past two decades, the Canadian OEMs statted to employ similar risk-sharing 
techniques as those used in Brazil. SMEs in the tiers 2 and 3 of the chain are more and 
more required to take technical and financial risks and they also need to develop new 
capacities: 
a) more value-added parts and pieces; 
b) higher investments in engineering and R&D for the conception, 
development and qualification of products; 
c) technical support and continuo us improvement; and 
79 
d) continuous cost reduction (CAMAQ, 2010). 
Moreover, SMEs (Tier 3, which comprises most of the industry) in the supply chain 
are now required to align the value chain to a global reality, as Bombardier and Pratt & 
Whitney Canada have both modified their value chains to leverage opportunities created by 
their worldwide presence. Bombardier is building the C-Series fuselage in China, the wings 
for the same aircraft in Northern Ireland, and expanded its manufacturing capability in 
Mexico. By forces of the market, the company has also built up a global product support 
network. Pratt & Whitney Canada has clone much the same through its parent company, 
PWC leverages a network of global engineering centers and continues to expand its highly 
regarded global product support network. This is the strate gy of both firms to continually 
search for new opportunities to improve their competitiveness. The next step in this 
globalization process is to determine whether Bombardier could conduct more of its 
engineering activities via engineering centers in low cost regions or whether Pratt & 
Whitney Canada could pursue more manufacturing in low cost regions. Both OEMs must 
balance these issues with the desire of the Canadian governments to maximize aerospace 
employment in the country (EDC, 2006; AeroStrategy, 2009; AIAC, 2010). 
Quebec is the main hub of the Canadian aerospace industry, and Montreal is its 
main cluster. In 2009, Quebec had 234 aerospace companies (4 OEMs, 14 companies in 
Tier 2, and 216 SMEs), which generated 40,200 direct jobs and CAD $12,4 billion. When 
considering world sales, the cluster puts Quebec in the 6th position in the industry, after the 
USA, France, Germany, the U.K., and Japan. Quebec concentrates 60 percent of total 
production of the Canadian aerospace industry, 90 per cent of its sales, almost 80 per cent 
of total employment, and 70 percent of all investments in R&D made by the industry in 
2007. The high expenses in aerospace R&D place the sec tor in first place among all 
industrial activity in Que bec. However, the reserves of innovative technology resulting 
from the investments in R&D made in the 1960s and 1970s are considered to be now 
depleted, after the dramatic growth of the industry in the 1980s and 1990s. Members of the 
industry consider that the current level of investment in R&D is inadequate to support 
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future growth. On the other hand, the industry is a main source of dividends to the 
province: as 80 per cent of the Que bec production is exported, it was the second most 
important manufacturing sector of Que bec in 2008. In 2006, the Ministry of Economie 
Development, Innovation and Export Trade (MDEIE) of Que bec estimated that over 10,000 
engineers and scientists were employed by the aerospace industry in the province, while in 
general terms, the industry employed 1 out of 200 people in Quebec (while in the Montreal 
area, that number was 1 out of95 people). In terms of revenue, employees ofthe Quebec 
aerospace industry received salaries 30 percent higher than those employed by other 
manufacturing sectors (MDEIE, 2009; MDEIE, 2010; AIAC, 2010; Investissement Québec, 
2010). 
In terms of geographical concentration, the Montreal cluster houses 98 per cent of 
the aerospace activity in Quebec, and it places the city among the largest aerospace centers 
of the world, together with Seattle and Toulouse (MDEIE, 2009). Figure 9 presents how the 
Quebec supply chain is divided: 
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Supply Chain of the Quebec Aerospace lndustry 
lndustry Structure in 2009 
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FIG. 9- The Supply Chain of the Aerospace Industry in Quebec 
Source: MDEIE, 2009 
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Figure 10 shows how the industry is distributed in the different administrative 
regions of Que bec: 
Île de 
Montréal 
63% 
The Aerospace lndustry in Quebec 
Employment by Admin. Reg ion 
(2009) 
Other 
Regions 
2 % 
Laval 
3% 
Laurentides 
13% 
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19% 
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(2009) 
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FIG. 10- The Aerospace Industry in Quebec: Employment and Revenues, 2009 
Source: MDEIE, 2009 
As presented in this section, despite the differences in their institutional 
environment and different levels of economie development between the two countries, 
Brazil and Canada managed to position themselves as major players of the global aerospace 
industry. The aerospace industry has sorne unique characteristics that demand specifie 
conditions of the institutional environment and specifie types of government support. Both 
Brazil and Canada understand the economie advantages of housing the aerospace industry 
in their territories. As a result, both countries try to adapt their institutional environment to 
needs of the industry, as we discuss in the next section. 
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6 Governmental Support to the Aerospace Industry 
6.1 The Govemment Embrace of the A eros pace Industry 
In general terms, an "industrial policy" can be defined in two major ways. The first 
is a comprehensive, long-term government plan for developing the entire economy. The 
second is connected to the means by which a government attempts to develop a specifie 
industry. As presented in our report, it is a well-known fact that every nation has industrial 
policies, whether they are comprehensive or fragmented, or whether government officiais 
admit the practice or not. 
Considering the dynamics between the aerospace industry and national 
governments, Griffiths and Zammuto (2005) state that national industrial competitive 
advantage relies on an institutional framework that can intervene in the economy, 
encourage broader systems of product and pro cess innovation, and encourage economie and 
industriallearning. The aerospace industry madel of competitiveness could be linked to a 
redefinition of the state strength/weakness dichotomy by focusing on the capabilities that 
governments have to implement or act out desired policies in coordination with the 
industry's firrns. As the economie conditions associated with a country' s institutional 
framework play a crucial role in structuring industrial competitiveness, in the aerospace 
industry, sorne national governments choose to support their local aerospace businesses 
through the implementation of one or more of the following variables: 1) a reliance on a 
mixture of large and small privately owned firms, 2) public/private sector research 
initiatives, 3) the presence of government regulatory agencies designed for coordination, 
and 4) inter-organizational structures. The presence ofthese variables in a coordinated 
institutional environment, combined with governance capabilities and their supporting 
infrastructures create a favourable business environment and a strengthened national 
industrial competitiveness. Such coordination is important because capitalizing on such a 
high-innovation and value-adding industry requires the development of specifie capabilities 
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between the state and the industry. It is equally important that these govemmental policies 
are coherent with institutional practices and that they are connected to the social needs of 
the country (Griffiths and Zammuto, 2005). 
Based on these variables, we analyze in this section how the Brazilian and Canadian 
institutional frameworks are favourable to the aerospace industry; the various public 
policies and programs designed for that purpose, and the interactions between public and 
private players of the industry. As a part of our analysis, we seek to understand how these 
variables contributed to the development ofEmbraer and Bombardier. In Sections 6.2 and 
6.3, we discuss specifie aspects of the Brazilian and Canadian institutional frameworks in 
support of the local aerospace industries. 
To a certain extent, the commercial aircraft industry is considered to violate every 
assumption of the competitive paradigm: the industry is defined by huge scale and scope 
economies, tremendous risk, and dramatic technological change. As a result, the market is 
inherently imperfect, there is no presumption that market outcomes are optimal, and 
govemment intervention can have lasting effects in industry structure and performance. As 
a result, starting in the 1970s, govemments of the main aerospace industry countries 
progressively started to finance smaller portions of the industry's project costs, as a 
consequence of either reduced military budgets or restrictions resulting from the high costs 
of the projects themselves or even international trade disputes. This reality created 
pressures for change in the traditional madel, which in part is the cause of the risk 
partnership madel that is now being widely used in the industry. However, it is quite clear 
that the development of the aerospace industry is closely connected to governmental central 
planning, defence strategies, and financial support. In the case ofBrazil, as the country's 
aerospace industry consolidated its position in the world market, Embraer exemplifies the 
important implications for national policies conceming the proper role of government in 
fostering "national champions." In the 1980s, Embraer took advantage of the military 
investments and subsequently govemment purchases of the AMX aircraft to strengthen its 
position and become more independent. After the AMX project, military funded projects 
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virtually disappeared and the public policies concerning defence investments are now 
perceived as weak. Considering the regional aviation market, one of the reasons for the 
high competitiveness of both Embraer and Bombardier in this segment has been the active 
participation of government agencies dedicated to support exports of their aerospace 
industries. The Brazilian and the Canadian governments offered attractive financing 
conditions to the export of regional aircraft, which generated elevated efficiency gains 
(both operational and financial) to the air transportation industry, especially in the United 
States (Tyson, 1993; Espafta, 2004; Lima et al., 2005; De Souza, 2007; Bragion, 2010). 
Another major key trend in the industry is the growing government/industry 
collaboration to create aerospace clusters. Governments are motivated to collaborate 
because the industry creates high value jobs and exports in an era of increasingly mobile 
capital and human resources. In addition, sorne nations support the industry for its ties with 
national security strategies and the belief that a healthy aerospace sector crea tes a positive, 
high technology image. The relationship between governments and the industry can take 
severa! forms : in sorne instances governments serve as catalysts to promote aerospace 
investment to foreign investors. This takes the form of serving as infmmation 
clearinghouses, streamlining administration, and offering tax incentives. Examples of such 
collaboration are the aerospace promotion efforts ofU.S. states of Alabama, Kansas, New 
Mexico, North Carolina, and Mississippi. In a deeper level of collaboration, governments 
participate in joint planning actions with the industry, identifying strategie technologies, 
cluster requirements or gaps, and human resource needs. Governments can also play an 
important role in implementing plans via research funding and training. Finally, 
governments can directly invest capital into a company or program (AeroStrategy, 2009; 
AIAC, 2010; The Hill Times, 2010). 
With the advancements ofRussia, China and Japan in the regional aviation market, 
Brazil and Canada should prepare for new competition: Canada' s pioneering role in 
creating the regional jet sector is now 15 years old and besides Embraer, Bombardier faces 
several new competitors in this segment. To maintain their positions within the industry 
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may require additional fun ding, ambition, and capability from the governments of both 
countries. One or more of the countries listed above may eventually join Embraer and 
Bombardier as successful aircraft OEMs, which could erode the Brazilian and Canadian 
market position. And the odds of this scenario are increased with EADS/ Airbus and Boeing 
apparent! y slipping development of a next-generation single-aisle aircraft due to 2020 or 
beyond. Besides the emergence of new competitors, government-industry coordination will 
grow in importance because ofthe increasing mobility of labour and capital within the 
industry. Most capability expansion is via joint venture, which means that potential 
investors are looking for in-country partners. From the institutional framework point of 
view, investors are looking for streamlined administration, transparency, the rule of law, 
human resources, and technology. Governments and firms have a fini te set of resources, 
which means that coordinated strategie planning is increasingly important (AeroStrategy, 
2009; The Hill Times, 2010). 
Govemments should also consider functional specialization as a successful strategy 
for the industry: while most governments are focused on building national champions or 
supporting development of a new program on home teiTitory, the globalization of the 
industry means that value creation and employment will increasingly migrate to functional 
clusters such as India/Russia for engineering/R&D or Mexico for manufacturing, or 
Singapore for MRO. In the case of Canada, which markets itself as a knowledge-industry 
country, aerospace has managed to attract only a few R&D centers from non-Canadian 
firms (AeroStrategy, 2009; The Hill Times, 201 0). 
In the topics presented below, we discuss how specifie characteristics of the 
institutional framework can influence in the development of the aerospace industry: 
1. Intellectual Property Rights - Good institutional aiTangements concem 
property right allocations between public and private sectors, and inter-
organizational transactions allocations between authoritative planning and market 
institutions of govemance. Aerospace companies are not usually active in the 
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publication of scientific papers, nor license technology. Instead, the industry is 
more characterized by corporate secrecy, rather than the registration of patents 
(Murtha and Lenway, 1994; Niosi and Zhegu, 2005). In addition, Onodera 
(2008), states that 
Prope1ty rights have se veral effects on economie development: 1) fixing the economie 
potential of as sets and allowing prope1ty to be used as collateral greatly enhancing capacity 
to invest; 2) integrating dispersed information into one system (priee) creating new 
opportunities to create surplus value through transactions; 3) increasing accountability and 
cutting down transaction costs; 4) making assets fungible and divisible; 5) networking 
people and improving the flow of communications about assets and the ir potential; and 6) 
protecting transactions. 
As emerging countries are becoming more and more active in the global 
aerospace industry, with production of parts and components outsourced to 
countries as distinct as Mexico, Brazil, Russia, and China, the main challenge 
facing large OEMs in North America and Europe is to have proper IP regulations 
and enforcement mechanisms to guarantee that their investments in other 
countries are viable options to expand the industry and will be respected in the 
duration ofthe contracts (AeroStrategy, 2009). Through intellectual property 
rights, governments can influence in the development of the aerospace industry 
by having predictable or erratic laws and regulations on IP; and by having 
weak or strong enforcement mechanisms to protect the rights of patent owners. 
2. Investments in R&D- One of the preferred ways of governments to support 
local aerospace industries is through the financing ofR&D projects. Compared to 
other high-tech industries, governmental funding ofR&D programs, especially in 
defence, is considered to be elevated. Partnerships between public and private 
R&D initiatives, both domestic and international are seen as a key 
competitiveness factor within the industry. As a result, international R&D 
partnering in aerospace and defence is well above the average, compared to other 
high-tech industries: between 1990 and 1998, aerospace had the highest 
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international partnering index of ali indus trial sectors. On the other hand, the role 
of govemment laboratories and university facilities in the development ofthe 
industry is secondary; instead, it is usually the large OEMs that attract or change 
these institutions according to their needs. Govemments justify official support 
to R&D in aerospace in light of so-called "market-failures." These include the 
market' s ability to capture full y the benefits of its investments and the 
opportunity cost of such an un certain type of investment. As a result, it is 
believed that the lev el of R&D investment in the industry is al ways below what 
would be considered appropriate from the perspective of optimal economie 
development and quality of li fe. So governmental support to R&D aims to reduce 
the so-called market-failures. Public-funded R&D programs most likely focus on 
particular subject areas that are deemed to have a strategie or critical quality. In 
order to minimize the risk of investing the taxpayers' money in works oflimited 
quality and utility, official R&D programs tend to be used to encourage firms 
within the industry to participate in programs of work that may generate further 
advances in knowledge, methodologies and innovation in materials, compounds, 
etc, that have relevance to a wider audience. However, critics of such programs 
point out to the question of the lack of transparency in matt ers of official fun ding 
of R&D activities, especially the programs designed to finance the development 
of new aircraft. In several cases, government support for R&D in aerospace is 
integrated with the national aerospace R&D program. As a result, these 
investments tend to blur with pre-competitive research expenditure. In addition, 
govemments organize national aerospace R&D programs (such as Canada's 
former Technology Partnerships Canada- TPC program), which operate 
basically offering assistance on a competitive and cost-shared basis for pre-
competitive and industrial research projects. Another critic of public funding of 
R&D is a reflex of the consolidation of the supply chain in the industry. The 
supply chain consolidation bas had a positive effect on investments in R&D, as 
the resultant larger organizations usually have sufficient critical mass to fund 
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internai R&D projects that wouldn't be otherwise funded by smaller firms that 
could not afford R&D laboratories. In conclusion, sorne cri tics of public R&D 
funding believe that federal R&D spending has had limited effects in the supply 
chain. Instead, governments should intensify the coordination of the ir R&D and 
communicating requirements throughout the supply chain (Sherry and Sarsfield, 
2002; Goldstein and McGuire, 2004; Niosi and Zhegu, 2005). Through 
investments in R&D, governments can influence in the development of the 
aerospace industry mainly by being hostile or supportive of R&D initiatives 
( e.g. financial support to R&D centers, investments in public research facilities, 
grants to universities, tax breaks for private investments in R&D, etc.) and by 
investing in higher education and human resources training initiatives. 
3. Government Procurement- The manufacturers of civil aircraft in all countries 
holding a strong position in the world industry have ali been major defence 
contractors, at !east at critical moments of their development. This massive 
inflow of federal government contracts has provided profits that were mostly 
likely applied in the development of commercial aircraft. Historically, 
government contracts provided the safety net to catch a plummeting commercial 
airframe company in cri ti cal moments, as large backlogs of these con tracts 
provided steady income during periods when commercial activity was depressed. 
Besicles the acquisition of defence equipment, governments can also influence in 
the aerospace industry through the acquisition of civil aircraft. However, the 
1979 GATT agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft prohibits government support 
for this type of activity, at least for the signatories of the agreement. On the other 
hand, only 24 countries are signatories to the agreement, including almost all 
major aircraft manufacturing countries, with the notorious exception ofBrazil. In 
addition, the WTO agreement on trade in civil aircraft eliminates duties on civil 
aircraft, including engines sub-assemblies and patis; and it defines several non-
tarif[ obligations for the signatories, including: 
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• Government-directed procurement actions and mandatory 
subcontracts: the Agreement provides that purchasers of civil aircraft 
can freely choose suppliers on the basis of commercial 
considerations. In addition, governments will not require purchases 
from a particular sources, in order to avoid government mandated 
offsets; 
• Sales-related inducements: the Agreement states that governments 
should not attach political or economie inducements (positive or 
negative connections to governn1ent actions) as an incentive to the 
sale or lease of civil aircraft; and 
• Certification requirements: the Agreement provides that the 
regulatory certification of civil aircraft, including operating and 
maintenance procedures, will be non-discriminatory as provided by 
the provisions of the separate Agreement on Technical Trade. 
Even though there is no publicly-recorded cases in recent years of a government 
directing its national carrier, or agents, to purchase a specifie civil aircraft, 
traditionally, governments were the owners of national airlines (or were among the 
major stockholders of them), and are in a convenient position to impose their 
conditions on the OEMs. These conditions are usually based on the geopolitical 
ambitions of each government. Deferree aircraft and aerospace equipment are 
excluded from the 1979 GATT agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft (for obvious 
reasons ), and in severa! countries, deferree procurement poli ci es in elude "bu y 
national" requirements and offset arrangements (Tyson, 1993; Technopolis, 2004; 
Niosi & Zhegu, 2005, Bernardes, 2010). Through government procurement, 
governments can influence in the development of the aerospace industry by being 
hostile or supportive of local aerospace firms when they acquire deferree 
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equipment, aircraft for official fleets, and pieces, parts and maintenance services for 
government fleets. 
4. Infrastructure- Large OEMs of the industry have the ability to attract hundreds of 
SMEs to a certain region and forma cluster. For that reason, policymakers should 
be focused on poli ci es designed to shape the competitive position of the industry in 
which OEMs are located and invest in public infrastructure that will support them 
and facilitate their continued development and growth. In general terrns, extensive 
and efficient infrastructure is considered to be an essential driver of competitiveness 
for all economie sectors. As in any other industry, aerospace infrastructure needs are 
critical for ensuring the effective functioning of the sector, in addition to 
determining the location of economie activity and the kinds of activities and 
accessory industries that can develop in a particular economy. Well-developed and 
functional infrastructure can reduce the effects of distance between regions, 
resulting in the full integration of the national market and connecting it at low costs 
to other markets in different countries and regions. In addition, extensive and 
effective infi-astructure networks have a significant impact in economie growth, 
besicles reducing income inequalities and poverty in a variety of ways. Effective 
transport infi-astructures for goods, people, and services (such as quality roads, 
railroads, ports, and air transport) enable private firms to get their goods and 
services to market in an effective manner, and facilitate the movement of workers to 
the most appropriate jobs. Economie development also depends on electricity 
supplies that are fi-ee of interruptions and shortages, giving businesses and factories 
the ability to work continuously. Finally, the private sector also relies on a solid and 
extensive telecommunications network that allows for rapid and free flow of 
information, which can increase overall economie efficiency as it ensures that 
businesses can communicate and make decisions taking into account all available 
relevant information (Smith and Ibrahim, 2006; World Economie Forum, 2010). 
Through investments in infrastructure, governments can influence in the 
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development of the aerospace industry by being hostile or supportive to 
investments that facilitate sales of aircraft ( e.g. airports, telecommunications, power 
generation, transportation, etc.). In addition, governments can facilitate the 
development of the industry ifthe laws and regulations for new investments in 
infrastructure (including PPPs), are predictable and contracts are respected- key 
factors in the decision making process of private investors in multi-billion dollar 
infrastructure projects. 
5. Financing and Export Credits- While govemments are prohibited from directing 
civil aircraft purchases, providing financing for customers through the provision of 
export promotion support and through export financing is an important part of the 
aerospace business. In addition, governments operate Export Credit Agencies and 
Investment Insurance Agencies (ECAs) to provide govemment-backed loans, 
guarantees and insurance to private firms seeking to expand business abroad, 
especially in developing countries and emerging markets, where commercial and 
political risks are considereà too high for conventional corporate financing. ECAs 
are mostly national, public or publicly-mandated agencies that usually support 
companies from their home country. In the aerospace sector, such support to exports 
is offered by the Ex-lm Bank in the U.S. and its European counterparts (COF ACE, 
Hermes, and ECGD) to their aerospace industries. In Brazil, the Brazilian 
Development Bank (BNDES) is the federal government agency that supports the 
extemal sales of Embraer aircraft, while Export Development Canada (EDC) is the 
Canadian counterpart for the sales of Bombardier products. The OECD agreement 
Arrangements on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits (which is not 
legally binding) govems policies on export credits and seeks to prevent countries 
from competing to offer the most favourable financing terms for exports, 
neutralising public finance as a source of competitive advantage in global markets 
(Teclmopolis, 2004; Lima et al., 2005; EDC, 2006; Hira and De Oliveira, 2007; 
ABDI and UNICAMP, 2009). Through financing and ECAs, governments can 
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influence in the development of the aerospace industry by being hostile or 
supportive of financing mechanisms that can boost the sales and ex ports of 
aerospace products. In addition, the tax system affecting private businesses can be 
hostile or supportive, depending on how weak or strong the enforcing mechanisms 
to collect taxes are. By observing international rules and regulations and 
international agreements on financial assistance to national businesses ( e.g. the 
WTO rulings on the Embraer versus Bombardier disputes), governments can 
promote the sales of their aerospace industries. If buyers perceive that the laws and 
regulations controlling financing programs and ECAs are predictable, they will feel 
confident enough to place their orders with a certain manufacturer. In close 
connection to the financing mechanisms and ECAs, the more predictable the laws 
and regulations governing a country's foreign trade (and the stronger the country's 
enforcement of its legislation), the more attractive the country will be to foreign 
investors and international buyers of aerospace products. 
6. Regulation and Legai Framework- Reguiatory agencies in the federai and 
state/provinciallevels make important decisions that affect the rules by which 
businesses opera te. The quality of the regulatory bodies is paramount to economie 
development. Clear and stable rules and regulations reassure the confidence of 
investors in the viability of their business plans. Simple rules and the 
encouragement to self-regulation or co-regulation can boost entrepreneurship; while 
excessive and superfluous rules asphyxiate businesses and eliminate job creation. In 
the United States, federal regulation of the airline industry through 1980s proved to 
be an indirect, unintentional, and y et significant source of public support for the 
development of the civilian aircra:ft industry. As a consequence oftighter regulatory 
restrictions on entry and priee competition, U.S. airline carriers competed with one 
another on service and quality, both ofwhich enhanced by procurement of new 
generations of aircraft models. As a result, the regulated, large U.S. domestic 
market provided a strong base of demand for technological innovation by the 
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aircraft producers. Finally, it is worth to note that there is a growing concern within 
the industry about tighter regulations and new legislation on the reduction of mono-
nitrogen oxide emissions and noise generated by aircraft, besicles regulations on 
safety requirements. These new regulations have already prompted major OEMs to 
invest in the development of new "green aircraft," generating large investments in 
R&D and the promise of more fuel-efficient aircraft (Tyson, 1993; Hillman, Keim 
and Schuler, 2004; CNI 2005; Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2010). Regulation is an 
important aspect of the governmental relationship with the aerospace sector because 
it adds value to the industry and it is an element of competitiveness. Civil aviation 
deregulation, which hasan immediate impact on the aerospace industry, gained 
momentum in the past decade ( especially in developing economies) through the 
liberalization of air transportation rights to increase foreign ownership levels and 
eventually remove cabotage restrictions between economies. In the past twenty 
years, the largest impacts in civil aviation deregulation have taken place in Central 
Europe, through the rapid increase in available seats; while China has been 
organizing deregulation efforts since 1990. China's central government has reduced 
tariffs on business jets and approvals of flight plans have been reduced from three to 
four weeks to a few hours. In addition, safety certification is used as a marketing 
tool by most OEMs, since it guarantees the quality of their products and processes, 
allowing the OEMs to overcome technical barriers to foreign trade (ABDI & 
UNICAMP, 2008, Bragion, 2010, Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2010). Through erratic 
or predictable regulations, governments can influence in the development of the 
aerospace industry, as new safety or environmental (emissions) regulations can 
determine the lifespan of an aircraft or the additional costs for OEMs to adapt their 
products to the new regulations. In addition, if a government is perceived as strong, 
it will have better mechanisms to enforce its regulations than one perceived as 
weak. The same principles apply to the labour legislation, together with the overall 
functioning of the judicial system, all factors that can facilitate or impede the 
development of an industry or economie sector. As the judicial system and the 
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taxation and labour rules and regulations of each country will generally be equally 
applied to ail industrial sectors, we will analyze the impact they have in the local 
aerospace industries in sections 6.2.2 The Brazilian Institutional Environment and 
the Aerospace Industry; and 6.3.2- The Canadian Institutional Environment and the 
Aerospace Industry. 
In addition to these factors, we point out a study called "Support to Dutch policy 
makers in assessing the extent to which there is an 'Internationallevel playing field in 
aerospace sector,"' published in 2004 by the consultancy group Technopolis. In this study, 
Technopolis compared government actions that could facilitate or impede the development 
of the aerospace industry in seven countries that are reference in the industry: the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy and Spain. The study investigated 
how these countries relate to various international treaties overseen by the European Union, 
the OECD and the WTO in order to support their aerospace industries. The benchmarks of 
the study were: 
1. Government facilitation in the development of new civil aircraft; 
2. Various forms of government assistance to aerospace-related R&D; 
3. Fiscal measures to encourage research and innovation; 
4. Government involvement in the procurement of aircraft; and 
5. Regional programs and initiatives (Technopolis, 2004). 
The relevance of this study lies in the fact that the benchmarks listed above can be 
linked to the six characteristics of the institutional environment used in our study. The 
benchmarks "Government facilitation in the development of new civil aircraft," "Various 
forms of government assistance to aerospace-related R&D," and "Fiscal measures to 
encourage research and innovation" are directly connected to Intellectual Property Rights 
and Investments in R&D, and indirectly connected to Infrastructure, as governments can 
justify investments in research centers and higher education as improvements in the 
country' s overall infrastructure. The benchmark "Government involvement in the 
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procurement of aircraft" is connected to "Government Procurement and Financing & 
Export Credits Agencies." Finally, "Regional programs and initiatives" is directly 
connected to Investments in R&D and Infrastructure (e.g., the regional support of the 
Quebec government to establish the Montreal aerospace cluster), and it is indirectly 
connected to Regulation and Legal Framework, as govemments need adjust their 
legislations in order to establish regional programs and initiatives to facilitate the 
development ofthe industry. 
The study concluded that each country had unique policies to facilitate the 
development of the industry in light of the different benchmarks, regardless the size of the ir 
aerospace sectors. The variations in govemment actions facilitating the development of the 
industry in each country are linked to factors such as the structure of the national industries 
( especially the presence of OEMs and other suppliers on Tier 1) and the national poli ci es 
on deferree. It is usually very hard to prove that the countries are providing subsidies in 
contravention of the various intemational treaties goveming aerospace production and 
trade, even though there is sorne space (the grey areas) within the terms of the intemational 
agreements for host governments to assist manufacturers to varying degrees. The fairness 
of one particular mechanism is considered especially hard to determine: the different 
national customs re garding the application of interest rates to loans and the repayment of 
launch investments. This type of official financial assistance has been always considered to 
be somewhat opaque to all parties who are not directly involved with the transactions; and 
the lack of public transparency applies to all five variables analyzed by Technopolis in 
different degrees (Technopolis, 2004). 
Ail seven countries compared in the study have sorne forms of investment schemes 
to facilitate the launch of new aircraft, evidencing the govemmental support for the 
development of the industry. The countries also give financial support to R&D programs, 
offering assistance on a competitive and cost-shared basis for pre-competitive and 
industrial research. In addition, four countries fund national aeronauticallaboratories, while 
Canada has a national research center specialized in aeronautics. The study also found that, 
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with the exception of German y, all countries operate an R&D tax credit system of sorne 
kind, with differences in tetms oftheir level of assistance, scope and implementation. 
Another form of govemmental assistance to the industry is the procurement of aircraft and 
export promotion programs. Even though the directed procurement of civil aircraft is 
prohibited by the 1979 GATT agreement, there is no way of quantifying the volume of 
assisted sales. While govemments cannot direct purchases, their ownerships or indirect 
connections with national carriers mean that they have severa! options to interfere in the 
success of their national industries. Govemments can also pro vide dedicated national 
financing agencies and major financial support by providing export guarantees and 
insurance amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars every year; while government 
procurement policies influence military sales. Local content policies (for security reasons) 
are another common practice within the industry (Technopolis, 2004). Even though Brazil 
was not part of the study, there is good reason to believe that the country has similar 
programs in place to facilitate the development of the local aerospace industry. One good 
example is the financial programs organized by BNDES to assist in the sales and export of 
Embraer aircraft, which is similar to the programs analyzed in the Technopolis study. 
Table 5 summarizes the importance of each component of the institutional 
framework in relation to the three dimensions of the Pearce model (Hostile or Supportive, 
Erratic or Predictable, and Weak or Strong) and how they contribute to facilitate or impede 
the development of the aerospace industry: 
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Table 5: Factors Influencing the Institutional Environment According to the Pearce Model 
According to the system presented in the table above, in the case of the aerospace 
industry, it is very important that the regulatory and legal frameworks are predictable and 
that the enforcement mechanisms to protect IP, for instance, are strong. It is very important 
that the State shows a willingness to make investments in infrastructure and that these 
investments are predictable. Predictable IP legislation, combined with strong enforcement 
mechanisms are very imp011ant qualities to the industry. As for financing and export 
credits, while a supportive is very important to the development of the industry, it is only 
moderately imp011ant that the State is strong or weak in this regard. Ideally, the industry 
would work with a supportive government in terms of government procurement, in a fairly 
predictable environment. Finally, it is very important that the government is supportive of 
R&D investments, while it not important, in terms ofR&D, that the govemment is weak or 
strong. 
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6.2 The Brazilian Framework Supporting its Aerospace Industry 
In this section, we present a brief overview of the Brazilian industrial poli ci es and 
the role of federal agencies and industry associations in the development of the local 
aerospace industry. Then, we discuss how specifie aspects of the Brazilian institutional 
framework and the country' s public policies have an impact in the development and 
performance of the aerospace industry based on the Pearce (200 1) model. The importance 
of each characteristic of the Brazilian institutional environment to the development of the 
local aerospace industry is weighted as hostile or supportive, erratic or predictable, and 
weak or strong. The discussion is based both on the documents indicated in Section 8 -
Bibliography, and on selected comments from the collaborators who were interviewed in 
the course of our research (as listed in Section 4- Methodology). 
6.2.1 Brazilian Industrial Policies and the Aerospace Industry 
In 2005, the Brazilian National Confederation of the Industry (CNI) published a 
report called "Strategie Mapping ofthe Industry: 2007-2015", in which it outlined the main 
elements that the private sector would need the most in order to promote economie growth. 
According to the report, Brazil has sorne basic institutional flaws that compromise the 
development of the country: the State is constantly draining resources from the private 
sector; the domestic interest rates are unrealistic; the infrastructure is inadequate; the 
taxation system is excessive and inefficient; and the judicial system is ineffective. In order 
to correct these deficiencies, Brazil needs to modernize its institutional environment and 
promote a structured and stable regulatory environment. The country also needs to invest in 
a quality health care system and design an educational system that is aligned with the needs 
of society; and foster entrepreneurship to be better prepared to meet the challenges of the 
global economy (CNI, 2005). 
Aware ofthese problems and in an attempt to consolidate the public policies for the 
industrial sector, the Brazilian Ministry ofDevelopment, Industry and Foreign Trade 
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(MDIC) has designed a program called "Productive Development Policy- PDP" in 2008. 
The central object of the policy is to support the national industry so that the recent 
expansion cycle in Brazilian industrial activity is sustainable. There are four main points in 
the pro gram, which are considered vital to the improvement and future sucees ses of the 
Brazilian industries: 1) expand the investment of Brazilian firms in capital goods; 2) 
expand the innovation capacity and the private investment in R&D among Brazilian firms; 
3) improve the export capacity ofBrazilian firms; and 4) strengthen Brazilian SMEs. As 
part of the program, MDIC determined that important Brazilian industrial sectors, such as 
aerospace, mining and ironworks, and bio fuels (ethanol) should be positioned an1ongst the 
five top players in the global market. The current view at MDIC is that aerospace is a sector 
that already has international projection and competitive capacity, so the policy aims at 
consolidating and expanding the leading position ofBrazil. The importance of the PDP 
program for the aerospace industry is that MDIC is attempting to centralize and coordinate 
the efforts of several federal agencies involved in economie development and the private 
firms of the industrial sector. As part of the coordination efforts, MDIC is working together 
with ABDI to design specifie poli ci es for the aerospace sector (MDIC, 201 0). 
The Brazilian Federal Government recognizes the importance of the aerospace 
sector to the country's economie development, and from the industry's inception, the 
government has supported civil aircraft manufacturing in ali stages of its development, 
most notably through funding R&D; joint government-private ownership, corporate 
fun ding at main markets loan rates; protection of the horne market; and export development 
policies. However, there are questions about to what extent the Brazilian SMEs in the 
industry have built up technological capabilities to continue supplying Embraer. For a fact, 
the MDIC and ABDI consider the supply chain to be one of the weakest elements of the 
Brazilian aerospace industry, and as a result, companies at the bottom of the pyramid have 
been engaging in consolidation operations in recent years as a mean to overcome the high 
dependency on Ernbraer interests and the low production scale of the local supply chain. In 
2003, 15 companies in the Sao José dos Campos cluster formed the High Technology 
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Aeronautics (HT A) consortium, aiming at increasing businesses with foreign OEMs. Even 
though the creation ofthe consortium consolidated the position of the companies, it was not 
enough to overcome the shortcomings of small and medium-sized subcontractors. Most 
companies that took part in the consortium operate in "family business" model; their 
production lines are regarded as outdated and lacking complexity. In addition, the small 
scale of their operation makes it impossible for them to negotiate better deals in the 
acquisition of raw materials, which is even more troubling given their chronic lack of 
working capital and limited access to short and long term financiallines. One possible way 
that SMEs found to diversify their business was to supply parts and pieces to other 
industrial sectors, especially oil and gas (Gomes et al. , 2005; Lima et al. , 2005; ABDI and 
UNICAMP, 2009; Ferreira, 2009; Malerba and Mani, 2009). 
6.2.2 The Brazilian Institutional Environment and the Aerospace Industry 
Considering the official position of the Brazilian government for the development 
ofthe local aerospace industry and the information obtained in the course of the interviews 
with key government officiais and industry representatives, we briefly discuss sorne 
elements of the Brazilian institutional framework that have an impact in the development of 
the local aerospace industry: 
1. Intellectual Property Rights - Brazil has no tradition in patent deposit and the 
number of Brazilian patents registered in Brazil and abroad is inexpressive; a fact 
that was pointed out by more than one interviewee. One of the reasons is that the 
National Industrial Property Institute (INPI) does not have the adequate 
infrastructure to pro cess all the patents and trademarks of Brazilian companies. A 
second reason is that the Ministry of Justice and the Public Ministry (the District 
attorney) lack the necessary knowledge to settle IP disputes. There is no national 
culture of patent registration, as companies and researchers are not aware of the 
economie, technological, and scientific benefits ofiP. As a result, the investment of 
private companies in R&D and innovation is insufficient to guarantee their 
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competitiveness in the long run. However, one interviewee pointed out that ABDI 
and the Ministry of Science and Technology are currently studying measures to 
increase awareness of IP within the industry and ways to improve the current 
legislation on IP. In addition to these problems, according to CNI (2007), piracy and 
copyright infringements are ever more frequent and disrupt the normalcy of 
economie transactions. Finally, there is no consensus between the govemment 
agencies (federal and state levels) and the private sector about the property rights of 
patents created with govemment support. However, ABDI proposed that INPI 
should prepare a study demonstrating what aerospace companies could do to 
reinforce IP protection in Brazil. In addition, one interviewee pointed out that the 
industry could benefit from policies that enhance the abilities of SMEs to bring 
innovation and generate new patents, as SMEs play a crucial role in the industry but 
lack sorne expertise and the capacity to innovate (CNI, 2005; CNI, 2007; ABDI, 
2010). 
2. Investments in R&D - Brazilian comparues know that they need to invest heavily 
in R&D if they are to be competitive in the world market. The current investments 
in R&D are not enough to bring Brazil to the same lev el of the most dynamic and 
technologically advanced countries. The Brazilian govemment and the CNI have 
developed a policy to invest 2 percent of the country's GDP in R&D, from 2010 
on. According to CNI, one ofthe problems of the policy is that the access to the 
funds is limited to very few agencies, such as the Brazilian Innovation Agency 
(FINEP- which is part of the Ministry of Science and Technology) and BNDES 
(which is under the umbrella ofMDIC). Another problem is that the cost of 
borrowing money from the govemment is considered to be very high; and there is a 
very limited number of private banks that lend mo ney for the acquisition of new 
machinery and equipment. The access to R&D funds is specially limited to SMEs. 
As a result, it is estimated that 90 per cent of ali R&D expenses are funded by the 
103 
cornpanies thernselves. One interviewee stated that Brazil stilllacks an encouraging 
institutional environrnent for technological developrnent that applies not only for 
large cornpanies, but also for SMEs - while industry associations suggest that the 
govemment should irnplernent a strong po licy on R&D financing to rernedy this 
situation. The existing legislation and prograrns on tax breaks to fund R&D 
initiatives have sensibly changed between 1995 and 2005, and such instability is a 
reflex of the fiscal limitations of the Brazilian state and the inconsistency of public 
policies supporting R&D and innovation. Another recurrent request, according to 
the sarne source, is that the governrnent should sirnplify the bureaucratie procedures 
for companies applying for R&D financing funds. In addition, sorne rnernbers of the 
industrial sector consider that the agencies regulating patent registration, IP 
gran ting, and technical standardization (ail un der the urnbrella of the Ministry of 
Science and Technology) are underfunded, understaffed, and politically weak, even 
though there were improvements in the ir services in the past decade. Part of the se 
deficiencies can be also linked to the lack of basic infrastructure for standardization, 
which is a result of a vicious cycle: the lack of infrastructure and technical services 
for tests and instrument calibration means that technical nonns are not thoroughly 
applied and observed. And because the nonns are not fully applied, the low dernand 
makes it difficult for the agencies to justify higher investments in basic industrial 
technology. Another problem is that part of the investments in basic industrial 
technology is concentrated in agencies with high technical and scientific capacities, 
which are not necessarily able to reproduce their achievements in commercial scale. 
This deficiency is a reflex of the poor relationship between private finns and 
Brazilian universities and research centers (CNI, 2005; CNI, 2007). 
As part of the Investments in R&D, we also consider the public policies and 
investments in Education and Human Resources Training to have an impact in 
the industrial activity, including aerospace. In Brazil, there is a lack of qualified 
personnel and the development of training programs is a major challenge of the 
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industry. To achieve further economie development, Brazil needs to invest in 
training programs not only for technicians ( e.g. IT) but also in higher education 
programs in technology (engineering, computer science, chemistry, physics, etc). 
CNI suggests that high technology sectors, such as aerospace, should coordinate 
with state and Federal Governments, universities and research centers in order to 
address their needs of qualified professionals and technicians. Brazil should invest 
more in post-graduate specializations for engineers and promote educational 
agreements and exchange programs with foreign universities. Entrepreneurship 
should also be a regular part of the curriculun1 of professionals working in high 
technology sectors. According to one interviewee, if Brazil is to further expand its 
economie development in a sustainable manner, HR training, reinforcement of the 
educational system, and more investments in R&D are paramount to the future 
success of industrial activities. In this regard, when compared to Canada, Brazil 
lacks huge investments in HR training (CNI, 2005; CNI, 2007). 
3. Government Procurement- In terms ofR&D, the Brazilian legislation that deals 
with government procurement is perceived as an obstacle to the advancements of 
R&D and innovation. In general terms, CNI suggests that the main piece of 
legislation on the subject (Lei de Licitaçôes- 8666/93) focuses only on the lowest 
priee as the determinant of govemment acquisitions, even in purchases for deferree 
equipment, which can compromise other determining factors of government 
procurement. In addition, Brazil has no official policy on government procurement 
(such as the United States and the Buy America Act or the Small Business Act) and 
there is a lack of central planning for government procurement. In addition, 
according to one interviewee, Brazil has no official policies for deferree 
acquisitions, while other government representative suggests that Brazil should have 
similar mechanisms to the "Buy American Act" to further propel the national 
industry (CNI, 2005; CNI 2007). 
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4. Infrastructure- Infrastructure is considered to be a critical variable for industry 
productivity and Brazil has a chronic problem investing in new infrastructure and 
maintaining what is in place. The productivity of Brazilian firms has been 
significantly affected by the country' s poor transportation infrastructure: there are 
problems in the supply of transportation services of all modes, combined with the 
poor and insufficient infrastructure of Brazilian ports and airports. The institutional 
framework of the transportation systems is still based on obsolete, low concurrence 
regulatory marks of the 1960s and 1970s. CNI suggests that Brazil should improve 
its regulatory framework and encourage the establishment public-private 
partnerships to modemize its logistics infrastructure and bring more private 
investments to the expansion of the country' s infrastructure. Besicles transportation, 
Brazillacks investments in energy generation, especially electricity and natural gas, 
which compromise the ability ofprivate firms to expand production (CNI, 2010). In 
general terms, interviewees stated that the aerospace industry does not rely heavily 
on physical infrastructures; with the exception of ai1port infrastmcture, which is 
considered to be a key determinant of the regional aviation expansion and should 
have an important impact in Embraer's sales. Brazil's airport infrastructure is 
considered to be faulty, but the Federal Government is now promising to make 
heavy investments to adequate the airports to the 2014 FIF A W orld Cup and the 
2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympie Games. Federal Govemment representatives 
suggested in their interviews that the government should improve the legislation to 
encourage the establishment of PPPs in order to accelerate the necessary 
investments to improve the country' s infrastructure. According to one respondent, 
there is also room for investments in the development of regional hubs in smaller 
cities and the further integration of Brazilian air routes with other South American 
countries. Finally, one interviewee pointed out that the Sào José dos Campos 
aerospace cluster is located in an area with relatively good infrastructure, easy 
access to the main Brazilian international airport, and it is closely located to the 
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main universities, training centers and R&D facilities in Sào Paulo, the main 
industrial hub and the economie center of Brazil. 
5. Financing and Export Credits- BNDES and the Financing Program for Brazilian 
Exports (ProEx) were crucial in financing sales for Embraer, as way to compensate 
the country' s weak financial system, high interest rates, currency and hyperinflation 
crises, and the lack of access to commercial credit. In 2008, 11 per cent of 
Embraer's sales were completed through BNDES credit lines, while in 2009 
approximately 39 percent of the sales were financed through BNDES. According to 
a government representative, financial support from BNDES to aircraft exports is an 
indicator of the government's commitment to the aerospace sector. The interviewee 
also pointed out that the Brazilian government constantly monitors and compares 
the types of financial support other governments off er to their aerospace companies 
in order to design similar strategies to further boost Brazilian aircraft exports. 
According to another interviewee, one of the reasons Brazil supports Embraer 
exports is that ali other major aircraft manufactmers (Bombardier, Boeing, and 
EADS/ Airbus) do the same thing; while, and in his perception, the Brazilian 
government sees the WTO disputes over the issue as a natural part of the game 
(Lima et al., 2005; Hira and De Oliveira, 2007; ABDI and UNICAMP, 2009). 
Regarding the financial mechanisms created to strengthen the local aerospace 
supply chain, MDIC, together with BNDES developed the Pr6-Aeronautico in 2007, 
a pro gram targeting the further development of SMEs in the Sào José dos Campos 
area. The purpose of the pro gram is to expand the aerospace supply chain through 
production and export of engineering services, together with aeronautic parts, 
components, and systems. As one interviewee stated, the Federal Government 
understands that the only way to consolidate the supply chain is to enhance the 
gains of scale and be globally competitive. In this regard, federal agencies are now 
designing policies to encourage the mergers and acquisitions of SMEs within the 
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national supply chain. Moreover, the program aims at the specialization of 
aerospace personnel and the signature of international cooperation agreements in the 
area of safety accreditation of products made in Brazil. BNDES offers financial 
support to SMEs willing to invest in the establishment or expansion of the ir 
businesses, rehabilitation, modemization, innovation and technological 
development, acting either through long-term financing or by subscription ofthe 
company securities. However, as the interviewee suggests, the Federal Government 
policies for upgrading the SME suppliers to the aeronautic sector should also take 
into consideration instruments for strengthening their technological capabilities. In 
addition, they should focus on stimulating the upgrading in the SMEs to completely 
new and more advanced technologies while forcing them to improve their relations 
with research institutions and further develop and implement engineering, project 
management and design procedures in Brazil. Finally, the same interviewee states 
that government policies should also focus on the diffusion of the innovation culture 
in the aerospace sector through the successful cases of SMEs within the supply 
chain that have accumulated innovative capabilities, instead of focusing mainly on 
Embraer or on foreign buyers (BNDES, 2007; Figueiredo et al. , 2008; Malerba and 
Mani, 2009). 
As a subdivision of Financing and Export Credits, we analyze the impact of the 
Brazilian taxation system on the local aerospace industry. In general, besides the 
lack of transparency, the Brazilian taxation system is considered to be ineffective 
and obsolete by the private sector. Regarding the taxes applied to imported goods, 
which apply to a large part of aircraft parts and systems, Brazil has a tariff 
escalation policy: raw materials and intermediary goods have lower taxes; capital 
goods have a moderate level of taxation, and consumer goods have higher taxes 
applied to them. On average, capital goods have a 14 per cent import tax associated 
to them. However, in cases when Brazil does not produce similar capital goods, it is 
possible to import them free oftax. CNI considers that the credit breaks for the 
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acquisition of capital goods and other changes in the tax legislation are positive 
steps in the expansion of industrial activity in the country. Embraer and other 
exporting companies in the aerospace industry are eligible to apply for the RECAP, 
a pro gram that offers special tax breaks for the purchase of capital goods by 
exporting companies. As Brazil has launched special taxation programs for severa! 
industrial sectors (including automobiles, railways and trains, the naval industry, 
and microelectronics ), that are considered of key importance to the economie 
development of the country, the aerospace industry states that a similar pro gram 
should be designed to encourage the further development of the industry in Brazil. 
As one government representative stated, changes in the taxation system have the 
most impact in the industry than any other aspects of the institutional environment-
and Brazil has a history of suddenly changing its tax system whenever the 
government budget is unbalanced ( e.g. the Provisional Contribution on Financial 
Transfers (CPMF), a tax that was collected between 1997 and 2007. The tax was 
created as an emergency fund to public health initiatives in Brazil). Another 
interviewee stated that the current taxation system tends to fa v our companies of Ti er 
1, while penalizing the final purchaser of the aircraft (who pays most of the taxes). 
The interviewee also stressed that most companies in Tier 1 are from foreign 
countries and they most likely benefit from tax incentives in their home countries. 
According to another interviewee, another flaw of the Brazilian tax system is that 
taxes are collected over all stages of production, which have a heavy impact in the 
final priee of products. A third government representative stated that Brazil is 
currently working closely with the OECD and WTO to correct fiscal discrepancies 
in the aerospace sector and equalize it with other major players within the industry. 
In addition, one respondent from a fourth government agency states that "it does not 
make sense to have heavy taxes on labour in a country that needs to create more 
jobs." As a result, the industry sees the taxation system as unpredictable and hostile 
to the business environment, while the government is strong in its capacity to 
collect taxes (Rios and Velloso, 2005; CNI, 2005; CNI, 2010). 
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Another aspect of the institutional environment that is connected to Export Credits 
is the local Foreign Trade Legislation. The legal requirements involving the 
notarization of foreign documents for comparues willing to do business in Brazil is 
considered to be excessive and it has high costs attached toit, which is ham1ful to 
the country' s foreign trade. Brazil has y et to sign several international agreements 
on foreign trade ( e.g. the Hague Apostille Convention). If Brazil were to sign 
international trade agreements and further liberalize foreign trade, private firms 
would benefit from a stronger legal framework and simplified bureaucratie 
requirements, which should also be more cost-effective. Another benefit associated 
with the signature of international trade agreements would be a competitiveness 
improvement ofBrazilian companies in the global market. Besides the legal 
impediments for exporting firms, one govemment representative states that 
Brazilian exports are hurt due to the county's structural problems in terms of 
customs inspection, lack of quaiified personnel, excessive red tape, and complex 
regulations on exports. In addition, there is no official policy to promote the 
participation of SMEs in the country' s exports and the coordination between the 
govemment and potential exporting firms is weak. Brazil should also invest in the 
development of a strong image for its industry, in order to stress the intrinsic 
characteristics ofBrazilian products, such as quality, diversity, innovation, design, 
and cultural identity, which are a fundamental fact in the development of an export 
culture. Regarding FDI, one interviewee stated that Brazil has adequate legislation 
to attract foreign investment, but in the end, each company will choose the foreign 
partners with whom it wants to establishjoint-ventures (CNI, 2005; Palermo, 2005). 
6. Regulation and Legal Framework- The main regulating body in the industry is 
the National Agency of Civil Aviation (ANAC) and it usually follows the 
recommendations ofthe Joint Aviation Authority (JAA) and the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), as indicated by one ofthe interviewees. The main piece of 
legislation regulating the industry is the Brazilian Code of Aeronautics (Lei 
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7565/86). As one respondent pointed out, Brazil has no specifie policies governing 
foreign carriers flying to the country and Brazilian carriers flying abroad. As the 
representatives from ANAC stated in their interviews, the agency symbolizes the 
Brazilian government message to the aerospace industry (and more specifically to 
the civil aviation sector) that the country has a stable institutional environment. 
Also, they stated that the government wants to reinforce that the sector has a 
transparent and a stable regulatory environment to operate and stressed the fact that 
Brazil has today a much better institutional environment than it had ten years ago. 
The current Brazilian regulatory framework only started to take shape in the 1990s, 
after the privatization of several public companies that used to provide services 
ranging from telecommunications to mining and gas exploration. As a consequence, 
the country is still adjusting to the model of regulatory agencies. In 2003, the 
Federal Government created an Inter-Ministerial Workgroup to analyze and 
evalua te the role of regulatory agencies in the face of the country' s current 
institutional framework. In the Workgroup's report to the Office of the President, 
the Brazilian government outlines the role of the regulatory agencies as the 
following: 
I. The Federal Government expects the total investment in the country's GDP 
to continue to grow in the next years; 
II. The Federal Govemment has the responsibility to create the adequate 
environment to encourage investments; 
III. The presence of regulatory agencies is indispensable for the success of 
private investments; 
IV. According to the current legal framework ofBrazil, it is the Federal 
Government who must assure the scope and quality of services offered to ali 
Brazilian citizens, so the role of the se veral regulatory agencies is vital to the 
proper function of the county's public services; 
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V. Stronger regulatory agencies can contribute to lower capital costs for the 
infrastructure sector (and investments in infrastructure) in Brazil; 
VI. The government should encourage economie regulation, not necessarily 
through regulatory agencies, especially in sectors that are not related to 
infrastructure development, such as the pharmaceutical industry; 
VII. The Brazilian model for its regulatory agencies should be aligned with those 
of other developed nations, where agencies are eminently responsible for the 
formulation of sector policies; 
VIII. In addition to the role of regulatory agencies, economie regulation should be 
constantly improved, aiming at the establishment of a competitive 
environment for all economie activities; 
IX. The development of social control mechanisms for the agencies is the next 
step to the optimal functioning of the regulatory model. Such mechanisms 
should include public consultations in order to address controversial 
regulations; the appointment of representatives from consumer rights 
organizations to observe the public consultation process in the agencies; the 
establishment of ombudsman offices in all agencies; the increased 
transparency of rules and contracts between agencies and companies; and 
the establishment of accountability mechanisms between the agencies and 
the Brazilian Congress; 
X. Contracts establishing good management practices and high performance 
goals can be combined with social control instruments in order to implement 
"transparency goals" as a tool to the improvement of regulatory 
effectiveness; 
Xl. The Brazilian government believes that regulatory agencies can work as 
tools to avoid certain deficiencies of the markets, but the State should not 
directly interfere in private economie activities as a result of pressures from 
interest groups or aggressive lobby activities. Regulatory agencies should 
primarily focus on the activities requiring heavy, long-term investments in 
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infrastructures, such as the building of dams and energy generation 
(Presidência da Republica Federativa do Brasil, 2010). 
Even though the recent debates on regulatory issues in Brazil have mainly 
concentrated on the role of the regulatory agencies, broader discussions have 
highlighted the need to build regulatory capacities inside the administration in the 
medium and long terms. The Brazilian Federal Government, through the Chief of 
Staff, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning, Budget and 
Management, is setting up the Pro gram for the Strengthening of the Institutional 
Capacity for Regulatory Management (PRO-REG), aiming at the improvement of 
the regulatory system and coordination among the institutions that participate in the 
regulatory process. Among other objectives, the PRO-REG seeks to establish an 
oversight body for regulatory quality and the introduction of a Regulatory Impact 
Analysis (RIA) as a policy tool to support decision making (OECD, 2008). 
The modernization of the regulatory mechanisms in Brazil also seeks to improve the 
regulatory processes, making them more structured. Regulatory legislation, as other 
laws in Brazil, is not necessarily prepared in accordance with quality control 
mechanisms, although formai procedures are used to prepare new legislation. It is 
important to notice that accessibility of laws and regulations to citizens has 
improved with electronic portais. On the other hand, the legal framework remains 
complex and uncertain, despite the consolidation instruments that have been 
introduced to reduce the number of existing laws. Simplifying the legal framework 
and making the process more transparent, effective and accountable are challenges 
requiring special attention from the Federal Government. In addition, legal certainty 
is needed to improve compliance and reduce the involvement of the judiciary 
(OECD, 2008). 
In the case of the aerospace industry, an example ofhow governments can facilitate 
business is the recently approved "Portaria Secex Number 1 0." The Federal 
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Govemment passed this piece of legislation in 2009, determining that ANAC was 
no longer required to approve the import of aerospace products, except those that 
have be en refurbished and tools to be used by firms of the sector. This measure 
eliminated one bureaucratie step in the imports of the industry, as other federal 
agencies are still in charge of enforcing customs regulations that apply to ali 
industrial sec tors in Brazil. CNI considers the establishment of the regulatory 
agencies starting in the 1990s as a positive step for the modernization of the 
economy. However, even though the institutional framework is fairly new, it 
already needs to be updated and improved. There is a perception that sorne agencies 
stilllack independence, transparency, a precise delimitation oftheir functions, 
financial autonomy and technical expertise. There is also a certain scepticism about 
the selection of the regulatory agencies' board of directors and the integrity of their 
mandates. Regarding the regulation of civil aviation, Brazil is following the world 
trend to deregulate civil aviation. Brazil bas an extremely high and largely repressed 
demand for air travel, and the country's airport infrastructure needs massive 
amounts of investments in order to serve the ever growing number of passengers 
they receive every year. So, it is clear to the Brazilian government that in order to 
enhance competition, the improvement of air travel services at competitive priees, 
and the expansion of the number of routes served by air companies, the country 
needs to modernize the framework regulating air traffic. However, Brazil is still 
reluctant to sign international agreements and be part of an "open skies" network 
mainly because the country is concerned about the level of competitiveness of 
Brazilian air companies and the possibility of jobs cuts resulting from the 
deregulation of the sector (Pasin and Lacerda, 2003; CNI, 2004; CNI, 2005; ABDI, 
2010;Br~go~2010). 
Another aspect of Regulation and Legal Framework that affects all industrial 
activity in Brazil (including aerospace) is the local labour legislation. The Brazilian 
labour legislation is perceived to be extremely rigid, and it is an enormous obstacle 
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to the economie growth of the country. The basis ofthe current labour legislation 
dates back to the 1940s and it has hardly changed ever since: as they are, Brazilian 
labour laws do not reflect the changes of the institutional framework, and are 
considered to be outdated, excessive! y extensive, and patemalist. The legal 
framework imposes hiring costs of over 100 per cent of tho se applied to direct 
salaries under the form of compulsory, non-negotiable taxes; and there are several 
restrictions for temporary contracts. In a study conducted in 2005, the World Bank 
affirms that labour regulations in Brazil are less favourable to business than in most 
of the 145 countries included in the study. The three main problems of the 
legislation are: 1) difficulties in hiring new employees; 2) inflexible working hours; 
and 3) difficulties in dismissing employees. In addition, there are strong restrictions 
for evening and weekend shifts, and all employees are entitled to paid annualleave 
that exceeds 21 days after 1 year in the job. In order to compensate for the indirect 
costs of hiring new employees, businesses tend to off er lower salaries, which in turn 
translate into low morale and low productivity. As a result, Brazil has a high 
number of unregistered workers, who have no legal guarantees or are self-
employed; and there is an accentuated discrimination against women and younger 
workers in the job market. Industrial sectors complain that the current framework 
hurts business growth, technological advancement, and higher productivity. As one 
interviewee summarizes it, the Brazilian labour legislation is obsolete and it is 
almost impossible to change it, since society is not ready to discuss major changes 
in labour rights, such as paid annualleave and the establishment oftemporary 
contracts ofwork (Saisse, 2005). 4 
Finally, we consider that the Brazilian Judicial System is another aspect of 
regulation and legal framework that can have an important impact on private 
businesses, including the aerospace industry. According to one government 
4 There are no specifie labor regulations for the aerospace industry in Brazil. The topics discussed in 
this section reflect the framework that applies to ali industries and workers in the country. 
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representative, Brazil still needs to make adjustments in the stability of its legal 
framework, as private firms stilllack confidence in the country's property rights, 
law enforcements (especially regarding respect to contracts), and the predictability 
of the judicial system. Legal counselling and other legal expenses are considered to 
be excessively high, but they are considered to be an integral part of doing business 
in Brazil. According to another respondent, there is a general perception that the 
interference of the Executive Branchon the Judiciary Branch is excessive. The 
private sector also feels that the Judiciary is excessively slow, which favours the 
maintenance of irregularities in the system and the disregard to legitimate rights. 
The inordinate possibilities of appealing of a legal decision (a well-known, widely 
used mechanism to postpone the payment of a court's rule or settlement), also 
contribute to the weakness of contracts. Besicles the overall perception that there are 
excessive and unnecessary bureaucratie procedures in the legal system, the Labour 
Courts are also perceived as having excessive normative powers over private 
businesses. Brazil also needs to reinforce and expand its alternative dispute 
resolution and mediation systems (CNI, 2005). 
Table 6 summarizes the importance of each component of the Brazilian institutional 
framework in relation to the three dimensions of the Pearce (200 1) model (Hostile or 
Supportive, Erratic or Predictable, and Weak or Strong) and how they contributed to 
facilitate or impede the development of the aerospace industry in Brazil: 
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1 nfrastructu re 
++ 
Supportive 
Predictable 
Strong 
Hostile 
Erratic 
Weak 
Table 6: Factors Influencing the Brazilian Institutional Environment According to the 
Pearce Model 
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Figure 11 shows the different actors influencing in the Brazilian aerospace industry: 
FIG. 11 -Public and Private Organizations of the Brazilian Aerospace Industry 
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Figure 12 shows the different actors influencing in the Brazilian aerospace industry 
by field of action: 
FIG. 12- Public and Private Organizations of the Brazilian Aerospace Industry by Field of 
Action. 
6.3 The Canadian Framework Supporting its Aerospace Industry 
In this section, we present a brief overview of the Canadian industrial poli ci es and 
the role of federal agencies and industry associations in the development of the local 
aerospace industry. Then we discuss how specifie aspects of the Canadian institutional 
framework and the country' s public poli ci es have an impact in the development and 
performance ofthe aerospace industry, based on the Pearce (2001) model. The importance 
of each characteristic of the Canadian institutional environment to the development of the 
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local aerospace industry is weighted as hostile or supportive, erratic or predictable, and 
weak or strong. The discussion is based both on the documents indicated at Section 8 -
Bibliography, and on selected comments from the collaborators who were interviewed in 
the course of our research (as listed in Section 4 - Methodology). 
6.3 .1 Canadian Industrial Poli ci es and the Aerospace Industry 
Traditionally, Canadian industrial and trade policies have always struggled to 
balance conflicting pressures: on one hand there is a small domestic market and the 
resultant dependence on exports; on the other hand, there is a reluctance to embrace fully 
American laissez-faire principles. As a result, Canadian industrial policy is considered to be 
aimed at harnessing the best features of markets and protecting citizens against the worst. 
Canada is a country whose popular culture is highly americanized, so political institutions 
and practices assume great importance. However, it is important to note that greater 
acceptance of state intervention in the economy is one the few things that differentiates 
Canada from the United States- to the point that 
if markets were entirely open and there was little difference in the organizing principles of the U.S. 
and Canada, the existence of separate countries would no longer be required (O'Brien, 1997, cited 
by Goldstein and McGuire, 2004). 
There are, of course, dissonant opinions: as one government representative stated, 
the Canadian government makes a clear distinction between the attributions of the public 
and private sectors. In the words of the respondent, there is very limited direct government 
influence over private businesses in the aerospace sector- and given the limited access to 
Canadian government officiais in our research, we assume that this is the official position 
of the Federal Government towards the industry. In any case, the Aerospace Industries 
Association of Canada (AIAC) considers that government actions to facilitate the 
development of the industry are justifiable from the point of view that governments 
recognize the benefits to be reaped from such investments. Governments know that the 
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investments in the aerospace industry are usually followed by an increase in trade; both by 
OEMs and the suppliers of parts and pieces in the industry's supply chain. AIAC also 
considers that the industry does not operate in a laissez-faire market place. Aerospace is 
subject to extensive government control and influence, with matters of national security and 
politics always in the balance, in addition to international trade concems. The industry is 
also unique in the sense that much of aerospace technology has both civilian and military 
applications, so it is hard to determine to what extent deferree programs are used to support 
cutting-edge R&D in the industry. In the end, the industry recognizes that this proximity 
with the govemment served to give private firms a competitive advantage in global 
commercial markets (AIAC, 201 0). Despite the clear separation between government and 
private firms in the aerospace industry, another interviewee suggested that subsidies and 
other forms of financial support offered to the industry (mainly through the Federal 
Govemment) give the government sorne power to negotiate business decisions, especially 
in terms of keeping production lin es (and jobs) in Canada, instead of relocating them to 
developing countries. 
Another example of governmental actions to facilitate the development of the 
industry was displayed when the Federal Government felt compelled to complain against 
Embraer at the WTO as Bombardier' s market position was seen as a crucial element in the 
decision. According to one Canadian official who deals with policies supporting the sector, 
under no circumstances could Canada accept a situation where Bombardier lost market 
share unfairly, especially in a market it had created. In order to support Bombardier; the 
Federal Govemment automatically accepted the risk that a number ofindustry's members -
especially the SMEs that may be the most interested in selling components to Embraer-
could be hurt by the WTO disputes (Goldstein and McGuire, 2004). 
Another initiative of the Federal Government to support the aerospace industry is 
the National Aerospace & Deferree Strategie Framework (NADSF), which was established 
in 2005 to define the blueprint for conjoint actions between the government and other 
industry stakeholders to enhance the global competitiveness of Canada in the global 
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aerospace market. The NADSF is a 20-year comprehensive policy aimed at creating the 
right conditions that can make Canada a preferred location from which to serve global 
aerospace markets. In this program, the Federal Government identified seven areas where it 
could take a leadership role in working with other stakeholders to improve its support to the 
industry: 
1. Strategie Initiatives and Major Platforms; 
2. Technology Development and Commercialization; 
3. Human Resources and Skills Development; 
4. Trade Development and Market Access; 
5. Sales Financing; 
6. Security and the Environment; 
7. Public Procurement (AIAC, 2010). 
The importance of the NADSF to industry is that it is perceived as a mechanism to 
document the Federal Governrnent's objectives and policy intentions supporting the 
Canadian aerospace sector. However, AIAC understands that for the further development 
of the industry, Federal Governrnent support should be mainly focused on three priority 
areas: 
1. Levering industry investments in technology development, product 
mandates and strategie platforms; 
2. Levering procurement to capitalize on the capabilities of Canadian-based 
firms; and 
3. Pro vi ding adequate export financing un der appropriate terms and conditions 
(AIAC, 2010). 
These three areas translate the expectations of members of the Canadian aerospace 
industry in terms of governrnent actions to facilitate the further development of the 
industry, as the sector expects the Federal Government to 1) consolidate its programs to 
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invest in new aerospace technology; 2) provide universal access to refundable Scientific 
Research and Experimental Development (SR&ED) investment tax credits; 3) adopta 
strategie approach to defence and national security procurement that includes a 
predisposition to further invest in Canadian solutions; and 4) establish a standalone aircraft 
sales financing framework (Technopolis, 2004; AIAC, 2010). 
The main government agency involved with the sector, Industry Canada, considers 
that the Canadian aerospace industry will face challenging issues in the next two decades, 
connected to increasing priees of oil and environmental pressures to reduce emissions and 
aircraft noise. In addition, other threats to the Canadian industry are the intense foreign 
competition, combined with lagging productivity resulting from sub-par levels of 
investment in R&D and infrastructure; the high value of the Canadian dollar; a decline in 
the Canadian content of domestic production and exports; and scarce capital for investing 
in new manufacturing equipment and technology development. Another problem, 
according to industry representatives, is that Canada' s public investment in aerospace has 
declined rapidl y sin ce the late 1990s, while many of the other major aerospace players have 
been increasing their support to the aerospace industry. In order to maintain their positions 
within the industry, Canadian aerospace businesses will have to meet the requirements of 
the civil aviation industry. In a report prepared by IC, major airline companies stated that 
they will seek to acquire innovative aircraft that will present the following characteristics: 
1) light weight, with lower combustible consumption; 2) more reliable and with less 
maintenance costs; and 3) longer lifespan (EDC, 2006; CAMAQ, 2010; AIAC, 2010). 
It is important to note that the private sector is also committed to articulate 
strategies to strengthen the industry: as a mean to support the industry in an evolving global 
context, the Aerospace Industries Association of Canada (AIAC), together with severa} 
govemmental agencies, launched the Future Major Platforms (FMP) initiative in 2008. 
Representatives of the industry and the govemment agreed to work together through the 
FMP initiative to improve Canada's position within the industry by: 1) identifying the 
major commercial platforms that offer the best opportunities for Canadian firms; 2) 
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identifying priority technologies necessary to participate on the identified future major 
platforms; 3) providing recommendations to align existing support mechanisms to facilitate 
technological development, with the understanding that no new funding is available; and 4) 
developing and implementing "capture plans" to assist Canadian companies in becoming 
suppliers to these platforms. Even though the program was initially created to support the 
commercial aerospace sub-sector, both the AIAC and the Federal Government expect to 
replicate the !essons leamed from the FMP process in other segments of the industry, such 
as MRO; military; helicopter; and space and unmanned aerial vehicles (AIAC, 201 0; 
CAARHA, 2010; The Hill Times, 2010). 
Even though there are several governmental programs to support the aerospace 
industry, the Federal Government considers that Canada still has a limited number of 
OEMs and mid-level companies, which forces companies in Tier 1 to buy foreign systems. 
As a consequence, in order to reinforce the supply chain, Tier 2 needs more development. 
Such limitation in the number ofTier 1 system integrators means that the Canadian 
industry, in general, is unable to respond to the demand of OEMs to fund and manage large 
work packages. As a result, the Canadian industry was not considered competitive enough 
in a recent call on bids to supply major work packages for the Embraer family of business 
aircraft, due in large part to the industry' s inability to res pond to the scope of the work 
offered. Members of the industry advocate that integrators with world class capabilities still 
need to receive further support from the government, especially through the SADI program. 
This applies to the complete development cycle - from product development to production 
and full training capacity (EDC, 2006; AeroStrategy, 2009; AIAC, 2010). 
While it is undeniable that the Canadian government is committed to support the 
industry, given the numerous successful programs and initiatives organized by public 
agencies, both the govemment and the industry know that the current level of support is not 
adequate. For example, SMEs claim that public policies have paid too much attention to the 
demands of large OEMs, and as a consequence, structural problems beneath the final 
assembly level have not received the proper attention from the Federal Government. In fact, 
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members of the industry and government representatives are well aware that money from 
the SADI program tends togo to the bigger players of the industry, so the government is 
now studying ways to improve SMEs access to SADI and review its repayment conditions 
(Goldstein and McGuire, 2004; The Hill Times, 2010). 
Figure 13 shows how the Canadian Federal Government supports the aerospace 
industry: 
federal Government Support to the Aerospace lndustry 
FIG. 13- Federal Government Support to the Canadian Aerospace Industry 
Source: AIAC, 2010 
As Figure 13 shows, the Federal Government support to the industry tends to 
concentrate in the areas of basic and applied research and product and manufacturing 
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methods development. As a re suit, there is a lack of private and public investment in 
technology demonstration. As the AIAC (2010) points out, 
Technology demonstration is defmed as a project that demonstrates how technology may be 
operationally integrated and exploited for a specifie end-use application, or range of applications. 
Technology demonstration programs aim to accelerate the maturation of advanced technologies 
and enable the development of the next generation products. 
This lack of investment in technology demonstration is essential to understand wh y 
continued investment in basic and applied research does not necessarily (and often does 
not) lead to commercialization. In addition, the limited capacity of the Canadian industry at 
the cri ti cal Ti er 1 system integrator level can be directly linked to the lack of investment in 
technology demonstration. To remedy this perceived lack ofinvestment in the aerospace 
industry, AIAC states that private businesses, government and academia should develop a 
partnership and pro vide sizeable injections of R&D funding through existing financial 
mechanisms. Such partnerships could offer tremendous new opportunities for the Canadian 
aerospace industry that are within its reach. AIAC states that funding programs must be 
substantial to meet the sizeable demands of developing new aircraft and reap the potentially 
high rewards over 30 to 40 years. As an example of the benefits of such programs, AIAC 
points out that the repayments on the CRJ aircraft program generated CAD $99 million on 
a loan ofCAD $45 million. As a result, members ofthe industry suggest that Canadian 
Federal Government should increase aerospace funding through SADI, NRC-IAR, and a 
special fund for Technology Demonstration Project by a total of CAD $400 million over 
four years. AIAC argues that such investment would ensure the Canadian aerospace 
industry's continued position as a world leader and as an important contributor to Canada's 
technological advancement and economie prosperity (AIAC, 2010; The Hill Times, 2010). 
6.3 .2 The Canadian Institutional Environment and the Aerospace Industry 
In addition to the official programs presented above, there are specifie aspects ofthe 
Canadian institutional environment that contribute to the success of the local aerospace 
industry, as we discuss in the following topics: 
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1. Intellectual Property Rights - IP Rights in the context of collaborative networks 
in the aerospace industry often remains at the university level. As the 
representatives from AIAC suggest, possible solutions could include pre-established 
IP agreements (e.g. CRIAQ) and allow that creative ideas come from businesses, 
other partners and co-inventors. The two sectors should work together to find a 
solution that is satisfactory to both parties. In addition, the industry suggests that 
the Federal Government should expand the scope of the SR&ED tax credit to 
include IP protection expenses involved in eligible R&D projects. 
According to AIAC, the current legislation on IP touching aerospace determines 
that when the Canadian government partially or wholly fund R&D initiatives in the 
industry, the IP developed is deemed to be the property of the Ministry or the 
Canadian Government. One problem of this arrangement is that it limits the free 
flow of IP and puts sorne restrictions to Canadian companies compared to the ir 
partners and competitors in other nations - as new aerospace programs are shifting 
and are increasingly being developed as a collaborative effort between multiple 
partners from different countries ( especially by a small number of large Ti er 1 and 2 
OEMs and system providers). These restrictions differ from the European Union 
treatment ofiP, as in Europe aerospace companies are actually encouraged to share 
IP rights amongst members and partners, based on their participation in each 
project. As a result, Canadian aerospace companies (in addition to the subsidiaries 
of European parent companies doing business in Canada) are at a disadvantage 
position, when compared to their partners in Europe. In addition, AIAC states that 
Canadian subsidiaries of large multi-nationals in the United States consider that the 
IP framework is essential to the development of a long term sustainable advantage, 
and for that reason, they should resist any attempts to limit the free flow of IP 
between subsidiaries in Canada and other jurisdictions. As a result, there have been 
severa! examples of Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. parent comparues refusing to 
participate in the Strategie Aerospace and Defence Initiative (SADI) recent 
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programs due to its IP restrictions. According to the representatives from AIAC, 
one of the main limitations of the programs is that some of its IP clauses are 
becoming all too prevalent, which is a factor th at limits the ability of the industry to 
innovate. According to AIAC, the Strategie Aerospace and Defence Initiative 
(SADI) template agreement should be modified to ease restrictions on IP ownership. 
2. Investments in R&D - Regarding the investment in R&D and innovation, the 
Canadian government recognizes that governments of major global aerospace 
players understand the need to share in the risk/reward nature of the industry, so 
they work closely with their industries to position them for success. Since the 
1970s, the governments of the U.S. and those of the European Union provide 
billions of dollars every year in repayable and non-repayable support for aerospace 
and defence R&D. As a result, the Canadian government launched the Strategie 
Aerospace and Defence Initiative (SADI) in 2007 in an attempt to fill the gap in 
terms of R&D fun ding in Canada, even though the country does not have the lev el 
of financial resources of other leading aerospace countries. Besides the SADI 
program, the Federal Government support for the aerospace industry is coordinated 
through several instruments that support a broad spectrum from basic research to 
product development. Such programs are managed by: 
1. The Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada 
(NSERC), which has invested over CAD $4 million in university-industry 
collaborative projects over the past ten years; 
2. The National Research Council (NRC); which has created the Institute for 
Aerospace Research (NRC-IAR), an agency that employs close to 370 
researchers and technicians and has managed to leverage CAD $28 million 
of A-base funding into a program that is considered to be highly relevant to 
the industry; and 
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3. The Industrial and Regional Benefits (IRB), which provides the framework 
for using federal ( defence) procurement as a lever to promo te industrial and 
regional development objectives of the Federal Government (AIAC, 2010). 
The NRC-IAR is the most important national grant-awarding body in the area of 
fundamental research. NRC-IAR facilities include 8 wind tunnels, 8 research 
aircraft, full-scale structural test rigs, engine test cells, etc. In 2004, the historical 
investment cost was estimated to be at CAD $80 million, and the estimated 
replacement cost was CAD $600 million. The Institute has 4 major departments: 1) 
the Aerodynamics Laboratory; 2) the Structures, Materials, and Propulsion 
Laboratory; 3) the Flight Research Laboratory; and the Aerospace Manufacturing 
and Technology Centre (located at the campus of the Université de Montréal). Most 
income of the NRC-IAR cornes from services to business; while ties with industry 
are strong: Pratt & Whitney Canada has its own test facilities at the Ottawa IAR site 
for years now. IAR services are priced based on a "straight fee for service base," 
comprised of a personnel and overhead component. The rates are the same for every 
customer, including the government and private firms within the industry, both 
Canadian and foreign. This pricing policy was based on a government decision that 
government research institutes must not compete with the private sector. 
Compensation packages of researchers working within the IAR are based on regular 
comparisons of the rates of researchers in all do mains in industry and academia, and 
the rates are of the same magnitude as outside organizations (Technopolis, 2004). 
The Technology Partnership Canada (TPC) program, which was funded by the 
Federal Government, identified three target sectors (aerospace, biotechnology, and 
environmental technologies) to receive 25-30 percent of the costs of developing 
new products reimbursed through a system of royalty payments. The TPC pro gram 
was superseded by the current SADI initiative. However, according to AIAC, the 
main difference between both programs is that the TPC took elements of risk into 
account when evaluating the performance of projects, while SADI does not take 
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"risk" into account. As a result, contract terms have become more onerous and the 
definition of eligible expenses has narrowed, which is considered to reduce the 
effectiveness of the pro gram. According to representatives from AIAC, Canadian 
companies are, as a consequence, at disadvantage compared to competitors across 
the world. Besicles the SADI program, the Federal Government is promoting the 
Innovation and Science and Technology (S&T) Cooperation Arrangements as 
important tools to forge S&T partnerships with India, China, the EU, Japan, Korea, 
Brazil, and Israel. According to a representative from Bombardier, the R&D support 
offered by the Canadian government to the industry is crucial to the development of 
the industry and it makes the sector feel confident that a combination ofprivate and 
public R&D funding will reinforce Canada's position within the global market in 
the future. 
The government of Que bec has also established initiatives to support research 
activities within the local aerospace industry: companies doing R&D in Quebec can 
have a tax credit of20 percent on the salary expenditures ofR&D. For a Canadian 
controlled private company, the credit is 40 per cent for the first CAD $2 million of 
annual wages paid in Quebec. The credit reduces linearly for assets totalling 
between CAD $25 million and CAD $50 million to 20 per cent, and it is refundable 
for all companies. In addition, as a means to attract foreign researchers to Canada, 
non-nationals working for a corporation conducting R&D in Quebec are eligible for 
a provincial tax holiday for up to a maximum of five years, which means that the 
researchers only pays the federal portion of their income tax (Technopolis, 2004; 
MDEIE, 201 0). These initiatives show a great level of commitment of the provincial 
government towards the industry, as a representative from UQAM stated that 
Quebec invests more in R&D (through tax credits) than sorne countries 
(Technopolis, 2004; MDEIE, 2010). 
In addition, the Quebec government is also committed to fund R&D projects in the 
aerospace industry through its Société générale de financement (SGF). The Quebec 
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government is especially concerned with the credit access of SMEs to fund their 
R&D initiatives. According to a representative from MDEIE, investments in 
education and R&D are advantage factors in Quebec and the challenge ofthe 
provincial government is to keep up the trend and train enough people each year. 
When compared to other Canadian provinces and the OECD countries, Quebec ' s 
expenses in R&D place the province in high places: first place among four 
provinces (when compared to Albetia, British Columbia and Ontario) and in 
seventh position, when compared to 32 OECD countries. Finally, MDEIE 
understands that investments in R&D must be constant and they are long-term 
investments, so governmental suppmt should not be unusual, especially if one 
considers the fact that aerospace is a source of high income jobs (Goldstein & 
McGuire, 2004; Government of Canada, 2010; AIAC, 2011, Conseil du patronat du 
Québec, 2011). 
As in the analysis of the Brazilian institutional framework, we consider the public 
policies and investments in Education and Human Resources Training as part of 
the Investments in R&D. The Canadian government (at federal and provincial 
levels) has important programs to support the aerospace industry, including the 
college centers for technology transfer. Two examples of such initiatives are 
the Technology Center in Aerospace (CTA) and the Consortium for Research 
and Innovation in Aerospace in Quebec (CRIAQ). At the moment of its creation, in 
2002, CRIAQ regrouped 20 private companies (including 14 SMEs), one research 
center and 9 universities, and its mandate was to coordinate the collaboration 
between universities and the industry's pre-competitive R&D initiatives. Since its 
inception, CRIAQ has managed 31 research projects involving over 200 
researchers and specialists. The success of Canada' s aerospace industry is largely 
based on a strong partnership between government, private firms and academia. As 
a result, the Canadian post-secondary education system had to adapt to have the 
right capacities to partner effectively with the industry. However, according to the 
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representatives from AIAC, sorne challenges exist, as for example, the alignment of 
research objectives among collaborators can be a challenge. Universities should be 
provided with additional fun ding to enhance the activities of the ir university-
industry collaboration offices and laboratories. In Quebec, McGill University, École 
Polytechnique de Montréal, Laval University, Concordia University, University of 
Sherbrooke and École de Technologie Supérieure have developed a joint program in 
the field of aeronautics and space technology leading to a Masters in Aerospace 
Engineering (Technopolis, 2004; MDEIE, 2010; AIAC, 2010). Regarding the 
availability of trained professionals, when compared to Alberta, British Columbia 
and Ontario, Quebec is lagging behind, as the province has the highest percentage of 
youngsters and adults who do not have a high school diploma and are not attending 
school (11.9 percent). The province is also lagging behind in terms ofworkers who 
are currently employed in their original fields of expertise, employment 
opportunities for middle-age workers, and economie integration of immigrants. The 
province also ranks in fomih place when the comparison is focused on labour costs 
(considering the minimum wage and labour taxes); and labour legislation 
(orientation of labour laws, influence and leverage of certain unions; and level of 
bureaucracy/paperwork associated with regular employment or job openings) 
(Conseil du patronat du Québec, 2011). 
Still on the topic of strategie planning, future demographie changes ( especially 
retirement), the Quebec government sees these changes as a factor of concern to the 
industry. In fact, most of the interviewees in Canada agree that demographie 
changes may pose a threat to the industry in the near future, as aerospace requires 
high-skilled employees. According to the interviewees, recent statistical trends 
suggest that Canada may not be able to meet the demands of Canadian industries for 
high-skilled professionals. 
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3. Government Procurement- In order to further develop its major policy for the 
sector, Industry Canada has prepared a study in 2006, in which the Federal 
Government tries to identify the main trends and challenges that the aerospace 
industry would face between 2006 and 2016. In this study, the government suggests 
that the sales of military equipment, including aircraft, would grow in importance to 
the industry. The United States will absorb most of the sales in this segment, but the 
Canadian Forces would also play an important role as a buyer, even though the sales 
of military equipment to the Canadian government are traditionally regarded as 
modest in the global market. As a result, the Canadian aerospace industry has a 
unique characteristic: unlike other major players of the aerospace industry, Canada 
has only a small domestic military aviation subsector, and has consequently directed 
most of its resources into civil aviation. According to the representatives from 
AIAC, the government is aware that public procurement can determine the future of 
the industry: the re-equipping of the Canadian Forces will open up further potential. 
The Hercules fleet that is serving the military today was designed in the 1950s, so 
the govemment knows that once-in-a-generation purchases like that are unique 
opportunities for Canada to enhance the capabilities of its aerospace industry. On 
the other hand, AIAC considers that there is an absence of a long-term defence 
procurement strategy, which undermines Canada's ability to sustain and grow a 
solid defence industrial base. As it is, current policies are considered not to take into 
account the full socio-economic implications of current procurement strategies, or 
the sovereignty implications of a weak or irrelevant defence industrial base (EDC, 
2006; The Conference Board of Canada, 2009; AIAC, 2010; CAMAQ, 2010; 
CAARHA, 2010). 
The Federal Government also launched the "Canada First Defence Policy," in an 
effort to transform the domestic defence industry in a key partner in Canada's 
defence and national security policies. On the same basis, the government uses its 
"Advantage Canada" program to identify the leveraging of defence procurement 
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spending as a means to accelerate the pace of technology innovation and reap 
economie spin-offbenefits. According to the representatives from Industry Canada, 
these programs recognize the need for Canada to have a healthy, vibrant, and 
innovative domestic defence industrial sector that can be both responsive to the 
country' s military needs and, at the same time, globally competitive. Another 
initiative from the Federal Government is the Defence Industrial Productivity 
Program (DIPP), which is credited asto have largely contributed to the creation and 
expansion of a solid base of defence, space and aerospace suppliers in Canada, with 
obvious repercussions in the procurement of aeronautical and space equipment. 
However, members of the industry state that Canada stilllacks a strategie approach 
to defence and national security procurement. A consistent deferree procurement 
strategy would bring potential to Canadian firms to develop and retain technologies 
and industrial capabilities deemed vital to supporting national economie, security 
and defence objectives. AIAC suggests that ideally, a more collaborative defence 
strategy should align Canada's deferree industrial capability and Canada's military 
requirements; maintain other benefits to Canada and the deferree sector in terms of 
competitiveness, skills development, employment, exports and intellectual property 
assets; and ensure economie growth and long-term prosperity (AeroStrategy, 2009; 
AIAC, 2010; The Hill Times, 2010). 
4. Infrastructure- The good infrastructure available in Canada was a crucial factor in 
the development of the Montreal aerospace cluster. For the government, the 
establishment of the cluster is perceived as a good source of income, as the industry 
attracted large economie investments, besicles generating high-paid jobs. In 
addition, the government of Canada invests large! y in R&D infrastructure facilities 
that are extensively used by the local aerospace industry, including rich tax credits 
and a national Institute for Aerospace Research (Deloitte, 201 0). As one res pondent 
stated, the Canadian investments in infrastructure are similar to those of other 
OECD countries, while representatives from Industry Canada stated that there is a 
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good infrastructure network that is part of the Canadian quality of life. Re garding 
the maintenance of the existing infrastructure, there is a shared responsibility 
between the federal and the provincial governments, while the Economie Action 
Plan is part of a federal initiative to improve the general infrastructure of the 
country. The interviewees agree that the aerospace industry has no specifie needs in 
terms of physical infrastructure; and the Federal Government sees it that no industry 
is favoured in terms of investments in infrastructure. At the provinciallevel, Que bec 
is aware that there should be more investments in new infrastructures and the 
province is committed to renew its aging public structures, while its great power 
generation capacity continues to be a point of advantage to the industry - and even 
though the costs of building new hydro plants are increasing, aerospace is not an 
energy-intensive industry. The telecommunications infrastructure is not an issue for 
the sector. 
According to a representative from the Federal Government, Canada funds public 
infrastructure and does not provide funding for industry or company-specifie 
infrastructure investments. Therefore, the Federal Government does not provide 
funding for specifie aerospace-related infrastructures. As the funding goes towards 
general public infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, ports, airports, schools, 
universities, etc, the benefits from those investments are available to ali industrial 
sectors. Of course, the aerospace industry and aerospace firms benefit from this 
investment to the extent that they utilize this public infrastructure network, but this 
is the same as for other firms and industrial sectors. 
As part of Infrastructure, we also consider investments made in Regional Support 
to the Aerospace Industry and to SMEs. In this sense, it is interesting to observe 
that besides the provincial governments, the Canadian Federal Government also has 
specifie programs to support SMEs in the aerospace industry. In 2005 , the Federal 
Govemment created the Office of Small and Medium Enterprises (OSME) with the 
mandate to address the needs and perspectives of SMEs selling to the government. 
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In the case ofthe aerospace industry, the OSME encourages and assists SMEs to 
participate in the procurement processes of the Federal Government; improves links 
between supply and demand, influencing change within government acquisitions; 
and conducts studies of the economie impacts of procurement between the Federal 
Governrnent and the private sector. The agency is committed to reduce barriers to 
participation in procurement in three key areas: 
1. Complexity: the idea is to simplify the procurement process, streamlining 
and keeping plain-language documents, which are self-contained and self-
explanatory. 
2. Criteria: aiming at avoiding unnecessary criteria, while recognizing the need 
for legitimate requirements. 
3. Capacity: making systemic changes to address the specifie challenges SMEs 
face due to their size rather than their ability. 
Besides the OSME, the Canadian Federal Government has a webpage to assist 
SMEs interested in doing business with the government. The page 
(buyandsell.gc.ca) is the main location for industry suppliers and government 
buyers to find information they need for doing business. Other source of 
governmental assistance is the Canada Economie Development for Quebec Regions, 
a federal agency that supports SMEs in the province. In 2009 the agency awarded 
CAD $737,600 to the Quebec Aerospace Association (AQA) in non-repayable 
funds to continue its work to strengthen Quebec's aerospace enterprises 
(Government of Canada, 2010; OSME, 2011). 
Regarding foreign competition, Industry Canada considers that the emergence of 
Brazil, Russia, China, and India as source of low-cost manufacturing is putting 
competitive pressures on the Canadian aerospace supply chain. As a result, in order 
to enhance their participation in the global industry Canadian SMEs should invest 
in: 1) the development of new advanced, composite materials; 2) new 
136 
manufacturing and maintenance techniques, including laser welding; 3) advanced 
machining techniques aimed at high-density materials; 4) the development of 
monolithic products, with a reduced number of parts; and 5) automation and 
robotics to enhance manufacturing techniques, including nanotechnologies. In 
addition, the SMEs should invest in collaborative engineering processes with 
OEMs, including the virtual design of aircraft. In terms of investments in R&D, 
Canadian aerospace companies keep current R&D expenditures at 6 per cent of 
revenues, which is considerably below the rate of intensity (R&D 
expenditures/sales) that the industry experienced in the 1990s (it peaked at 12 per 
cent of revenues in 1997) as a result of weakened profit mar gins and the 
strengthening of the Canadian dollar. Over the past ten to fifteen years, the 
investment in R&D has remained relatively constant, at approximately CAD $1 
billion per annum (The Conference Board of Canada, 2009; CAMAQ, 201 0; The 
Hills Times, 2010; AJAC, 2010). 
Apart from the Federal Government, sorne provincial govemments also have 
regional programs to facilitate the development of the aerospace industry in their 
provinces. MDEIE has a special program to support feasibility studies for an 
investment project in aerospace in the province. The program offers financial 
contributions to companies wishing to implementa project to invest in Quebec. The 
pro gram can finance up to 40 per cent of the cost of expeti services for feasibility 
studies for a maximum grant of CAD $100,000. The eligible sectors are: 
manufacturing, recycling, business services, research and industrial development 
and scientific services. The Quebec government has also developed special 
programs to support aerospace SMEs to expand their businesses. MDEIE is 
committed to assist SMEs to develop more complex aerospace products, diversify 
and exp and the number of products and services they produce and the clients they 
serve. The provincial government also wants aerospace SMEs to be more active in 
Quebec ' s foreign trade, especially by assisting Quebec companies to attend the 
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Bourget and Farnborough aerospace exhibits and other international events. MDEIE 
is also committed to coordinate the dialogue between the Federal Government and 
the local aerospace industry, reinforcing partnerships to finance the development of 
new products, the sales of aircraft, and the purchase of defence equipment (MDEIE, 
2006; Investissement Québec, 201 0). 
Since the aerospace industry relies heavily on the availability of a high qualified 
workforce, the government of Que bec considers that training high qualified 
workers is a major challenge to overcome. According to a representative from the 
provincial government, the specialized training centers located in Quebec could 
successfully provide the necessary workers for its aerospace industry in recent 
years. But the real challenge is to assure that these training centers will be able to 
match the demand for qualified workers in Quebec in the near future (MDEIE, 
2006). 
According to a representative from the Quebec government, CRIAQ is a perfect 
example of the provincial support to the industry, as it is a forum to facilitate the 
communication between government, universities, and industry members. CAMAQ 
is also a very effective forum, focusing exclusively on HR and training issues that 
concern the industry. The province also recognizes the importance of AIAC, AQA, 
and AéroMontréal as indispensable elements in the dialogue between government 
and industry. As the provincial government does not get directly involved in the 
decision making process of private companies, these industry associations are an 
open channel to understand what the government can do to improve the business 
environment for aerospace in Quebec. Of course MDEIE is awa:re that it has a small 
staff dedicated to the aerospace sector, but they claim to be a very active and very 
effective team. In addition, MDEIE's offices overseas are also committed to support 
the export of parts and aircraft made in Que bec. 
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In addition to Quebec, Ontario also operates severa! fiscal measures to support and 
encourage R&D activities within the aerospace industry, including the following 
programs: 
a) The Ontario Innovation Tax Credit, which offers 10 per cent full y 
refundable tax credit for Canadian controlled private companies; 
b) The Ontario Business-Research Institute Tax Credit, which offers 20 per 
cent tax credit for corporations that enter into approved contracts with 
eligible Ontario research institutes; and 
c) The Ontario Super Allowance, an additional tax incentive which permits 
accelerated write-off of research-related costs. The benefit consists of two 
portions: the base amount, which is an average ofthe R&D expenditures of 
the previous three years, and an incrementai portion, which is the amount 
that exceeds the base amount in a given fiscal year (Technopolis, 2004). 
Besicles the support programs for the aerospace industry in Que bec and Ontario, 
where most of the Canadian industry is located, the Western Economie 
Diversification Canada agency is committed to support the development of the 
sector in Western Canada, especially in the fields of repair and manufacturing of 
regional and commercial aircraft; maintenance, repair and overhaul of small gas 
turbine engines; and provision of parts and service for flight simulators. Western 
Canada concentrates 14 percent of the country's industry. British Columbia, 
Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba provincial governments are firmly committed 
to bring more aerospace businesses to their provinces, advocating that firms could 
benefit from generous R&D tax treatments and low operating and business costs 
(Western Economie Diversification Canada, 2011 ). 
5. Financing and Export Credits- In Canada, Export Development Canada (EDC) 
plays a similar role of other Export Credit Agencies (ECAs), offering financing and 
credit insurance solutions for Canadian companies within the industry. A typical 
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EDC loan to aerospace firms is repaid over eight to 17 years, at commercial rates. 
As the EDC's Transportation Team (2006) points out: 
" Ali the major aircraft producers in the world seek govemment support, so this is not unique 
to the Canadian industry. lt is simply something that needs to be done because of the high cost 
of the items involved. Private lenders are certain! y a significant part of it, but they may not 
have the risk capacity that EDC was created to deliver." 
As sales financing capacity is regarded as an important competitive discriminator in 
global aerospace markets, especially for the sales of aircraft, the Federal 
Government decided to play a vital role in working with commerciallenders to 
create such fmancing capacity through EDC. The agency states that the aerospace 
sector represents its largest loan exposure, having accounted for more than CAD 
$7.5 billion, in 2009, out of its CAD $30 billion in loan receivables. In 2008, EDC 
supported nearly CAD $5 billion in business in the aerospace industry, which 
accounted for approximately 20 per cent of the industry total. EDC pro vides 
insurance and financing support for the full range of aerospace ex ports, including 
propulsion, helicopters, simulators, aerospace parts and services. The majority of 
EDC' s exposure in the aerospace industry is secured by mortgages on aircraft 
operated by 26 of the world's largest airlines and their regional affiliates. In the case 
ofBombardier, EDC started working with the company in the early 1980s, when 
Bombardier first ventured into mass transit products. Historically, EDC financing 
support to Bombardier ranged from 35-40 percent of the company's commercial 
aircraft sales. EDC also has financially supp01ied other aerospace giants such as 
CAE, Pratt & Whitney, and Bell Helicopter. According to the representatives from 
AIAC, however deeply involved with the sector, the Federal Govemment should 
intensify the role of EDC in the aerospace industry through the establishment of a 
new Aircraft Sales Financing Framework that should fully exploit EDC's financing 
capacity as an instrument of public po licy in addressing "capacity gaps" in the 
commercial banking sector. In order to do so, the Federal Govemment should: 1) 
concentrate the current financing instruments into one structure (EDC is the agency 
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with most expertise for this task); 2) ensure that financing capacity is adequate to 
meet market demands, while explaining internai government capacity constraints; 3) 
provide a clear policy framework and supporting criteria for assessing financing 
requests, one that meets the manufacturer's sales strategies; and 4) delegate the 
management of individual transactions to the new structure/entity resulting from the 
consolidation of the sales financing strategy. On the other hand, the Canadian 
govemment considers that other export credit agencies are assisting aerospace 
sectors at historically high levels, which increases the pressure on both EDC and 
other Canadian government financing programs. However, the fact the government 
feels compelled to invest more in the development of the aerospace industry can 
pose a challenge in the public relations front: taxpayers may not always perceive the 
public investments in private companies as a government priority and may pose 
obstacles to the financing programs (e.g. Canada Account) (Technopolis, 2004; 
EDC, 2006; EDC, 2010; AIAC, 2010). 
Also part of the Financing and Export Credits affecting the aerospace industry is 
Taxation. In this aspect, Canadian firms struggle with two main challenges to their 
ability to compete globally: lagging productivity performance and a strong currency 
buoyed by high energy priees. A tax reform is necessary to allow manufacturing 
sectors (including aerospace) to achieve real growth in machinery and equipment 
investment. Firms within the industry are using their cash to acquire new 
technology, much ofwhich is imported at highly competitive priees, to become 
more efficient. Sorne possible areas of a tax reform would include eliminating 
capital taxes, cutting corporate income tax, smoothing corporate tax rate increases 
for small businesses, allowing accelerated capital cost allowance to lapse after three 
years, introducing an environmental technology investment tax credit, and retaining 
federal interest deductibility for investments abroad. According to representatives 
from the Federal and Quebec governments, the taxation system is not a major 
concem for the local aerospace industry, as they point out that Canada has one of 
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the lowest new investment tax rates of the G7 countries (Conference Board of 
Canada, 2008). As one respondent stated, taxation levels will always be considered 
high among private firms (especially when compared to the U.S.). AIAC has been 
expressing these concems to the govemment, but they have not yet been addressed. 
In any case, the industry understands that the tax system will not change in the near 
future and the private sector is weil adjusted to the current system. On the other 
hand, the SR&ED program oftax incentives is considered to be the largest source of 
federal support for industrial R&D and it is applicable to tiered tax credit covering 
wages, materials, new capital equipment (not used equipment, nor land/buildings), 
contracted research and sorne overheads. There are provincial variations in the 
application ofthe program (Technopolis, 2004; AIAC, 2010). 
At the provinciallevel, the 2010 report "Bulletin de la prosperité du Québec," 
published by the Que bec Employers Council, uses the indicator Effective Marginal 
Tax Rates on Investment (MTRI) to compare the impact of taxes on new 
investments in different provinces of Canada and in the OECD countries. The index 
compares the effect of ali charges and tax rules that affect the retum on 
investment. It takes into account the capital tax, the sales tax, tax on corporate 
income, rules and depreciation rates, and methods of accounting for inventories. 
Quebec's MTRI was 20.9 percent in 2009, ranking the province second among 
Canadian provinces (Alberta was in the first position), and ninth in a list of 20 
countries. According to Quebec's Ministry of Finance, in 2012, the province's 
MTRI will be reduced to 13.3 per cent, due to an 18 to 15 per cent decrease of tax 
rate on corporate income at the federallevel combined with Quebec's tax abolition 
on capital. These measures will place Quebec in the first position among Canadian 
provinces. In 2009, companies investing in Quebec- including the ones in the 
aerospace industry, benefited from a MTRI that was both one of the lowest in 
Canada and one of the best in the OECD countries (Conseil du patronat du Québec, 
2011). 
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Finally, another aspect of Financing and Export Credits that has an impact in the 
development of the aerospace industry, is Canada's Foreign Trade Legislation: 
besides the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFT A) and several Free 
Trade Agreements signed between Canada and several countries (including talks 
with Japan and the European Union), the country continues to push for freer trade 
through the WTO in the Doha Development Round. The Federal Governrnent uses 
its Global Commerce Strategy and the Foreign Investment Promotion Strategy 
to boost Canadian commercial engagement in global value chains. Other tools 
include the Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (FIPAs), 
which provide the protection and predictability that foreign investors need when 
investing in Canada. As the representatives from AIAC stated, the Federal 
Government can influence through free trade agreements that can benefit the 
industry. As a large exporter, Canada could always benefit from free trade 
agreements; therefore, the establishment of new trade agreements is al ways a factor 
of concern to the AIAC members (Governrnent of Canada, 2010). 
6. Regulation and Legal Framework- Transport Canada is the main regulatory 
body of the civil aviation industry in Canada. Re garding the general regulation of 
economie activity, the Federal Governrnent approved in April2007 the Cabinet 
Directive on Streamlining Regulation; which is a key component of the current 
Federal Government focus on improving regulation in Canada. The directive 
oversees the development, implementation, evaluation, and review of regulatory 
initiatives and it follows these underlying principles: 1) protection and advancement 
of the public interest; 2) promotion of a fair and competitive market economy; 3) a 
decision-making process based on evidence; 4) the creation of accessible, 
understandable, and responsive regulation; 5) the advancement of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of regulation; and 6) the requirement of timelines, po licy coherence, 
and minimal duplication (The Conference Board of Canada, 2008). 
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The Federal Government determined that the directive applies to all federal 
departments and agencies, providing a broad approach to streamlining both existing 
and future regulations in Canada. Federal departments and agencies are required to 
identify interested parties and publish regulatory proposais. Once the proposais are 
published, they should be available for 30 days to receive comments (75 days if 
international trade is affected). Public policy issues and objectives must be clearly 
stated. Then, the regulatory instruments that achieve the policy objectives, reflect 
the risks involved, and minimize unintended influences are the ones to be most 
likely to be selected. The selected regulatory instruments should be based on 
national or international standards and be coordinated with other federal 
departments. Ideally, the benefits and costs of proposed regulations are to be 
considered and quantified, with regulations focused on achieving the maximum net 
benefit to the Canadian economie development (Conference Board of Canada, 
2008). 
As the representatives from Bombardier and AIAC stated, Transport Canada (TC) 
has a high standard regulatory framework and the sector considers it to be a 
reinforcing message of the safety associated with the Canadian industry. As the 
industry sees it, it is important to corn ply with safety requirements, even if it means 
complying with sorne bureaucratie steps. The same interviewees say that sometimes 
the industry feels that the safety regulations are not reviewed as dynamically as they 
should, but in general, the government does a fair job within the regulatory agencies 
and in general, the industry has a good relationship with TC. The industry is closely 
following the new regulations on the so-called "green aircraft," and the implications 
that tighter environmental regulations may have in the businesses of private firms. 
Regarding the civil aviation industry, according to a representative from the Quebec 
government, recent changes in the market suggest that foreign airlines will be 
allowed to serve domestic routes in North America and Europe. The provincial 
government has little power to interfere in the industry regulation, as the regulatory 
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agencies are mostly a federal responsibility. Mergers and acquisitions are not a 
factor of concern to the industry, as they are usually approved without major 
restrictions. 
Table 7 summarizes the importance of each component of the Canadian institutional 
framework in relation to the three dimensions of the Pearce (200 1) model (Hostile or 
Supportive, Erratic or Predictable, and Weak or Strong) and how they contributed to 
facilitate or impede the development of the aerospace industry in Canada: 
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lnvestments in R&D 
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Table 7: Factors Influencing the Canadian Institutional Environment According to the 
Pearce Model 
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Figure 14 shows the different actors influencing in the Canadian aerospace sector: 
FIG. 14- Public and Private Organizations of the Canadian Aerospace Industry 
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Figure 15 shows the different actors influencing in the Canadian aerospace sector by 
field of action: 
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FIG. 15- Public and Private Organizations of the Canadian Aerospace Industry by Field of 
Action 
As presented in this section, governments can and do support their aerospace 
industries through different policies and mechanisms. The main forms of government actions 
that can have an impact in the aerospace industry are associated with the institutional 
framework of the following areas: intellectual property right; incentives for R&D; 
government procurement; national defence strategies; investments in infrastructure; sales 
financing and export credits; safety and civil aviation regulations; environmental regulations; 
free trade agreements; taxation (e.g. tax breaks on R&D initiatives); HR training and 
education; and labour legislation. As both Brazil and Canada have adapted their institutional 
environments to accommodate sorne of their national aerospace industries needs, both 
countries managed to develop severa! finns that are highly competitive in the world market. 
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7 Discussion & Conclusions 
Brazil and Canada are two of the largest co un tries in the world, and at first sight, 
they come from a similar historical background: both countries were settled by Emopean 
colonial empires; both initially explored for the riches associated with their natural 
resources. Both countries share a diverse, multi-cultural population- a product of constant 
waves of immigration, who were brought either by force or in search of a better life. To 
fully understand and precisely determine all the variables that put Brazil and Canada in 
i their different stages of development- including the differences in the political, economical 
and social realities of each country- is beyond the scope of our research project and it 
would most certainly be an incomplete attempt even if it were part of our research 
objectives. However, when we analyzed sorne specifie aspects ofthe institutional 
environments ofBrazil and Canada and the impact ofthese variables in the development of 
the local aerospace industries, we geta sense that the World Economie Forum's Global 
Competitiveness Index is an effective tool that can be linked to different stages of economie 
development between two countries. In om case, the differences in the institutional 
environment of Brazil and Canada are reflected in the position each country holds in the 
2010-2011 rank: while Canada appears in the lOth position, Brazil holds the 58th position 
(WEF, 2010). 
Such differences can be also seen through the positions Brazil and Canada hold in 
the Government-Business Efficiency Gap Index, an annual indicator compiled by the IMD 
World Competitiveness Center in Switzerland. The index compares how countries rank in 
terms of government and business efficiency, separately. Then, IMD calculates the gap 
between the public and the private sectors of each country and the resulting gap shows 
where countries stand in their relative competitiveness: the closer the gap is to zero 
(government efficiency close to business efficiency), the higher the country is placed in the 
rank. The index is calculated based on analysis made by leading scholars and IMD' s own 
research and experience, using in their methodology data from each country covering the 
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national environment of four main factors: 1) Economie Performance; 2) Government 
Efficiency; 3) Business Efficiency; and 4) Infrastructure. In 2011, Brazil had the highest 
gap between government and business efficiencies (-26) of all 59 countries surveyed by 
IMD and was placed in the last position of the rank (the least competitive country). Canada, 
on the other hand, had a gap of only -1 and it was placed in the ih position. This 
asymmetry validates in a certain way the findings of our research: while government and 
private businesses are more in tune and work closely to each other in Canada, there is a 
large gap and an irregularity in their relationship in Brazil- a gap that is holding back the 
full potential for economie growth and social development of the country (IMD, 2012). 
The different levels of development present themselves not only through official 
reports from govemment agencies or international organizations, research publications or 
news coverage. In the course of our research, we spoke to govemment officiais, 
representatives from the private sector, and members of the academia. First, we will present 
the summary of our findings re garding the interactions of the institutional environment and 
the aerospace industry in Brazil. Based on the responses of aU interviewees conceming 
each ofthe six characteristics of the institutional environment, we considered in our 
comparison (1 - Financing and export credits; 2 - Government procurement; 3 -
Infrastructure; 4- Intellectual property rights; 5 - lnvestments in R&D; and 6- Regulation 
and legal framework), we present a brief summary of the Brazilian institutional 
environment and how they affect the local aerospace industry. To give the reader a better 
idea ofhow the institutional environment plays a role in the development of the industry, 
we complement our summary with comments selected from the transcripts of the 
interviews. Then, a similar analysis is presented regarding the interactions of the 
institutional environment and the aerospace industry in Canada. 
In general terms, interviewees consider that Brazil has an institutional environment 
that is stable and does not pose any threats to the aerospace industry. As one respondent- a 
major officer within the MDIC's office coordinating federal policies for the industry-
states it, the Federal Government is now mainly concemed with the further expansion of 
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the local aerospace supply chain. With the emergence ofHelibnis (a helicopter 
manufacturer) as another major OEM in Brazil, the government is confident that firms in 
Tiers 2 and 3 will be able to diversify their production lines and bring further investments 
to the supply chain. The government also understands that however stable the institutional 
environment is, the private sector will always be susceptible to the macroeconomie 
environment, both internai and extemal - and the exchange rate will always be a source of 
concem, as the local industry depends extensively on imported parts. 
Wh en asked about the effectiveness of public poli ci es aiming at the industrial 
development ofBrazil, the interviewee from the University of Brasilia pointed out that the 
Federal Government current industrial policy aims at the development of 32 different 
industrial sectors, covering all major industries in the country. Besides being an almost 
impossible task (supporting 32 industries at the same time), the interviewee claims that the 
poli ci es are in fact out of synch with the private sector and its needs. In different interviews, 
even the officiais at MDIC stated that such an ambitious policy is completely unrealistic. 
The government officiais advocate that aerospace should not be considered as a simple 
industry, as it also has a significant impact on deferree and national security policies. 
Instead, there should not be a distinction between civil and military aviation, in terms of 
go v emmental support to aerospace, with the Ministry of Deferree working closely with 
MDIC and ABDI to develop their future policies and programs affecting the industry. 
Despite all the efforts from the Brazilian Federal Government to facilitate the 
development of the local aerospace industry, one interviewee a professor who has done 
extensive research on the industry supply chain- has a more pungent vision of the public 
policies for the sector. The professor states that although they are valid and well-
intentioned, the public policies for the sector are still very limited. ABDI, the agency 
coordinating all the government efforts to support the industry, has limited resources, 
limited personnel, and limited operational freedom. As a result, the agency produces 
several reports that are positive in their form, but with little practical use for the private 
sector. 
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Regarding the Brazilian Intellectual Property Rights environment, there is a 
consensus among interviewees that IP is not a priority issue to the local aerospace industry, 
while agreeing that the country needs to improve its IP legislation. 
lntellectual Property 
(erratic or predictable 
legislation; weak or 
strong mechanisms to 
fight piracy) 
Brazil hasan erratic and weak IP environment: agencies controlling 
patent registration, IP granting, and standardization are 
underfunded, understaffed and politically weak. The country has no 
tradition in patent deposit and piracy and copyright infringements 
are quite common. 
As for the investments in R&D affecting aerospace in Brazil, there is a strong 
dependence on public funding for R&D and the development of defence equipment/aircraft. 
In addition, the R&D funds are concentrated in the Sào José dos Campos cluster, while 
Embraer remains the main investor in R&D in the industry. But refreshing as it is that 
Embraer does not depend on government funds for R&D, the company still depends on 
public credit lines to export its aircraft, as discussed in our report. 
lnvestments in R&D 
(hostile or supportive of 
investments in R&D, 
education and human 
resources training) 
Brazil has a hostile R&D environment: there is a lack of public R&D 
funding, the cost of borrowing money is high, there is a lot of 
bureaucracy involved in public funding, and there are limited 
private sources of money for R&D. There is little coordination 
between universities and the industry. The country is also hostile in 
terms of education and HR training for the aerospace industry: 
Brazil has weak policies in higher education and technical courses. 
There are few educational options for technicians and as a 
consequence, the country lacks qualified personnel. There is little 
international integration in education and a lack of investment in 
HR 
151 
When asked about the importance of government procurement to the development 
of the local industry, all interviewees agree that the Brazilian governrnent played a decisive 
role in the early days of Embraer and the establishment ofthe Sào José dos Campos cluster. 
Exarnining the history of the Braziiian aerospace industry, it is undeniable that, in its 
inception, the sector received full support from the Federal Government. State support of 
high-tech firms is pivotai to their success throughout their lifespan. Embraer considers that 
the support from the Brazilian government has been fundamental and allowed the company 
to exist. In its early years, Embraer had stable and consistent state support, as the 
i governrnent was its most important customer. Through the years, the relationship between 
the company and the governrnent reflected the changes in global conditions and the 
evolution of the aerospace industry. Embraer realized that, in order to continue its growth, 
it was necessary to develop a global systems integration approach. 
The govenunent support was also present in the form of an autonomous centralized 
training and research facility, with a clear mission. The establishment of the Aeronautical 
Institute of Technology (IT A) as a separate entity from the Ministry of Aeronautics with the 
sole purpose of developing the aircraft industry was a proof of the governrnent' s 
commitment to the new industry. As a result, Brazil set up the foundation of aerospace 
engineering training, focusing on a concrete mission of creating a competitive aircraft 
industry. This did not mean that Embraer was created with the sole purpose of producing 
military equipment. The decision of the Brazilian government to produce civil aircraft also 
played a decisive role in the development of the local aerospace industry, as after the 
privatization, Embraer became a major exporter of civil aircraft. Over the years, the 
company learned how to use the tools and the influence offered by the Brazilian 
governrnent to establish itself as one the world's main aircraft manufacturers. As one 
respondent put it, even though Embraer does not produce all parts and pieces of its aircraft 
in Brazil, what the company has achieved is much more remarkable: developing an 
incredibly well organized and efficient product line, based on the design of extremely 
complex products; outsourcing the production of severa! parts and pieces to contractors all 
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over the world and then assembling the final products to perfection, as the main civil 
aviation regulatory agencies in the world attest their compliance to safety regulations. 
Government 
Procurement (hostile or 
supportive of locally 
manufactured products 
and services) 
Although the Brazilian government was essential to the 
establishment of the local aerospace industry, the country now has a 
more hostile position towards the industry than the one it had in the 
1 past, as government procure ment is solely dictated by the lowest 
· priee, even for defence equipment. The industry states that the 
current policy does not favour investments in R&D. ln addition, Brazil 
has no official icies for defence acquisitions. 
Regarding infrastructure, support to SMEs and development of regional 
aerospace clusters, the Brazilian institutional environment does not favor the local 
aerospace industry. Brazil hasan increasingly failing transportation infrastructure and yet 
there is little coordination in the government investments to improve the quality and 
capacity of local airports- an investment that could have a positive impact in the local 
aerospace industry. According to one interviewee, the aerospace industry, as most of the 
private sector in Brazil, deals with the government following a simple logic: "if the 
government cannot help us, it should at least do not disturb us. If the government is really 
willing to support the sector, it should concentrate its efforts in the further development of 
regional aviation both domestically and within South American countries, especially 
through the establishment of transportation hubs in smaller cities ofBrazil." Instead, MDIC 
and ABDI are committed to support the further development of the local supply chain, a 
strategy that will not likely happen for one simple reason: the lack of scale and the absence 
of another larger OEM within the local industry. Even with the emergence and further 
development ofHelibnis, it is very unlikely that the local supply chain (which is formed 
mostly by SMEs) will ever be as large and competitive as that of the United States, Canada 
or Europe. As an example, the interviewee cites the acquisition of Celma, a local 
manufacturer that was bought by GE in 2006 with the promise that GE would make 
extensive investments in the country to manufacture turbines locally. Instead, according to 
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the interviewee, GE actually dismantled the manufacturing line of Celma and decided to 
concentrate the local re sources on MRO services for turbines manufactured abroad. T o 
make matters worse, the two main air companies (GOL and TAM) do not operate any 
Embraer aircraft and they probably will not buy them in the future, not even with official 
support, as both companies prefer to keep maintenance costs down operating a few models 
from EADS/ Airbus and Boeing. 
Infrastructure (hostile or 
supportive of 
investments to improve 
infrastructures, promote 
the development of 
regional aerospace 
clusters and to promote 
the creation of SM Es) 
Brazil has a hostile environment for private businesses in terms of 
infrastructure. The country has chronic deficiencies in transportation 
infrastructure, which is dated and inadequate. There are limited 
investments in energy generation, and there are few investments in 
PPPs. Legislation concerning investments in infrastructure lacks 
transparency, and as a consequence, few investors feel confident 
enough to fund new projects. The country still has a great pent up 
demand for infrastructures. Regarding SM Es & the development of 
regional aerospace clusters: apart from isolated initiatives from the 
Sao Paulo state government, Brazil has no policies on regional support 
to aerospace. SEBRAE is a federal agency designed to support SM Es, 
but the country has no fic programs for aerospace. 
Concerning the financing mechanisms and export credits (including taxation and 
foreign trade legislation) initiatives impacting the local aerospace industry, all 
interviewees share similar opinions about the role ofBNDES in the international success of 
Embraer: the Brazilian government is supportive of the local industry in terms of financial 
mechanisms and exports credits. In addition, the Brazilian Agency for Industrial 
Development (ABDI) is currently coordinating a task force together with BNDES to 
strengthen the Brazilian supply chain, with specifie credit lines: 1) for aerospace companies 
willing to export (in the pre-shipping and post-shipping operations, and facilitating sales in 
foreign markets); and 2) financing development of aerospace products and services based 
on the risk-partnership model. The original program was completed in June 2010 with a 
budget of BRL $100 million and it was set to be renewed, depending on industrial 
cooperation agreements within the sector. Other measures coordinated by ABDI Aerospace 
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Industry team include the offer of fiscal incentives for the establishment of local dealers of 
aerospace raw materials; the further development of RET AERO (the 
Special Tax Incentives for the Brazilian Aerospace Industry), which aims at the 
modemization of fiscal and customs procedures applied to the sector. The idea behind 
RET AERO is to eliminate fiscal asymmetries between the Brazilian industry and its foreign 
competitors. ABDI also understands that a better customs framework for the industry can 
facilitate and improve the insertion of Brazilian aerospace products and services in the 
global market, but the agency recognizes that the legislation conceming the industry still 
has to be altered (ABDI, 2010). 
In addition, MDIC is committed to sign specifie free-trade agreements for the 
aerospace industry with other South American countries. The Ministry has also organized 
studies for the aerospace industry aiming at the improvement of the fiscal legislation and 
customs procedures that affect the industry, together with the design of strategie financing 
of programs and projects for the sector. The Brazilian Federal Governrnent has also 
designed specifie mechanisms to reduce taxes in different stages of production and to 
reduce import taxes for members of the industry, such as the Recoflnitiative (which 
roughly translates as the "Industrial Bonded Warehouse Customs Regime Initiative"), and 
the exemption of the PIS/Pasep and Co fins import taxes for the who le manufacturing stages 
of aircraft. Even though these financial incentives (together with the ProEx prograrn) are 
the subject oftrade disputes between Brazil and Canada at the WTO, the general 
understanding in Brazil is that these measures were put in place to compensate the losses in 
the industry resulting from the country's heavy tax system, the lack oftransparency of the 
regulatory environment, and other structural deficiencies that translate into high interest 
rates for credit operations. In addition, Brazil considers that Canada was equally favoring 
Bombardier, only in a more efficient manner, as part of its tax breaks for R&D programs 
and EDC financial support for sales (BNDES, 2007; Figueiredo et al., 2008; Celli Junior, 
2010; MDIC, 2010). 
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On a positive note, one representative from ABDI said that the WTO disputes with 
Canada served to educate the industry on how to seek legal assistance on international 
forums: both the government and the private sector are now better prepared for future 
disputes. The industry became more aware of international law and now seeks constant 
assistance from the govemment in the resolution of international disputes, including the 
assistance of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), which was deeply involved 
in the Embraer-Bombardier case and has extensive knowledge in international agreements. 
In addition, as the same interviewee points out, Brazil is nowa well-established democracy: 
there is more awareness concerning the fight against corruption; there is freedom of press 
and people are more informed toda y than ever. 
, Financing and Export 
The Brazilian government is supportive of the industry when it co mes 
to export credits: BNDES financing plays a vital role in the sales of 
Embraer, especially in its experts. Regarding taxation, the country has 
an erratic tax system and the government is surprisingly strong when it 
cames to tax collecting, as Brazil has a heavy tax system and the 
Federal Revenue Agency is one of the strongest agencies in the 
country. The tax system lacks transparency, taxes are collected over ali 
stages of production, and changes in the legislation are not always 
clear nor discussed at length before being approved. Regarding foreign 
trade legislation, wh ile the presence of the government is strong in 
terms of foreign trade legislation, excessive bureaucracy and complex 
regulations make it difficult for Brazilian companies to export. There 
are also structural problems and bottlenecks in the country's port, 
airports, roads and railway systems, which ali jeopardize the country's 
Credits (hostile or 
supportive mechanisms 
· to internai and external 
sales of the industry; 
. erratic or predictable tax 
system; hostile or 
supportive foreign trade 
legislation) 
fore trade. 
When it cornes to regulation and legal framework, Brazil has a strong regulatory 
system, even though the country is still adjusting its regulatory model and sorne regulatory 
agencies stilllack a clear mandate, a consistent budget and an independent board of 
directors. Regarding the country's legal framework, sorne interviewees share the 
perception that the performance of the Judicial Branch and the current mechanisms oflaw 
enforcement have limited impact in the perfmmance and further development of the local 
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aerospace industry. One interviewee pointed out that the Judicial Branch is undergoing 
sorne major structural reforms, including high investments in IT, aiming at the 
modemization of the judicial system. On the other hand, even though there have be en 
recent improvements, most interviewees recognize that Brazil still has a long way ahead 
fighting organized crime and corruption; and improving the off er of public services, 
including public safety. The interviewees also share a point of view re garding the industry 
and the Judicial Branch: they point out that the aerospace has little concems over the 
deficiencies of the judicial system, and as far as the government agencies dealing with the 
Aerospace Industries Association of Brazil (AIAB) are concemed, the industry never 
brought any negative feedback to the govemment about the judicial system. 
Nevertheless, as one interviewee appropriately put it, the negative impact of a weak 
Judicial Branch cannat be measured by taking only one specifie industry into consideration, 
as a weakjustice system is never limited to one industry. In general, private firms will 
charge more for their products and services in order to compensate for the high legal costs 
of doing business in Brazil. According to a representative from the Federal Govemment, 
the weak legal system ( combined with poor law enforcement) and the heavy taxation 
system are the main obstacles for business expansion in the country. In addition, as another 
govemment official sees it, the main problem of the Brazilianjudicial branch is that it is 
very slow. A legal dispute in a Brazilian court can take over 10 years to be ruled, with 
numerous possibilities to appeal from a decision. In addition, corruption within the system 
is another matter of concem, with several cases of economie power influencing a legal 
decision reported in the last decade. As a result, citizens and companies sometimes do not 
even bother to seek legal assistance to solve their disputes. For companies, the problem is 
even worse, as the legal bureaucracy associated with opening and closing a business in 
Brazil hurts the economie activity. 
Conceming the poor law enforcement in Brazil, sorne interviewees pointed out that 
sin ce the country is a federative republic, part of that responsibility lays in the hands of 
State Governments, who do not necessarily coordinate their law enforcement efforts with 
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the Federal Government. In addition, the same lack of coordination applies for education 
and health care policies within the country. Finally, interviewees also agree that the country 
needs to improve the control of its borders with neighbouring countries and customs 
services. 
Regulation and Legal 
Framework (erratic or 
predictable laws and 
rules; weak or strong law 
enforcement 
mechanisms) 
When it comes to the regulatory agencies, Brazil offers a supportive 
environment for businesses, as most regulatory agencies are fairly 
independent. ANAC follows the determinations of the FAA and JAA. 
However, regulatory agencies still lack transparency and a precise 
delimitation of the ir functions. Brazil still needs to integrate its civil 
aviation industry in a global scale -the country is closed to foreign 
carriers in the domestic routes. Regarding labour legislation: the cost 
(in form of taxes, benefits and social contributions) of creating a new 
job is estimated to be at al most 100% of the sa lary to be pa id for that 
position. lt is difficult to hire new workers, the working hours are not 
flexible, and it is costly to dismiss workers. As a result, there are a high 
number of unregistered and autonomous workers, with limited access 
to 
The fact that Embraer established itself as one of the main OEMs in the global 
aerospace market despite all the deficiencies of the Brazilian institutional environment is 
remarkable. As pointed out by Pearce (200 1 ), wh en faced with environment challenges, 
independent organizations can operate independently of direct government dictate. While 
most organizations depend on and reflect the government directives applying to the place 
where they do business, independent organizations - as exemplified by Embraer operating 
in Brazil- are free to set their own goals and objectives, rather than pursue those imposed 
on them by governments. After its privatization, Embraer managed to succeed in a 
nonfacilitative environment in part because the company decided to cover the gaps of the 
institutional environment in Brazil: the company established risk partnerships with foreign 
investors (managing sorne of the risk associated with financing new aircraft models), 
invested heavily in R&D, and focused on exports rather than domestic sales as its main 
source of income. While it is undeniable that the Brazilian government offers valuable 
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support to the external sales (through BNDES), there is little doubt ofEmbraer's own 
merits in succeeding in a business environrnent that it fairly hostile and erratic, dealing with 
a governrnent that can be both qui te strong ( e.g. the tax collection system) or 
disappointingly weak ( e.g. the judicial system). 
The success of the Embraer business model is qui te obvious - the company was 
developed and supported by the Brazilian government over several decades, only to grow 
larger and stronger after it was privatized. However, there is one question we should ask 
ourselves: does the Brazilian government have the ability to replicate that model to other 
industries, oris Embraer (and by extrapolation, the Brazilian aerospace industry) a one and 
only example of a truly competitive business initiative supported by the Federal 
Governrnent? If the answer to that question is positive, the further development of He li bras 
and the production of a genuine Brazilian helicopter should not pose a major challenge to 
the Brazilian governrnent. Ideally, the Federal Governrnent should examine the Embraer 
example closely, in order to replicate the positive initiatives and avoid past mistakes to 
support other industries in Brazil. 
Considering the current environment and business conditions for the industry, one 
may say that the Brazilian aerospace sector is strong and competitive in the international 
market, even though there is a lack of public poli ci es for the sector, credit lines, and support 
to local suppliers. The Brazilian supply chain is weak and its improvement is not perceived 
as governrnent priority, although the official position may tell otherwise. There should be 
stronger policies regarding governrnent purchases from the local industry, further 
development of the supply chain, credit lines, support to SMEs, and attraction of foreign 
investment. 
In Canada, the institutional environment of Que bec and the rest of Canada also had 
a decisive role in the development of the local aerospace industry. During the interviews 
with representatives of governrnent agencies, industry associations, the private sector and 
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academia, a unanimous opinion among the interviewees presented itself: Canada has a very 
stable institutional framework and a very solid, stable business environment. 
Representatives from the private sector agree that both Quebec and Canada have an 
institutional environment that is favourable to business. Representatives from Bombardier, 
AQA and AIAC ali stated that government at the federal and provinciallevels show great 
commitment and offer strong support to the industry, translating in a relationship of mutual 
trust. The private sector feels that govemment policies for the industry are consistent, stable 
and comply with international regulations, while a good institutional framework gives 
credibility to both the government and the industry. However, one interviewee stated that 
while supportive ofthe industry, the leve! of public support to Canadian aerospace is 
moderate. The same interviewee stated that the resolve of the Chinese government to enter 
the aerospace industry is a good example of strong government support to the development 
of a specifie economie sector. Besicles China, both Embraer and Bombardier see the 
determination of the governments of other counties (e.g. Russia, Japan) in entering in the 
regional aviation market as a considerable threat to their market positions and a challenge 
to their de-facto duopoly. 
In terms oflntellectual Property rights, the representatives from the Federal 
Government state that the private sector is in general satisfied with the current legislation 
on IP - in addition to being satisfied with the legislation on foreign direct investment, and 
mergers and acquisitions ( e.g. the Competition Act, the Investment Canada Act, etc). As a 
result, these issues are not a source of concern within the industry. However, according to a 
representative from Bombardier, the IP legislation still requires sorne fine-tuning, as the 
industry would like the Canadian legislation to be more integrated with that of the U.S. In 
any case, the sector feels that the government is supportive of the local industry in IP 
disputes involving Canadian firms. 
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lntellectual Property 
(erratic or predictable 
legislation; weak or 
strong mechanisms to 
fight piracy) 
Canada has a predictable legislation on IP rights. One issue that the 
industry would like to be improved is IP in the context of collaborative 
networks often remains at university level, as there is a lack of pre-
establish IP agreements. Canada is a strong state when it cames to 
combating IP rights infringements. 
Besicles a stronger institutional environment, the Canadian aerospace industry 
benefits from a more organized government structure supporting the industry, especially in 
tenns of investments in R&D and the higher education system. This is an industry that 
thrives on high technology and innovation, and the Bombardier example shows that high 
investments in R&D always pay off. The Canadian government should continue its support 
to the industry - especially through its R&D programs, by expanding and making them 
available to the SMEs at the base of the producer' s pyramid. 
lnvestments in R&D 
(hostile or supportive of 
investments in R&D, 
education and human 
resources training) 
Canada has a supportive govemment in teïms of investments in R&D: 
the SR&ED program is a good tool to finance R&D activities in the 
industry, with provincial variations across Canada. There are many 
R&D programs coordinated by federal and provincial governments, 
universities, the industry, and research centers. Public funding is 
considered to be crucial to the R&D initiatives of the industry. CTA and 
CRIAQ are successful examples of federal and provincial initiatives to 
support training and educational programs for the industry. Rapid 
demographie changes associated with the retirement of baby-boomers 
pose an HR challenge to the industry. 
While there is no question of the importance of government procurement to the 
development of the industry and the supportive position ofthe Canadian govemment, 
interviewees suggested that the amount spent by the Federal Government in defence 
equipment is modest, compared to other OECD countries. However, the Canadian 
aerospace industry does profit from the defence purchases of other govemments, especially 
the U.S., through partnerships with U.S. suppliers of defence equipment. Respondents 
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agree that contracts between the govemment and private businesses are respected in 
Canada, even though private firms know that official procurement can be withdrawn in 
times of government transitions. In fact, it has happened in the past and it is not unlikely to 
happen ag ain, but companies are aware that the se are the rules of the game. Similar 
responses were collected both from federal and provincial officiais, reflecting the perceived 
stability of Que bec to the rest of Canada. 
Government 
Procurement (hostile or 
supportive of locally 
manufactured products 
and services) 
The Canadian government is supportive of the local aerospace industry 
in terms of government procurement. The Federal Government 
expects to re-equip the Canadian Forces in the near future, replacing 
its older Hercules fleet. The private sector considers that government 
procurement still has to improve its strategie coordination to offer 
further support to the local industry. 
On the other hand, there is also a consensus among respondents that as a free-
market econorny, the State cannot be the primary supplier of goods and services. Y et, 
interviewees agree that in terms of infrastructure, public services, public security, and 
welfare, the Canadian govemment is more present than that of the United States. Canada 
has a good network of public services and they are perceived as part of the Canadian life. 
When compared to Canada, Brazil is geographically isolated from the rest of the global 
industry, a factor that can translate in higher costs for foreign manufacturers- especially 
when the available infrastructure is inadequate. By contrast, as more than one Canadian 
interviewee said it, one of the reasons that the Canadian supply chain is so strong is that it 
is close enough to the American market and the infrastructure that is available to the 
industry to export its product is adequate. 
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Infrastructure (hostile or 
supportive of 
investments to improve 
infrastructures, promote 
the development of 
regional aerospace 
clusters and to promote 
the creation of SM Es) 
The Canadian governments (at the federal and provinciallevels) have 
been supportive of the private sector in terms of infrastructure. The 
country's good infrastructure was crucial to the establishment of the 
Montreal aerospace cluster. The main challenge the Canadian 
government has to face concerning infrastructure is the costs to 
maintain and re pair the aging infrastructures of the country. As for 
SM Es & regional support to the industry: the OSME and Canada 
Economie Development for Quebec Regions are federal agencies 
aiming at the support and development of SM Es in aerospace, assisting 
them in governmental procurement processes. However, SMEs 
complain that obtaining federal assistance is a lengthy, bureaucratie 
process, and they are discouraged by ali the required paperwork. 
Besides strong support from Quebec, aerospace also receives sorne 
support from other provincial governments. 
As for issues related to financing mechanisms and export credits available to the 
industry (including the support to SMEs), the macroeconomie policies of the Canadian 
government are a factor oflittle concern to the industry, according to the interviewees. As 
the Bank of Canada is the ultimate decision-maker on changes in the interest and exchange 
rates, private firms know that there is little room to negotiate with other federal agencies 
involved with the sector. As the United States is the main economie partner of Canada, 
Canadian firrns have learned long ago how the exchange and interest rates affect their 
businesses, including in their decisions to renew their machinery and capital goods. But 
even in this case, according to the representative from MDEIE, the government is aware 
that companies need to have favorable financial conditions to invest in new capital goods, 
otherwise the country risks to compromise its productivity. On a different note, according 
to a representative from an industry association, the government should improve its 
mechanisms to offer financial support for SMEs to renew their capital goods in 
programmed intervals. Finally, as the respondent from Bombardier put it, the private sector 
has developed sorne mechanisms to edge the risks associated with fluctuations in the 
exchange rate. Other than that, as far as economie policies are concerned, FDI is considered 
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to be an integral part ofCanadian industries (and the private sector), as the country's 
economy is deeply intertwined with the United States. 
The SMEs within the industry know that they play an important role in the local 
supply chain, but they feel that the official financial support at the base ofthe producer's 
pyramid is still scarce. As an example, the respondent from an industry association cited 
that applying for the SADI program grants is virtually impossible for SMEs, given the 
complexity of the paperwork associated with the pro gram. In addition, the government 
should improve existing and/or implement new policies to attract more SMEs to reinforce 
the supply chain within the industry. The industry is also concerned about the participation 
of SMEs in the sales of deferree equipment to the government. 
Financing and Export 
Credits (hostile or 
supportive mechanisms 
to internai and external 
sales of the industry; 
erratic or predictable tax 
system; hostile or 
supportive foreign trade 
legislation) 
Interviewees agree that the Federal Government is supportive of the 
industry: EDC plays a similar role of BNDES in the export and financing 
of Canadian aircraft. However, Canadian taxpayers are more vigilant 
about government spending than Brazilian ones, a fact that can li mit 
the a mount of public mo ney supporting the industry. Regarding 
taxation, Canada has a predictable tax system and the State is strong in 
its mandate of collecting taxes. Even though the tax system is not a 
major concern for the Canadian aerospace firms, the private sector 
advocates for tax reforms that would address issues such as cuts on 
capital taxes and corporate income tax; and smoothing corporate tax 
rate increases for SM Es. At the regionallevel, Quebec has a good tax 
system for new investments, when compared to other provinces of 
Canada. ln terms of foreign trade legislation, Canada has supportive 
foreign trade legislation: besides NAFT A, Canada has free trade 
agreements with severa! countries. ln addition, Canada advocates for 
freer trade through the WTO Do ha Development Round. 
Regarding regulation and legal framework, respondents share a similar view of 
the regulatory system of Canada: it is predictable and stable. In addition, the country has 
good law enforcement mechanisms, which is a key factor to determine the state as strong in 
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terms of its legal framework. Interviewees also agree that the Canadian judicial system is 
perceived as strong, independent, and fully functional. The industry has no specifie needs 
from the judicial branch; and while judicial costs can be high, especially for SMEs, the 
system is in general affordable. In addition, conflict resolution chambers are an alternative 
to costly judicial disputes. There is no doubt of the strength ofCanada's democracy, respect 
for human rights and private property, which are, in fact, so strong and stable that the 
private sector does not even worry about institutional changes in these areas. It is a 
common opinion among respondents that changes in the institutional framework are 
discussed at large before they come into action, so everyone affected by such changes is 
well aware of new rules and regulations, while tools such as the Access to Information Act 
is a powerful mean to control the support of the government to the industry. 
At the provinciallevel, the provincial judicial system is strong and independent and 
the legal framework of Quebec offers favourable conditions for private businesses, 
according to a representative from the provincial government. There have been only a few 
labour disputes in the past 30 years, which is a sign of a stable labour environment. Even 
though Quebec (and as a consequence, Canada) has a high labour cost for the industry, the 
respondent from Bombardier says that this is part of the game: the private firms established 
in Quebec do consider that labour costs are high, but they are aware that the industry 
employs high skilled workers, who will always demand high salaries. As a result, the sector 
knows that it is impossible to avoid high labour costs. 
There is also a common opinion among the Canadian interviewees about the labour 
regulation: Canada has good regulatory mechanisms of the labour force and the private 
sector is not concerned about labour legislation. Even the workers of the sector seem to be 
satisfied with the current labour regulations, as the private sector has no history of conflict 
with unions or worker's associations. According to the representative from the Quebec 
govemment, one of the reasons, in his perception, of the success of the Montreal aerospace 
cluster is that Quebec labour laws are more favourable to business than in the rest of 
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Canada or in the U.S., a factor that contributes to the decision of companies to establish 
their businesses in the province. 
Crime and corruption are not tolerated and the government is constantly fighting 
both. As a result, poli ti cians are well aware of the risks of engaging in corrupt acts. As a 
matter of fact, as one to representatives from AJAC put it, the tolerance for corruption is so 
low that it occasionally interferes in the activities of legitimate groups such as AIAC and 
AQA, in the sense that they need to register as lobby organizations and have to be careful in 
their dealings with government officiais. As a consequence, the associations are required to 
keep records oftheir interactions with the government and are subject to the regulations 
that apply to alllobby organizations. 
Regulation and Legal 
Framework (erratic or 
predictable laws and 
rules; weak or strong law 
enforcement 
mechanisms) 
Regulations are predictable and the government has strong 
mechanisms to enforce the law. Transport Canada is the federal 
agency responsible for civil aviation regulation and it works in 
cooperation with the FÂÂ and other internationai reguiatory bodies. 
The industry has a good relationship with TC and there is good 
communication on the establishment of new rules and regulations 
concerning aerospace. Regarding labour legislation: just like in Brazil, 
there is no specifie labour legislation for the aerospace industry in 
Canada. Quebec, where most of the Canadian industry is located, ranks 
in fourth place when its labour costs are compared to other provinces 
(considering the minimum wage and labour taxes); and labour 
legislation (orientation of labour laws, influence and leverage of 
certain unions; and level of bureaucracy/paperwork associated with 
regular employment or job openings). 
Regarding the private companies within the sector, Bombardier is such an 
emblematic and important firm to the Canadian aerospace industry because it has emerged 
as the most successful business from the Canadian effort to build a competitive aerospace 
industry. The local aerospace industry is the result of an industrial policy aimed at creating 
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a Canadian industrial capability and increasing the country' s ability to encompass 
externalities within national borders. Bombardier is also emblematic in its role as the 
leading force of the Montreal aerospace cluster, which is also considered to be a broader 
success ofthe country's public policy for the aerospace industry. Of course the government 
has extremely high expectations for the sector, after all the money that was invested over 
the years in the development of national aerospace powerhouses. Bombardier is among the 
50 largest exporting companies of Canada, which is a relatively small group of firms for the 
bulk of the country's exports. The pressure is even higher because many ofthese exporting 
firms do not enjoy commanding positions in high-technology sectors. As the respondent 
from Bombardier sa ys, apart from small adjustments in specifie points of the poli ci es 
supporting the local aerospace industry, the private sector seems to enjoy a positive 
relationship with the Canadian governrnent. Other interviewees suggested that there is a 
high degree of mutual trust and openness between the public and private sectors, which 
translates into a supportive environrnent for business and into positive economie dividends 
for Canada and its citizens. 
Despite their commercial disputes and overall competition, Bombardier and 
Embraer have indeed much in common. Within the industry, both firrns are perceived as 
well-run companies with strong and consistent strategies for the regional aviation market. 
Both companies benefited from strong, imaginative leadership, which contributed to 
produce excellent relations with each country' s po licy decision-makers: the governrnents of 
Brazil and Canada consider the two companies as indispensable parts of the ir national 
economies, generating thousands of jobs and bringing millions of dollars to each country 
every year. Both firms are connected as they both identified the potentials of the regional 
jet market ahead oftheir rivais. As a consequence oftheir status, in spite oftheir low 
employment contribution, these firrns have considerable political weight. 
A difference that is symptomatic of an institutional environrnent less developed in 
Brazil than in Canada is the perception among private businesses that the best way the 
governrnent can support them is by staying out of their way, as one Brazilian respondent 
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put it. IfBrazil really wants to move forward and have a more prominent role in the world 
economy, the government needs to start addressing these structural deficiencies 
immediately. Finally, both Brazil and Canada have a tradition of govemment intervention 
in the economy, combined with nervousness about the influence of the United States over 
both their domestic economies and the international trading system. In their efforts to 
support their local aerospace industries, both govemments absorbed debt and provided 
other means of financial support to their aerospace champions. The willingness of Canada 
and Brazil to defend Bombardier and Embraer is a clear sign that the two govemments, 
while embracing liberalisation, are not willing to disregard the nationality of 
intemationalised firms. It is clear that both Canada and Brazil consider the aerospace 
industry to be a cornerstone of their technology policies and neither is willing to abandon 
the field or give sorne space to their competitors. 
In the course of our research and during the interviews with representatives from 
governmental agencies from both countries and members of the aerospace industry, we 
concluded that the governments ofboth Brazil and Canada are facilitative oftheir 
aerospace industries. Both govemments are suppotiive of independent organizations within 
the aerospace sector and both govemments have fairly predictable policies, laws and 
regulations, despite the big gap between their institutional environments. 
As we have shown in this report, the quality of the institutional environment has a 
direct impact in the business environment of a country. In our example, it is clear that 
Canada has a stronger govemment, more solid institutions, and efficient mechanisms to 
guarantee the enforcement of its laws and regulations. Brazil, on the other hand, is 
perceived as a somewhat strong State, with relatively strong and stable institutions, a 
vibrant economy and social indicators that have been consistently improving in the past 30 
years. However, the country still has sorne pressing issues to address in terms of law 
enforcement, fairness and reliability of the justice system, fighting corruption, and 
diminishing the staggering gaps in wealth distribution, to name just a few of the problems 
that are still preventing the country to be a fully developed world economy. 
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As a reflex of its more advanced and organized institutional environment , the 
Canadian govemment support to its aerospace industry is more consistent and embracing 
and better coordinated th an that of the Brazilian government. As figures 11 through 15 
show, while the Canadian Federal Government bas at least 15 agencies involved in the 
development of its aerospace industry, the Brazilian government bas only 8 federal 
agencies directly involved with the sector. To make matters even worse, the coordination 
between the Brazilian agencies is weak and somehow disconnected from the real needs of 
the industry. Right now, one of the top priorities ofthe Brazilian government for the sector 
is the expansion of the local supply chain, even though it is clear that the industry is not 
mature enough to have a second major OEM operating in the country. The fact that sorne of 
the Brazilian govemment officiais interviewed are confident that the local supply chain bas 
the potential to grow to the point that even turbines could be made in Brazil may be a bit 
too much optimistic. The country's technological environment may never be advanced 
enough to attract major players within the global industry for such high and risky 
investments. 
For Canada, while the institutional environment does not pose a threat to the private 
sector, the obvious challenge is to diversify its economie partners and not depend so much 
on the health of the U.S. economy. As shown in this report, the other crucial issue to be 
addressed in the country is the demographie changes that will occur with the retirement of 
baby-boomers and the ability of companies to replace them and train the new generation of 
workers. Bombardier bas a solid support system in the Montreal aerospace cluster, 
especially in terms of investments (both private and public) in R&D and professional 
training, and the company mostly likely will continue to be stable, profitable, and 
innovative for many years to come. The Canadian aerospace sector as a whole will mostly 
likely to continue to profit from its proximity to the U.S. and the highly integration between 
the supply chains of both countries. 
One major difference that reflects level of development of the industry in both 
countries is the investments in education and R&D. Brazillacks a serious, long-term 
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educational po licy and the federal universities have a long history of lack of investments in 
both infrastructure and personnel. The little interaction between universities and the private 
sector also compromises the quality of the higher education system, as there is a gap 
between the skills and qualifications in demand by private fi1ms and the curricula of the 
universities and other training centers. As there is no question that highly qualified 
personnel will always be in demand by the aerospace industry, both in Canada and Brazil, 
the differences in the quality of the education they receive in each country plays a central 
role in the amount of innovation, higher productivity, and the ability to adapt to changes to 
economie adversities that differentiates these two great nations. 
As a Brazilian citizen, it is easy to understand the pride Brazil takes in Embraer and 
the importance of the company as a flagship model of the industrial capacity ofthe country. 
The company is a constant reminder that Brazil can offer more to the world thanjust 
commodities and good music. Unfortunately, until the institutional improvements that the 
country needs so badly are in place, there are slim chances that the success of Embraer can 
applied to other Brazilian manufacturers or industrial sectors. Until such institutional 
adjustments take place, the mostly likely scenario for Embraer is to continue on its proven 
path to success: as little dependence from the government as possible (with the exception of 
the export credit lines), private funding ofR&D initiatives, and a strong focus on extemal 
sales. 
The aerospace industry has an enmmous capacity to expand in Brazil, given the 
recent increases in the numbers of passengers flying for the first time and willing to become 
frequent users of civil aviation services in Brazil. Who knows if Embraer would be able to 
supply all the aircraft needed if other regional hubs were to be developed in Brazil? There 
is no question of the size of unexplored markets and the growth potential, they are beyond 
promising but the real challenge lays in the following question: what are the basic 
requirements in terms of knowledge and capacity to adapt necessary to survive in an 
institutional environment that is anything but obvious? Would it be possible for Canadian 
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SMEs within the industry to increase their presence in Brazil and avoid the current risks 
and threats associated with the current institutional environment? 
It is our hope that this report could open the door to a collaborative approach 
between Brazil and Canada in the aerospace industry. In order to answer the questions 
above, it is necessary to further investigate the growth potential for Embraer and 
Bombardier in Brazil; and the viability of a collaborative approach between Brazil and 
Canada to further develop their aerospace industries- including joint investments in R&D, 
expansion of educational exchanges and training programs, and a combined strategy to 
address the imminent competition of China and Russia in the regional aviation market. 
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The problem to be investigated: 
"What aspects of the institutional environment and which public poli ci es of Brazil and 
Canada have the greatest impact in the development of independent economie 
organizations of the aerospace industry of both countries?" 
Objectives ofthe research: 
1. To identify the aspects of the institutional environment of Brazil and Canada which 
qualify their governments as facilitative or nonfacilitative of the economie 
independent organizations in the aerospace industry. 
2. To identify how the independent economie organizations of the aerospace industry 
in Brazil and Canada relate to the institutional environment of each country in order 
to enhance their positions in terms of business performance, profitability, market 
share, and other indicators of business development. 
3. To identify the perception of government representatives, aerospace industry 
associations, regulatory agencies, and private businesses about the effects of public 
poli ci es in the development of independent economie organizations in the aerospace 
industry of Brazil and Canada. 
4. To compare and describe the similarities and differences between Brazil and 
Canada concerning the institutional environment, the relationships between business 
and government organizations resulting from this environment, and the influences 
of public poli ci es in the development of aerospace industry of both countries. 
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Initial introduction and greetings to the interviewees. 
l'rn a student ofthe Master Program in International Public Administration at École 
nationale d'administration publique- ENAP Montreal. My research project is a 
comparative study based on the aerospace industries of Brazil and Canada that seeks to 
identify which aspects of the institutional environment of both countries will qualify their 
governments as facilitative or nonfacilitative of the independent economie organizations. 
Y ou were selected to collaborate with this proj ect because (exp lain the reas ons wh y the 
person was selected) and for that reason, I would like to interview you. I would like to 
request your permission to record this interview, so that I can take the most advantage of 
our conversation. This research project is being conducted for academie purposes only and 
it is one of the requirements to obtain my degree at the ENAP Masters pro gram. 
If you agree to collaborate with this research project, I would like to stress the 
following points: 1) you can, at any time, refuse to answer any of the questions that may 
embarrass you in any way; 2) you may refuse to take part in this research project and you 
do not need to justify your reasons; 3) you may have access to the results of this study, if 
you wish; and the access to the results is unconditional to your participation in this project. 
I would like to stress that there will not be any type of identification of the 
interviewees that may cause you an embarrassment or uncomfortable situation. There is no 
right or wrong answers. What matters the most to this project is your own perception about 
the questions that I will ask you. The questions are organized in a pre-determined order that 
may be changed in response to the answers of all interviewees taking part in this study. 
After this brief presentation, I would like to start our interview, which has an 
estimated time of 35 minutes. 
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1. How do you perceive the Canadian institutional framework in terms of its legal 
stability ( e.g. sudden changes in the legislation, respect of contacts, and 
independence of the judicial system) and what is the impact of this 
stability/instability in the economie development of the country? 
2. Would you please make sorne comments on the relevance of the Canadian 
government investments in infrastructure, including energy, education, 
telecommunications, R&D, and transportation (roads, railroads, ports, and airports), 
etc., and the impact of the current Canadian infrastructure in the development of the 
aerospace industry? 
3. In your opinion, to what extent does the government of Canada can influence the 
Canadian aerospace industry? In answering this question, please bear in mind the 
ability of the State in the decision making process of private businesses in terms of 
investment, business expansion, employment, internai and external sales, pricing 
policies, mergers and acquisitions; and salaries. 
4. What is the impact of the current economie policies of the Canadian government (in 
terms of the interest rates, exchange rate, inflation, etc.) in the development of the 
aerospace industry of Canada? 
5. W ould y ou please make sorne comments about the Canadian legislation related to 
the following fields: intellectual property, private investment (including foreign 
direct investment- FDI), monopolies, taxation, and work regulation; and its impact 
on the aerospace industry? 
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6. Considering the taxation structure of Canada, would you please make sorne 
comments on the impact of the current level of taxation applied for the aerospace 
industry in Canada? What are the positive and negative aspects of the taxes applied 
to the Canadian aerospace industry? 
7. Would you please make sorne comments about the Canadian Judicial Branch, based 
on the following criteria: faimess/impartiality, honesty, agility (time), costs 
( affordable ), and consistency/reliability? 
8. In your opinion, how capable is the Canadian government in terms of law 
enforcement and punishments to those who break the law? How this ability/inability 
of the Canadian govemment affects the industrial/economic development of the 
country? 
9. How do you evaluate the presence ofthe government in terms of respect to private 
property, public safety, fight against organized crime and corruption, supply of 
quality public services, etc? 
1 O. How do you perce ive the performance ofthe Canadian government as a regulator 
(through several regulating agencies) of the private economie activity in Canada? 
11. Based on your general knowledge, would you please make a comparison between 
the Canadian and the Brazilian aerospace industries and the role that the 
government of each country has as a promoter of economie and industrial 
development? 
12. This is the end of our interview. Please feel free to make any additional comments 
or statements about the role of the Canadian government and the private 
organizations of the aerospace industry. 
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Summarized Transcripts of the Interviews 
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Interviewee 1 - Ministry of Development, lndustry and Foreign Trade- Brasilia 
Question 1: The Brazilian institutional framework is considered to be stable - members of 
the Brazilian Association of Aerospace Industries do not consider the institutional 
framework as a threat to their businesses. 
Question 2: Brazil has a good airport infrastructure, even though it's not expanding at the 
same rate of the rest of the economy - this problem could be solved in part by developing 
regional hubs in smaller cities. 
Question 3: There are no specifie policies for the government acquisitions for defence (nor 
minimum percentage of parts made in Brazil). The government should promo te more joint-
ventures and cooperative projects with foreign manufacturers. The govemment should 
support more R&D initiatives. 
Question 4: The govemment is more focused on how to further develop the local supply 
chain than on issues related to the exchange rate. As the Ministry sees it, the exchange rate 
is not a major concem of the industry. There is room for improvement in FDI, taxation and 
logistics & infrastructures. 
Question 5: Brazil has high labour costs, especially compared to those of Mexico and other 
Asian countries - there are no specifie labour laws for the industry and this is unlikely to 
change. There are good laws on IP, but there is no culture among companies of patent 
depositing. There are no policies covering technological cooperation. The industry could 
benefit from a po licy to enhance the abilities of SMEs, which pla ys a crucial role in the 
industry but lacks sorne expertise and the capacity to innovate. 
Question 6: The taxation system that is in place tends to favour companies on the Tier 1 of 
the production chain and it penalizes the final purchaser of the aircraft (who pays most 
taxes). Most Tier 1 companies are from foreign countries and they usually benefit from 
financial support from their home governments. The RET AERO program aims to correct 
this distortion and it was a government response to a request from the industry. However, 
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the government understands that fiscal benefits alone cannot improve the performance of 
the industry, it is also important to improve our competitiveness. 
Question 7: The Judicial Branch is not a major concern among the members of the 
aerospace industry in Brazil. 
Question 8: Law enforcement does not play a major role in the aerospace industry in 
Brazil. 
Question 9: IP protection, public safety, organized crime, corruption fighting and the offer 
of public services do not play a major role in the aerospace industry in Brazil. 
Question 10: ANAC is the agency responsible for ticket pricing, airport fees, and signing 
bilateral agreements with foreign countries or companies operating in Brazil. There are no 
specifie policies for foreign companies flying to Brazil or Brazilian companies flying 
abroad. There should be further integration with the Latin American markets. The 
government should improve the regulatory framework concerning deferree purchases 
aiming at the further development of the supply chain in Brazil. 
Question 11: Canada is better equipped to in v est in innovation. Besicles Bombardier and 
Bell Helicopter, Canada has several OEMs that play a major role in the world industry. 
Quebec has a strong aerospace cluster and Canada has a better support system for R&D, 
funded by both provincial and the Federal Governments. BNDES is studying the Canadian 
R&D financial support programs and may replicate them in Brazil. Embraer still depends 
excessively on foreign parts. The Brazilian supply chain can only further develop (to level 
with the Canadian counterpart) with massive investments in R&D. 
Interviewee 2 - Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade- Brasilia 
Question 1: Ever since the creation of Embraer and its privatization in 1994, the Brazilian 
government is committed to the aerospace industry - so the institutional framework 
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connected to the sector is as stable as possible. The priority right now is to further develop 
the supply chain (Helibras). The Brazilian government is constantly comparing the 
institutional framework of other major players in the industry in order to offer a similar 
reality in Brazil. Although the institutional framework is stable, this is an industry that is 
very susceptible to the economie environment, at both local and international scales. 
Question 2: The main infrastructure connected to the industry is that of airports- other 
infrastructure aspects have an impact on the overall costs of operating in Brazil. One of the 
reasons the government offers financial support to the industry is to compensate the lack of 
a strong supply chain in the country. For example, Brazil has little to none suppliers of 
aerospace steel and for that reason, the industry depends on the priees set by foreign 
suppliers. If a second Tier 1 integrator (Helibras) cornes into the industry, it would be easier 
to justify the establishment of a supplier of aerospace steel in the country. 
Question 3: There is no direct interference on issues related to compensation. The industry 
traditionally needs government support to finance the development and selling of aircraft. 
Defence purchases can play a major role in the industry. BNUES has a major role in the 
relationship of the government and private business- through its credit lines, the bank can 
boost the sales of local companies. 
Question 4: The main variable regarding economie policies is the exchange rate, since the 
Brazilian industry still depends extensively on imported parts. Devaluating the Brazilian 
currency would have a very negative impact on the industry. 
Question 5: The legislation concerning IP is fairly good, even though Brazil has no 
tradition in investing in innovation, patent registration and R&D. However, this problem is 
not exclusive of the aerospace industry- all industries in Brazil have a weak performance in 
te1ms of innovation and R&D. 
Question 6: The taxation system is heavy and harmful to the industry. Taxes are collected 
over all stages of production, which will impact on the final priee of products. It's hard for 
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the government to have a taxation policy exclusive to the aerospace industry; any benefits 
given to one specifie industry should apply to ali others. Taxes also have a negative impact 
on the industrial policies created by the Brazilian government. 
Question 7: The Brazilianjudicial system is heavy, expensive and the access toit is 
difficult. The :flaws of the system have negative impacts in all industries in Brazil. One 
main impact is on the priee of goods and services: companies tend charge more to 
compensate their judicial costs. The fraillegal framework also has an impact on financial 
support to the industry: private banks generally do not offer credit lines to the aerospace 
sector. 
Question 8: As a re:flection of the problems in the judicial system, the law enforcement in 
Brazil is somewhat weak. The two main challenges for private businesses in Brazil are the 
judicial and the taxation systems. As mentioned before, this has an impact on the priees of 
goods and services, as companies transfer those extra costs to its consumers. 
Question 9: IP protection, public safety, organized crime, corruption fighting and the offer 
of public services do not play a major role in the aerospace industry in Brazil. As Brazil is a 
federative republic, each state has its own policies concerning public safety, education, 
health care, etc. However, it is well known in Brazil that there is room for improvements at 
both the quality of public services and the percentage of the population that have access to 
them. 
Question 10: Ideally, the Brazilian government would work only as a regulator of the 
private sector in the country, as opposed to the role of a supplier of goods and services. 
There is now a counter-movement to the 1980-1990s privatization waves and the 
government is reinforcing its presence in economie activities. However, this movement is 
not being observed in the aerospace industry. 
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Question 11: The Canadian government (at provincial and federallevels) gives a more 
significant financial support toits aerospace industry. The Canadian supply chain benefits 
from its proximity to the USA market. 
Question 12: The Brazilian government hasan industrial policy aiming at 32 different 
sectors of the industry. Aerospace should not be considered as a simple industry, as it also 
has a significant impact on defence and national security policies - There should not be a 
distinction between civil and military aviation, in terms of industrial support to aerospace. 
The main focus of the Brazilian government is on the strength and further development of 
the supply chain. Considering the aerospace industry, the Brazilian government is 
supportive of the independent organization, predictable and strong. 
Interviewee 3 - Brazilian Agency for Industrial Development - Brasilia 
Question 1: The Brazilian government is suppmiive ofthe aerospace industry. Embraer 
was created as an extension of the research investment started with IT A and CT A. The 
government showed its support through the bilateral agreements signed between Brazil and 
Italy (AMX) and Argentina (CBA 123). The HTA consortium and the financial support to 
extemal sales (BNDES) also show the commitment of the government to the sector. The 
current policies for the industry are considered to be stable (mature) and the govemment 
seeks to have an open channel of communication with the industry. The govemment 
compares the support given to the industry by other major players and tries to implement 
similar initiatives in Brazil. 
Question 2: The Brazilian aerospace industry is concentrated in Sao José dos Campos, an 
area that has good infrastructure in comparison to the rest of the country. There is easy 
access to airports, training centers and universities, etc. There is a constant flow of 
investment in the region (main industrial hub in Brazil). Sorne modem labs and research 
centers are available, but there is need to invest more in the modernization of the existing 
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infrastructure. Even with the infrastructural disadvantages, Embraer performance is equal to 
that of other major players in the industry. 
Question 3: There is little to none interference on how plivate organizations conduct their 
businesses in the sector. The main areas of influence are HR training, R&D, adjustments in 
the taxation system and financial support to exports. BNDES is focusing on sorne R&D 
programs to strengthen SMEs. There are also programs aiming at the enhancement of the 
productivity and technological development of the sector. Other than that, the Brazilian 
government has a golden share at Embraer, with veto power over defence-related issues. 
Question 4: Economie policies have a relevant impact on the industry. BNDES has offered 
sorne financial supp01i to the export of Embraer aircraft, after the 2007/2008 economie 
crisis. The Brazilian government is trying to reduce the interest rates in order to improve 
the business environment in the country - and it still needs to be further reduced. As most 
of the production ofthe industry is exported, the government seeks to improve economie 
conditions that have a positive impact on foreign trade. Exchange rate is one of the reasons 
for the OMC disputes between Brazil and Canada. 
Question 5: There is good legislation on IP, but there is no tradition or a culture of patent 
registration in Brazil. ANAC (civil aviation) usually follows the recommendations of the 
F AA and JAA. Local manufacturers working with foreign partners may actually lose IP on 
products developed locally resulting from local adaptation to an imported part or 
machinery. ABDI and INPI are trying to improve the IP legislation and awareness in the 
,industry. There is a lack of resources in the Brazilian agencies responsible for IP in the 
country. BNDES is seeking to perfect the lending mechanism for foreign buyers of 
Brazilian aircraft. There is rigid labour legislation in place, with high indirect labour costs. 
Hiring foreign professionals ( specialists) should be an easier process. 
Question 6: Brazil is working closely with the OECD and WTO to conect fiscal 
discrepancies in the sector and equalize it with other major players in the industry. The 
Brazilian government created the RET AERO pro gram in order to extend fiscal benefits to 
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SMEs working in the industry, in order to strengthen its supply chain; part of these fiscal 
incentives is meant to correct productivity disadvantages of local manufacturers resulting 
from a lack of HR training. Tax breaks for R&D actions is seen as a positive long-term 
investment in the further development of the industry. 
Question 7: ABDI never had any negative feedback from the industry concerning the 
judicial branch. There is a governmental effort to modernize the judicial branch, with 
investments in the digitization of processes and massive acquisition of IT equipment. There 
has been a constant improvement in the Brazilian courts in the last decade. The WTO 
disputes with Canada served to educate the industry on how to seek legal assistance on 
international forums: both the govemment and the businesses are now better prepared for 
future disputes. The industry is now more aware of international law and seeks constant 
assistance from the government in helping members of the industry settling commercial 
disputes. 
Question 8: The Brazilian government has good capacity to enforce the law- the problem 
is that there are several ways to appeal from a decision and it can take years before a finai 
verdict is ruled. Brazil is growing at high rates and fast speed, so the government 
sometimes lack the capacity to invest in the judicial system at the same pace. The Ministry 
of Justice has a special agency (CADE) that rules over industrial disputes. Brazil still needs 
to improve its image overseas ( e.g. international credibility over issues such as the Gol 
accident in 2006). 
Question 9: Brazil has recently invested in the modernization of its police force at both 
federal and state levels. There is more awareness concerning the fight against corruption. 
There is freedom of press and people are more informed toda y than ev er. There is room for 
improvement in controlling the borders with neighbouring countries and customs services. 
Question 10: ANAC is directly responsible for certifying new aircraft. There are also the 
Civil Aviation Secretariat (MD) and Infraero (airports). ANAC works closely with the FAA 
in order to determine the safety standards for the industry. 
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Question 11: The Brazilian government has prepared a benchmark study to compare its 
industry to that of Canada, aiming at the further development of the Brazilian supply chain. 
SMEs in Canada can receive more fiscal benefits than companies in the 1 st ti er (as a result 
of the WTO disputes). Canada has better support mechanisms for SMEs than Brazil, 
including R&D facilities financed by the government. The Brazilian legislation currently 
prevents the government from implementing similar initiatives in the country. The Ministry 
of Industry is currently studying ways to create R&D centers in Brazil to further support 
PMEs in the aerospace sector. 
Question 12: The Brazilian government is committed to support independent economie 
organizations through ABDI. Brazil is trying to consolidate its institutional framework and 
its repercussions on private organizations and business transactions. A sign of the latest 
advancements is the specifie ABDI policies for the aerospace industry. The government is 
also seeking to consolidate and narrow clown its relationship with the industry. Right now, 
the industry is still recovering from the 2007/08 economie crisis, but its overall situation is 
satisfactory. 
Interviewee 4 - Brazilian Development Bank- Rio de Janeiro 
Question 1: Brazil has improved the stability of its institutional framework since the return 
of democratie governments. Changes in the tax legislation have the most impact on the 
aerospace industry. Contracts are respected and the economie stability is a reflection of the 
stable institutional environment. Brazil understands that a stable institutional framework is 
requirement for economie development. 
Question 2: Brazil is experiencing a major investment cycle in infrastructure, especially 
hydroelectricity, roads, and ports. The government is establishing PPPs to co-finance these 
works. Aerospace is not so dependent on the physical current infrastructure - what is more 
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crucial is the R&D infrastructure, which is still weak: in Brazil. Embraer is the main sponsor 
ofR&D programs in the industry, but it is still not enough. 
Question 3: Considering the performance ofEmbraer, government hasan important role in 
the industry, but it is not the main element of Embraer's success. The government has a 
major inducing role in all economie activities- and in the case of aerospace, it wants to 
strengthen the supply chain and enhance the aggregate value of the parts and aircraft made 
in Brazil. BNDES is committed to support the export ofBrazilian products/aircraft. The 
government does not interfere on pricing policies. Regarding monopolies and 
acquisitions/mergers: the government knows that a stronger supply chain and higher gains 
of scale will only be possible with bigger players. 
Question 4: The current policy on inflation targets is harmful to all industries. Brazilian 
high interest rates, combined with an exchange rate that is permanently high reduce the 
competitiveness of the industry in terms of relative priees. 
Question 5: Brazil has good legislation on IP, but there is no tradition in the industry 
concerning patents. FDI: Brazil has adequate legislation to attract foreign investment, but in 
the end, each company will choose foreign partners to establishjoint-ventures. CADE is the 
agency responsible for regulating monopolies and unfair practices. Taxes: this is a 
problematic issue, with taxes being collected in all stages of production - RET AERO is 
aiming at fixing the distortions in the industry. Labour laws could be modemized to 
facilitate hiring/dismissing employees in the industry. 
Question 6: It is possible that Embraer may pay more taxes on a part that is made locally 
than on one that is imported, given sorne current tax incentives. There is a work group that 
is pushing the regulation of RET AERO in order to correct the se flaws. In general, the tax 
legislation has negative impacts on the industry. 
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Question 7: In general terms, the Brazilian judicial bran ch is fair and honest, but it is not 
fast. There are endless possibilities to appeal from a sentence and as a result, the system is 
slow. 
Question 8: The government is capable of enforcing the law. However, in certain 
occasions, society does not adhere to a specifie law, as people don't see it as a 
fair/reasonable rule. Because the justice system is so slow, individuals who break the law 
tend not to won·y about possible punishments- and even if they are punished, they can 
appeal from the sentence. 
Question 9: There are different levels of responsibility - the federal and state governments 
are each responsible for sorne items. The Federal Government is improving the quality of 
the services that it provides nationwide. Brazil still needs to improve its ability to fight 
organized crime, and it is doing so as a consequence of its economie growth. The Ministry 
of De fen ce is conducting studies to purchase new, modern equipment to fight crime in 
Brazil. 
Question 10: After the privatization processes started in the 1990s, Brazil established 
severa} regulatory agencies - they are still "young" institutions and they are still 
establishing their field of action. At this time, the agencies are investing in attracting and 
training talent in order to improve their work. Over time, the agencies will play an 
important role in the economie development of Brazil. 
Question 11: The Canadian supply chain is stronger than the Brazilian, including the 
Canadian ability to manufacture engines, for example. Canadian competences are more 
complex and more developed. Both governments play a decisive role in the success of the ir 
industries - Canada gives more support to R&D than Brazil. EDC is also an important 
element of the Canadian industry and even though BNDES gives financial support to the 
exp01i of Brazilian aircraft, it is not as strong and constant as that offered by EDC to 
foreign buyers of Canadian parts and aircraft (Brazil cun-ently observes the WTO & OECD 
treaties and regulations concerning financial support to the aerospace industry). 
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Interviewees 5 & 6- National Agency of Civil Aviation- Brasilia & Montreal 
(Delegate of the Agency at ICAO) 
Question 1: ANAC symbolizes the Brazilian government message to the aerospace 
industry (civil aviation) that it has a stable institutional environment. The government 
wants to be transparent and have a stable regulatory environment. All changes in the 
framework are supposed to be discussed in a broad level - the agencies try to be an open 
communication channel between government and industries. In Brazil, institutional changes 
are a complex and long process. Contracts are by large respected in Brazil. Better 
environment today than 10 years ago. Brazil is getting ready to have a stronger voice in 
international forums. 
Question 2: Economie stability after 1995 translated into new investments in infrastructure. 
15 years later, one can say that it' s still not enough time to rebuilt or modernize it. How to 
finance new infrastructure? Through PPPs. Some investments are not attractive to private 
sector, so the government has to finance them. Airport infrastructure is still weak, but it's 
improving, but Brazil still has a long way ahead. There have been recent investments in air-
traffic control. Financial resources (Infraero) need to be better managed. Aerospace is not 
so dependent on physical infrastructure and improvements on infrastructure to the sector 
are less cost consuming than in other industries. Investments in HR training and R&D still 
very low, but it's improving (ITA & Co.). Ideally, Brazil should duplicate its current 
infrastructure every 2 years to keep up its economie growth. 
Question 3: Governments play an important role in aerospace. Ali four main global players 
depend on government financing. BNDES is the main financer ofEmbraer exports. WTO 
disputes are a consequence of government support to the industry. Embraer hasan 
advantage over SMEs in receiving government funds. Government acquisitions ( defence) 
play a major role in the performance of aerospace companies. Brazil should have legislation 
inspired on the Buy American Act to propel national industry. CADE works in a 
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transparent way and Brazil has good mechanisms to control mergers and acquisitions. 
Regarding pricing strategies, the government does not interfere in this matter. 
Question 4: Inflation is under control. The foreign debt has been paid. BNDES has a 
straightforward and daring po licy for the sector. Inflation-targets policy is not harmful to 
the sector. Exchange rate is harmful to the sector and the government is slow in managing 
it. In general, government makes good choices, but it is just too slow to react at the moment 
businesses need a change. Interest rates works as a discouragement to any industrial activity 
in Brazil. Brazil has one of the highest interest rates of the world and the government do es 
not have a plausible explanation to that. 
Question 5: Labour legislation is obsolete and it is almost impossible to change it. 
Question 6: Brazil needs to reform its fiscal legislation- it doesn't make sense to have 
heavy taxes on labour in a country that needs more jobs. Brazil has good tax legislation for 
the aerospace industry. Taxes are also at a satisfactory level for civil aviation. In 
comparison to other sectors of the economy, aerospace has a lower taxation level over it. 
Certain segments of the sector still pa y high taxes. 
Question 7: The judicial branch is independent, and even though it has sorne problems, it is 
functional, but not effective. The main problem of the judicial branch is that it's very slow. 
A dispute in a Brazilian court can take 1 0 years or more to be ruled. Corruption is another 
factor of concern. Because the system is so slow, people sometimes don't even bother to 
seek legal assistance to solve a problem. The legal bureaucracy associated with opening and 
closing a business in Brazil hurts the economie activity. 
Question 8: Law enforcement is still weak in Brazil. It's imperative that Brazil fights 
corruption and promotes a major reform in the judicial system if it wants to be seen as a 
developed country. Judges need to pass on the message that the system works and that 
people can rely on the justice to settle their legal problems. 
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Question 9: The state is present in rnatters of protection ofprivate property. Police 
apparatus has rnuch irnproved in the past 10-20 years. Fight against organized crime and 
corruption has also irnproved. Corruption is not anyrnore acceptable in police forces. There 
are even sorne excessive actions in the Federal Police investigations. Again, the system 
needs to be more agile. 
Question 10: ANAC, in conjunction with FAA sets security standards for the industry. 
Security standards are now more rigid that those ofiCAO's. Brazil is still developing a 
regulatory agency culture; the govemrnent still needs to evolve its capacity as a regulator. 
ANAC works in a satisfactory way and in general, cornpanies follow its resolutions. A 
good regulatory agency has two basic responsibilities: observe (control) the market and 
regulate it. There are sorne distortions in the Brazilian rnodel: sorne agencies collect more 
rnoney than their "parent" rninistries. ANAC has a good legislation behind it; it is on the 
right track to train its personnel; it has a reasonable system to select and replace ( over tirne) 
its board of directors; and it is fairly (self) funded. 
Question 11: Canada has a higher level of financial support to its aerospace industry. 
Canada benefits from its proxirnity to the U.S. and its pmiicipation on NATO (the defence 
segment of the industry). Canada also has a more advanced space pro gram, which benefits 
all segments of the aerospace industry. Brazil should invest more on defence and the 
acquisition of fighter jets. 
Question 12: HR training, reinforcernent of the educational system, and more investrnents 
in R&D are pararnount to the future success of Brazilian industrial activities. In cornparison 
to Canada, Brazillacks huge investrnents on HR training. 
Interviewee 7- University of Brasilia -Brasilia 
Question 1: The industrial poli ci es for the aerospace sector are very weak - ABDI has 
lirnited resources, limited personnel and limited freedom to manage industrial policies. It 
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basically prepares reports that are most important to politicians, with few practical results 
for private businesses. Most oftheir studies are filled with positive suggestions to fmiher 
develop all industrial activity in Brazil, but they are out of synch with the market. The 
industrial policy designed by the MDIC is not feasible: you can't have 30+ different sectors 
of the economy targeted as "priority." 
Question 2: Investments in R&D are concentrated in the Sao José dos Campos area, but 
Embraer is the main investor in R&D - government funding is still very scarce. 
Question 3: Strong dependence on governmental support: R&D, financing, acquisitions for 
defence pm-poses. The industry cannot survive without government support. 
Question 4: Embraer depends on the BNDES credit lines to export its planes= it's the same 
business model of the Eximbank, EDC, and the EU, but the issue is still controversial 
(WTO disputes) 
Question 6: The Brazilian tax system is harmful to ali industrial activities and for that 
reason, the govemment put in place the tax incentive programs (RET AERO) and other 
mechanisms (BNDES) to support the industry. Ifwe compare the amount oftaxes over 
aircraft made by Bombardier and Embraer, Bombardier will pay fewer taxes than Embraer. 
Question 9: To the industry, the best approach is "ifyou can't help us, you should at least 
do not disturb us." 
Question 10: Brazilian regional aviation has a great potential to expand and reinforce the 
industry. The government should support the establishment of transportation hubs in 
smaller cities. 
Question 11: Embraer has al ways had its focus on the external markets - the government 
suppo1i was essential for the success of its extemal sales. The main source of income of 
Embraer is the extemal markets, not the government. The govemment has been present 
ever since = P&D before the privatization, BNDES support to foreign sales after 
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privatization. International partnerships (AMX) were crucial to the learning process of 
Embraer (risk partnerships). Embraer doesn't need governrnent money anymore to design 
new aircraft. The focus ofEmbraer is turning to defence. Canada supply chain benefits 
from its proximity to the U.S. market. Canadian support is stronger because the industry is 
stronger in Canada- better supply chain, for instance. 
Question 12: The further development of the Brazilian supply chain is unlikely to happen: 
there is no other major OEM in the area to justify the investment. The percentage of parts 
made in Brazil that is sold to foreign OEM is negligible. TAM and Gol would not buy 
Embraer aircraft even if the governrnent offered financial support to bu y them: they pre fer 
to keep maintenance costs down with a few models from EADS/ Airbus & Boeing. 
Initiatives such as GE buying a plant to manufacture turbines in Brazil were seen as a 
positive sign of a stronger supply chain, but in fact, nothing happened so far. 
Interviewee 8 - Ministry of Economie Development, Innovation and Export Trade-
Montreal 
Question 1: Canada and Que bec have very stable institutional frameworks. The judicial 
framework is a favourable environrnent for private businesses. Few labour disputes in the 
past 30 years, so it's safe to say that the labour environrnent is stable. Contracts can be 
withdrawn in times of governrnent transitions; it has been in the past and it is not unusual to 
happen in such times. 
Question 2: Canada's investment in infrastructure is equivalent to other OECD countries. 
Aerospace has no specifie needs in terrns of physical infrastructure. Que bec is committed to 
renew aging infrastructures. Quebec has a great power matrix and it's a point of advantage 
to the industry. Costs of building new hydro plants are increasing, but aerospace in not 
energy intensive. Telecommunications is not an issue for this sector. Education and R&D 
are advantage factors in Quebec and the challenge is to keep up the trend and train enough 
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people each year. Demographie changes (retirement) is a concern. Investments in R&D 
must be constant and it's a long-term investment, so governmental support is not unusual. 
Question 3: Deferree acquisitions play an important role in the performance of the industry. 
Canadian government has been buying substantial quantities of deferree equipment. 
Government support for R&D activities is justifiable because aerospace is source of high 
incomes and developing aircraft is expensive, but in the long term, the investment pays 
itself. Government has little power to interfere on business decisions, but it has been a long 
time supporter of the sector. No employment poli ci es for sector. EDC pla ys a major role in 
the exp01i of aircraft, but the support follows the WTO directives. There are no pricing 
policies or other interferences fi·om the government. The Competition Bureau oversees 
mergers and acquisitions, but aerospace is not a concern. The Federal Government has 
mechanisms to control FDI. 
Question 4: Economie policies are conducted by the Federal Government (Bank of 
Canada) and no industry benefits from special economie policies. Interest rate is higher 
than in the U.S. Comparues are adapted to a strong CAD dollar. Sorne companies waited 
too long to renew their equipment, profiting from a favourable exchange rate, which may 
also have influenced in the lower Canadian productivity. The trend of parity or quasi-parity 
will persist. 
Question 5: Quebec labour laws are more favourable to business than the rest of Canada 
and the U.S. Contracts are respected and they are not a source of problems to the industry. 
IP is regulated by the Federal Government and it is not a factor of concern. FDI is regulated 
by the Federal Government and the policies can change according to the party in power, but 
it is not a factor of concern. The Canadian economy is deeply intertwined with the U.S., so 
foreign direct investment is an integral pati of the Canadian industry. 
Question 6: Both the provincial and the federal tax system is favourable to the industry. 
There are fewer taxes over profits in Canada than in the U.S. Taxation is not a factor of 
concern for the members of AIAC/ AQA. Tax breaks for R&D play an important role in the 
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industry and are becoming more and more common in countries with major players in the 
industry (U.S., EU) 
Question 7: The judicial branch is strong, independent, and fully functional. Aerospace has 
no specifie needs from the judicial branch. Judicial costs can be high, especially for SMEs, 
but in general, the system is affordable. Conflict resolution chambers are an alternative to 
costly judicial disputes. 
Question 8: Canada has a strong law enforcement capacity and the government is strong. 
However, democracy is strong and Canada is far from being an oppressive regime. Private 
property is well recognized and respected in Canada. 
Question 9: There is a free-market economy in Canada; the state is not the primary supplier 
of goods and services. In terms of infrastructure, public services, public security, and 
welfare, Canadian government is more present than the U.S. There is a good network of 
public services and they are part of the Canadian life. Crime and corruption are not 
tolerated and the government is constantly fighting both. Politicians are well aware of the 
risks of engaging in corrupt acts. 
Question 10: Recent changes in the market suggest that foreign airlines will be allowed to 
serve domestic routes in North America and Europe. Regulatory agencies are mostly a 
federal responsibility. Mergers and acquisitions are usually approved. Quebec has more 
labour regulations than the rest of Canada, but there haven't been any significant disputes 
in the past two decades. 
Question 11: The most visible aspects of the competition between Brazil and Canada are 
the WTO disputes. Brazil is growi11g in importance in the aerospace sector and it has the 
potential to be a major player in the world industry. The Canadian industry is older and 
more developed than the Brazilian. Embraer benefited from the military government in its 
early developments. MDEIE follows the strategies ofEmbraer closely. Quebec is aware of 
the investments to diversify the Brazilian supply chain. Canada is aware that the Brazilian 
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govemment will invest more in defence in the future. Canada is not a major buyer of 
military equipment and most of its acquisitions are imported. Govemment support in the 
defence sector is crucial because most civil aircraft is an adaptation of military equipment. 
Question 12: CRIAQ is a concise way to explain the suppmi of the Quebec govemment to 
the industry, as it's a forum to facilitate the communication between government, 
universities, and industry members. CAMAQ is a very effective forum that deals with HR 
and training issues. AQA and AIAC are impmiant parts of the dialogue between 
govemment and industry, together with AéroMontréal. MEDIE has a small staff dedicated 
to the aerospace sector, but it's very active and very effective. MDEIE's offices overseas are 
also committed to support the ex pmi of parts and planes made in Que bec. 
Interviewee 9 & 10- Industry Canada - Ottawa 
Question 1: Canada has a strong institutional framework, which is not a concem of the 
private sector. Canada has strong institutions. 
Question 2: There is a good infrastructure network that is part of the Canadian quality of 
life. In terms of maintenance of the infrastructure, the re is a shared responsibility between 
federal and provincial govemments. The recent Economie Action Plan is part of a federal 
initiative to improve the general infrastructure ofthe country. No industry is favoured in 
terms of investments in infrastructure. 
Question 3: Limited influence: focus mainly on the business environment (innovation, 
productivity, R&D). IC focuses on the legal aspects of the market, such as Competition 
Act, Investment Canada Act, etc. Other agencies involved in the industry are: DF AIT, 
Business Development Bank of Canada, National Defence, Transpmi Canada, EDC 
(federal), and MDEIE (Quebec) and Depatiment oflndustry (Ontario). Also NRC 
collaborates with universities and provincial govemments on training issues 
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Question 4: Interest & ex change rates, together with inflation targets are all set by the Bank 
of Canada, which is independent ofthe PM's Office. As most ofthe transactions in the 
aerospace industry are conducted in U.S. $,the exchange rate is the most important aspect 
of the economie policies. Higher ex change rates meant that companies had to in v est more 
in innovation, productivity, and continued investment 
Question 5: The legal framework is strong. Competition Act is a strong piece of 
legislation. Investment Canada Act reviews the mandate ofFDI in the country. Patent Act 
deals with IP. None ofthese issues is a major source of concern in the aerospace industry. 
IP is not a factor of concern among the members of the industry - the IP legislation is 
effective. IP protection is primarily provided by the Patent Act - it sets out what can and 
cannot be patented in Canada, the process for obtaining a Canadian patent, and enforcement 
provisions for the protection of patent rights in Canada. 
Question 6: There is no specifie tax regime for the aerospace sector. Canada bas one of the 
lowest new investment tax rates in the G7. Canada has expmt sales financing mechanisms-
through EDC, which is governed by the Aircraft Sector Understanding (OECD). The level 
of taxation is not an issue with the companies applying for the SADI pro gram. 
Question 7: Canada bas a strong, independent and full y functional judicial branch. The 
legal framework of Canada is not a source of concern in the aerospace industry. 
Question 8: Canada has strong mechanisms to enforce the law. Law enforcement is not a 
concern in the industry. 
Question 9: Institutions such as the RCMP, DFAIT, and CIDA are collaborating with the 
govemments of Afghanistan, Haiti and other countries, in an effort to improve their 
institutional framework. 
Question 10: Transport Canada is the agency responsible for regulating civil aviation. It 
works closely with F AA and EASA and it maintains high security standards. 
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Question 11: Industry Canada has limited knowledge of the Brazilian aerospace sec tor. 
Bombardier and Embraer compete in the same regional aircraft market and Embraer has a 
strong reputation in the world market. IC seeks to collaborate with its Brazilian 
counterparts in the industry, especially in ways to minimize the threat of new entrants 
(China, Russia) in the market. The strength of the supply chain in both countries is also a 
topic for further collaboration. 
Question 12: IC is aware of a possible HR shortage in the near future and it's been 
devising policies to address the future needs of the industry- but education is mainly in the 
hands of provincial govemments. The FMP Initiative is an example of collaboration 
between the government and the industry, together with AIAC. 
Interviewee 11 - lndustry Canada - Ottawa 
Question 2: lnvestments in infrastructure are shared between the federal and provincial 
govemments. Federally regulated areas (airports, ports, railways) are funded by the Federal 
Government. Education, health care, local transit, energy and highways and roads are 
funded by the provinces. Economie Action Plain is an example of a federal program to 
finance new infra. No specifie infrastructure programs for aerospace sector. 
Question 3: Industry Canada and its SADI program are an important source ofR&D 
financing, especially for SMEs. The government doesn't make any distinction between 
grants given for military or civil aviation programs. There is very limited direct influence 
over private firms. AU companies are privately owned. The Competition Act is one 
example of legislation goveming marketplace practices, it prevents anti-competitive 
practices. 
Question 4: The exchange rate has a major impact on all manufacturing in Canada. A high 
valued dollar can make things difficult for the manufacturing sector as it makes products 
less competitive intemationally. It also creates pressure for innovation and improvement 
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and this helps manufacturing in the longer-term. Since the Canadian aerospace industry is 
highly export oriented, the nature of economie policies abroad has a major impact on the 
sector. 
Question 5: The Competition Act is the government tool that deals with conspiracies 
against competition, bid-rigging, abuse of dominant position, exclusive dealing, market 
restrictions, refusai to deal, and priee maintenance. The Investment Canada Act requires a 
review of significant FDI in Canada. It applies to new investments in Canada and the 
acquisition of control of existing Canadian business. There have been no major concems 
raised by the aerospace industry about patent protection in Canada. There have been no 
major competition issues in the Canadian aerospace industry. 
Question 10: The main regulatory authority for the aerospace industry in Canada is 
Transport Canada. It has responsibility for aircraft certification and ongoing airworthiness 
of aircraft. 
Question 11: Brazil and Canada have "sister" aerospace industries: both depend heavily on 
exports. Embraer has more domestic recognition than_ Bombardier. Canada should increase 
domestic awareness of its aerospace industry. The supply chain is more integrated in 
Canada. 
Interviewee 12 - Bombardier- Montreal 
Question 1: The govemment shows great support to the industry. It's a relationship of 
mutual trust. Canada has a stable legal framework. Government policies for the industry are 
consistent, stable and comply with international regulations. A good institutional 
framework gives credibility to both the govemment and the industry. Access to Information 
Act is a powerful tool to control the support of the government to the industry. 
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Question 2: The support offered by the Canadian government to R&D projects is of crucial 
importance to the development of the industry. The government is always keen on 
promoting the ideals that make the country move forward. Govemment is doing a great job 
expanding and maintaining the existing infrastructure. 
Question 3: The govemment of Canada, through IC, has been supporting the industry for 
sorne time, as the industry generates high revenues and creates high profile jobs in Canada. 
Govemment does support the industry, but it's the companies that make the final decisions. 
Government supports the exports of Canadian products and should continue to do it. 
Bombardier keeps the government informed of its projects, as it is considered to be a 
partner of the company. 
Question 4: The exchange rate is a factor of concem, but Bombardier has sorne mechanism 
to edge the risks associated with it. When the company is developing a new project, they 
always make multiple projections based on different economie realities to mitigate the risks 
associated with that project. 
Question 5: As a company, Bombardier follows the rules and laws of Canada, because it's 
the country that they've selected to do business in. Re garding IP, Canada should have 
stronger mechanisms to protect its IP rights- maybe Canada should follow U.S. IP laws 
more closely. There should be more dialogue between govemment and business in regards 
of better IP legislation. Even if the legislation is not strong enough, the government is still 
supportive of IP disputes involving Canadian firms. 
Question 6: Taxes associated with labour costs are high, but considering the high leve! of 
the professionals working in the industry, it is justifiable. High skilled workers will always 
have high costs associated with them. 
Question 10: Transpoti Canada has a high standard regulatory framework and Bombardier 
sees it as a reinforcing message of the safety associated with the industry. F AA has also an 
important role in the regulatory framework. It's important to comply with safety 
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requirements, even if it means complying with bureaucratie steps. Sometimes the safety 
regulations aren't reviewed as dynamically as they should, but in general, the government 
does a fair job within the regulatory agencies. 
Question 11: Both countries have top quality aerospace industries. Brazilian government 
support to the industry is stronger than that of Canada. Canadian government support to the 
industry has a higher level oftransparency, although Brazil claims to comply with 
international regulations on govemment support to the industry. In comparison to other 
emerging countries in the industry, Canada is never being accused to breach international 
agreements on official support to the industry. EDC and BNDES have similar roles in their 
support to the industry. 
Question 12: Bombardier regards both the federal and the provincial governments as 
partners and is happy to supply them with ali the information they need to improve their 
policies to the industry. The (possible) lack of qualified personnel is a worrisome factor, but 
Canada is not alone in this matter. Bombardier is keeping an eye on the future of the 
industry and on Embraer's strategies - also Russia and China are being observed. Canada 
and Brazil should combine forces to better understand the advances of new competitors in 
the industry. 
Interviewee 13- Association Québécoise de l'aérospatiale- Montreal 
Question 1: Canada has a strong, stable institutional framework and this environment is 
very favourable to businesses. 
Question 2: Physical infrastructure is not a factor of concern in the industry. There should 
be official programs to assist SMEs in renewing their machinery more often - similar to the 
German program. 
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Question 3: NRC-IRAP is an important program to support R&D programs in SMEs, but 
the support should be expanded. Access to Federal Government funding programs is 
complicated, especially for SMEs: requirements to apply for them should be simplified. 
Question 4: Companies are mostly satisfied with econ policies. There should be more 
access to credit, especially to SMEs. Economie conditions are fundamental in Canada's 
response to foreign competition: government should prevent companies from moving 
plants to "low cost" countries. 
Question 5: There is a certain degree offlexibility regarding mergers and acquisitions. 
There should be more programs to attract SMEs to reinforce the supply chain. Legislation 
governing military purchases should be further discussed in order to support local SMEs. 
AQA members would like to see a formai federal policy for the industry. Federal programs 
to support the industry should be more coordinated. OEMs are still the main target of 
government support. 
Question 6: Good taxation system in place, but there is room for improvement. Tax 
contributions are welcome, but they should consider the long ROI times of the industry. 
The EU has better tax credits mechanisms to support its industry. 
Questions 7 through 9: In general, Canada has a strong government. The law enforcement 
is strong in terms of IP. There is a high level of compliance with the WTO regulations, so 
this is not a problem to the industry. Corruption and other issues mentioned in the questions 
are not a concern either. 
Question 10: AQA members are satisfied with the domestic regulatory framework. The 
only sources of con cern are international agreements with foreign agencies ( e.g. F AA) and 
the impact they have on exports of Canadian aircraft and parts. Transport Canada is fairly 
in dependent on matters of regulating the industry. 
Question 11: Brazil has one large company - Embraer, and then a very small number of 
companies in the supply chain. So obviously, in Brazil there is not a significant "in-house" 
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participation in the supply chain and for that reason one can argue that the industry is not 
fully operational. This is not the case in Canada and this is a major difference. 
Question 12: AQA counts on government support to help SMEs expand in other markets. 
The major challenge of AQA is to attract SMEs into R&D. SMEs would like to enhance 
their transactions with OEMs and for that, they expect sorne government support. 
Government should work closely with the industry to prepare for possible HR shortages in 
the industry. Training programs and education should be a constant priority. 
Interviewee 14: Université du Québec à Montréal- Montreal 
Question 1: Government is stable and supportive of the private sector. There is a moderate 
level of public support to the sector. The arrivai of China, Russia and others will change the 
dynamics of the industry. The establishment ofthe Montreal cluster was a smart move from 
the Canadian government. 
Question 2: The lev el of public investment in infrastructure is considered to be adequate, 
though it can be considered moderate. Besicles the investment being made in infrastructure, 
the government is also investing in attracting qualified immigrants to work in the aerospace 
industry. 
Question 3: The subsidies offered to the industry (mainly from the Federal Government) 
gives the government sorne power to negotiate business decisions, especially in terrns of 
keeping production lin es (and jobs) in Canada, instead of relocating them to developing 
countries. 
Question 4: Both Brazil and Canada depend largely on the priee of commodities (natural 
resources) and for that reason, exchange rate is always a factor of concern. Right now, the 
Canadian dollar is very strong and this can bad for the industry. Interest rates, on the other 
hand, are very low. 
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Question 5: Canada does not have a specifie legislation for the aerospace industry- the 
government lets it to the industry to determine their IP strategies. It's really each company 
that will decide how deal with their IP issues (investment, patent registration, innovation, 
etc). There is no polie y in this area. 
Question 6: The tax credit programs (both provincial and federal) are an excellent way to 
finance R&D programs. Quebec invests more in R&D (through tax credits) than sorne 
countries. There are no specifie programs for the aerospace industry. 
Questions 7 through 9: There are no major problems in the system. Canada has a very 
stable institutional framework. Crime rates are very low, corruption is not a relevant issue 
(take note of the Transparency International Index). 
Question 10: The Conservative party traditionally doesn't have a strong regulatory role in 
private businesses. The Conservatives have a "laissez-faire" understanding of the market. 
Question 11: Brazil and Canada were very successful in supporting the ir aerospace 
industries. Brazil has a very strong in the world economy and its importance is growing 
remarkably. The PDP (MDIC) is very ambitious and hardly feasible. Canada is more 
selective and more focused on a few industries, which facilitates the government support. 
Apart from aerospace, Brazil has no remarkable industrial success story. Bombardier needs 
to succeed in the C-Series, otherwise it can be in serious financial problems. 
Question 12: New entrants will define the strategies ofBrazil and Canada in aerospace. 
Aerospace will al ways need government support. Most of the support in Canada cornes 
from the Federal Government. Quebec is supportive, but in terms offinancial resources, 
most of it cornes from Ottawa. Bombardier benefited from government support given to 
Canadian companies after the WWII to be in its current position. 
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Interviewees 15 & 16 - Aerospace Industries Association of Canada- Ottawa 
Question 1: Canada is a very stable country, especially the legal framework, and this 
reflects on good businesses in the industry. Changes in the institutional framework are 
discussed at large before coming into action. 
Question 2: The industry is not so dependent on physical infrastructure. There are 
governmental programs to support the development ofR&D infrastructure that are 
extremely beneficiai to the industry. 
Question 3: Government can influence through free trade agreements that can benefit the 
industry. As a large exporter, Canada could always benefit from free trade agreements- and 
that is one of the main concerns of AIAB members. The Que bec government is considered 
to be quite suppmtive of the industry. 
Question 4: Inflation is not a problem. The strong Canadian dollar is a factor of concern, as 
it makes Canadian exports less competitive. To compensate the !osses, companies invest in 
the improvement oftheir competitiveness. Aerospace is a long-term investment (with 
returns and profits lasting 30-40 years, as the life of a particular model), so investors need 
to have sorne degree of certainty. 
Question 5: Monopolies don't pose a threat in the industry. IP legislation is not totally 
clear. Sorne companies don't know how to protect their IP interests. The emergence of 
China in the industry poses questions about IP rights. Major players in the industry should 
address this question collectively. 
Question 6: Taxation levels Gust like the exchange rate) are considered to be high among 
AIAC members (especially when compared to the U.S.). AIAC has expressed its concerns 
to the government, but they haven't been addressed yet. The industry understands that the 
tax system will not change in the near future. DF AIT is committed to improve its support 
system to industry in this regard. 
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Question 7: Canada has a strong government, and the judicial bran ch is independent. 
Excessive legal requirements (as in the case oflobby organizations) can be costly and add 
bureaucracy to industry associations. 
Question 8: Corruption is not tolerated- and it's fought even to an obsessive level: the 
regulation on lobbying is considered to be very tight. 
Question 9: The state is present and strong and companies don't consider government 
agencies as a threat to businesses. 
Question 10: Transport Canada is the main regulator of the industry, and comparues 
established in Canada do pretty much what TC determines in terms of safety regulations. 
The industry has a good relationship with TC, which works close! y with F AA and EASA in 
matters of security regulations. AIAC has a good collaborative relationship with TC, F AA, 
and EASA. The "green airplane" is a factor of concern, as it can add high costs to the 
industry (as a result of environmental regulations). 
Question 11: The Canadian industry has both national companies and subsidiaries of 
foreign manufacturers. The supply chain in Canada is more developed than that ofBrazil. 
AIAC has a good relationship with AIAB (under the ICCAIA). Brazil has a reputation of 
good civil aviation services. Canada benefits from its proximity to the U.S. and it has a 
stronger supply chain. Embraer is a "de-facto" monopoly, while Canada has severa! 
companies in all tiers of the industry. The Canadian industry is more advanced and it 
invests more in innovation. 
Question 12: A future need oftrained personnel is a concern, but there are severa! 
programs to address the issue (e.g. CCAA). On the other hand, the retirement of baby-
boomers will pose a great challenge to ali Canada. Outsourcing is another major concern of 
the industry, especially to Latin America and Asia- Brazil should pay attention to this 
trend, as it can be equally lucrative and dangerous to the industry. AIAC members would 
like to have less government involvement (esp. regulations) in the industry. 
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